David Morlog

The accused was the victim of a drive-by shooting and sought refuge in his uncle's vehicle.

Police responded to a 911 call and administered first aid in a public parking lot.

The uncle informed police that the accused had brought a bag into the vehicle, which police searched and found to contain a loaded handgun and significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and oxycodone.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence, alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the police acted properly as first responders and the accused lacked standing to challenge the search.

On the trial proper, the court rejected the accused's testimony and found him guilty of all drug and firearm offences based on circumstantial evidence establishing knowledge and control.

The appellant, William Gillen, appealed his convictions for trafficking fentanyl, possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal focused on the trial judge’s instructions to the jury, specifically whether the judge usurped the jury’s fact-finding role, encouraged propensity reasoning, or permitted the jury to use text messages for a prohibited purpose.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s instructions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.

Uygar Kaan Celenk was convicted by a jury of possession of 1.35 kg of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and two firearm offences (possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of a firearm without a license/registration).

The Crown sought a 15-year prison sentence, while the Defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of fentanyl and the presence of a loaded prohibited firearm in a commercial vehicle, and mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, first-time offender status, rehabilitative potential, and childhood trauma.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, balanced with rehabilitation and restraint, the court imposed a global sentence of 13 years imprisonment, with 1 year of credit for pre-trial custody and other factors, resulting in a remaining sentence of 12 years.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year firearm prohibition and a DNA order.

The applicant, Christopher Punzo, charged with possession of cocaine for trafficking, sought the return of $80,620 in seized cash under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code to cover his legal expenses.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to satisfy the onus that he had no other assets or means available to meet his reasonable legal expenses.

The judge determined that the applicant had misrepresented his financial situation and possessed significant undisclosed funds and equity in a condominium, concluding that access to the seized funds was not "truly necessary."

The offender, a 35-year-old first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of trafficking one ounce of fentanyl to an undercover officer.

Despite her recent rehabilitation efforts, the court found she lacked insight into the gravity of the offence and played a key role as a broker in the transaction.

Emphasizing the lethal nature of fentanyl and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a four-year penitentiary term.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marihuana, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The evidence was obtained via a search warrant that contained an incorrect address, rendering it invalid.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding the breach minor due to good faith and no risk of entering the wrong house.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in minimizing the seriousness of the Charter breach but ultimately upheld the admission of the evidence based on a holistic application of the R. v. Grant factors.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's appeal of the three-and-a-half-year sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's sentencing approach.

The appellant, Bismark Barrett, appealed his 30-month sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He sought a conditional sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge took an unduly narrow view of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on inmates, specifically regarding the risk of infection and the negative impact of institutional measures like lockdowns and program suspensions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decision not to reduce the sentence based on Covid-19 related deprivations.

Jovane Jolly pleaded guilty to two counts of fentanyl trafficking.

The Crown sought an 11-year sentence, while the defence proposed 6 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of fentanyl trafficked (over 6 ounces), the offender's related criminal record, his disregard for human life by continuing to traffic after an overdose death, and committing offences while on bail.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, social context evidence regarding systemic discrimination as a Black man, presentence custody, time on restrictive bail, and rehabilitative prospects.

The court imposed a global penitentiary term of 9 years, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation while acknowledging the social context evidence's impact on moral responsibility.

The appellant, Timothy Byers, appealed convictions from 2014.

The appeal was case-managed due to persistent delays.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with court-ordered timelines for filing materials.

The appellant sought an adjournment, citing COVID-19 restrictions and recent retention of counsel, but the court found these excuses lacked merit and were an attempt to manipulate the process.

Applying the factors from R. v. Villanti, the court considered the extraordinary five-year delay, the appellant's conduct, and the Crown's diligence.

The court granted the Crown's motion, dismissing the appeal due to the appellant's persistent non-compliance and manipulation, emphasizing the importance of respecting court orders and the principle that "inaction has its price."

The accused brought an application to adjourn his joint jury trial for drug importation, scheduled to commence in less than three weeks, in order to retain counsel of choice.

The accused had previously discharged counsel and had been warned multiple times that the trial would proceed with or without counsel.

The court dismissed the adjournment application, finding that the accused had not acted diligently or in a bona fide manner to retain available counsel, and that the application was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the system to achieve a de facto severance from his co-accused.

The applicant, Shawn Tedder, faced charges of trafficking and possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He brought several pre-trial motions, including an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, an application to quash indictment counts under s. 601(1) of the Criminal Code alleging unconstitutionality of s. 5 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), various constitutional challenges to the medical marihuana regulatory schemes (MMAR, MMPR, ACMPR) and CDSA ss. 4, 5, and 6, and an application under s. 8 of the Charter for exclusion of evidence.

All of Tedder's applications were dismissed.

The court found no s. 11(b) violation, affirmed the validity of CDSA s. 5 offences despite regulatory changes, and rejected constitutional challenges due to an insufficient evidentiary record and established legal principles distinguishing medical users from commercial suppliers.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana under 3 kg for the purpose of trafficking.

He operated an illegal marijuana dispensary in Toronto that he claimed was intended to serve only medical users.

The Crown sought a $25,000 fine and two-year probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with one year of probation and 100 hours of community service, finding that while the operation posed risks of community harm, no actual harm occurred, the accused's motivation was primarily to help medical users, and he had ceased operations and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The Crown brought an application for directions regarding the procedure to review documents seized from the respondent's residence over which solicitor-client privilege was asserted.

The Crown proposed providing the respondent with a copy of the USB key containing the documents so she could identify privileged materials, while the defence argued for a third-party referee.

The court accepted the Crown's proposal, finding it sensible and protective of the respondent's rights as the privilege holder, and ordered the respondent to review the documents within 60 days.

The applicants, charged with arson and production of controlled substances, sought a Rowbotham order for state-funded counsel at their upcoming preliminary hearing after being refused Legal Aid.

The court found that while the applicants met the first criterion of being refused Legal Aid, there was uncertainty regarding their financial means due to support from family and friends.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application on the third criterion, concluding that representation at a preliminary hearing is not essential to a fair trial, and that a Rowbotham order at this stage is only available in exceptional circumstances.

The offender pled guilty to two counts of trafficking in hashish oil (shatter), a Schedule II substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offender sold single grams of shatter to an undercover police officer on three occasions for $70 each.

The Crown sought to establish aggravating factors related to production and manufacture of shatter, but the court dismissed the Crown's expert evidence application and found insufficient evidence of production involvement.

The offender was a youthful first offender with no criminal record who demonstrated genuine rehabilitation post-arrest, including pursuing law school studies.

The court imposed an absolute discharge, finding that a conviction would be disproportionately harsh given the minor nature of the offences, the offender's location at the bottom of the distribution chain, and his demonstrated rehabilitation and future professional prospects.

Four offenders with no prior criminal records were sentenced for their roles in a sophisticated commercial cocaine trafficking operation involving 43 kilograms of cocaine.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount principles for large-scale cocaine trafficking.

The directing mind received 12 years, a fully committed participant received 11 years, a trusted courier received 10 years (less pre-trial credit), and a minor participant whose vehicle was used received 6 years.

A forfeiture order was also made for the vehicle used in the offence.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from a police sergeant regarding the dangers associated with the production and consumption of cannabis concentrate ("shatter") as aggravating factors in sentencing for drug trafficking.

The defendant opposed the admission of this evidence.

The court conducted an admissibility voir dire and determined that the proposed expert evidence should not be received.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility under the Mohan test, particularly regarding relevance, necessity, and the qualifications of the proposed expert witness.

This criminal trial concerned a large-scale drug trafficking operation, 'Project Odyssey,' which led to the seizure of significant quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, and GHB.

Six defendants were arraigned, with one passing away during the trial.

The court addressed preliminary motions regarding confidential informant privilege and a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, both of which were dismissed.

The core issues at trial involved proving possession, knowledge, and intent for trafficking and importing charges, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied the principles of reasonable doubt and the Supreme Court's guidance on circumstantial evidence from *R. v. Villaroman*.

Ultimately, four defendants were convicted of trafficking, while one was fully acquitted.

Importing charges against two defendants were dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

The accused, Hai Thi Pham, was convicted of producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

She challenged the two and three-year mandatory minimum sentences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found both mandatory minimums grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios involving licensed production and mistakes of law, and thus unconstitutional under s. 12 and not saved by s. 1.

Consequently, the court imposed a 10-month custodial sentence, followed by 18 months probation, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and forfeiture of grow-op equipment, considering aggravating factors (large commercial operation, public safety hazard, property damage) and mitigating factors (first offender, family, mental health issues, sentencing delay).