Leonard Ricchetti

The applicant sought to be relieved of its obligation to pay interest at the contract rate of 11.2% on a prompt payment determination, arguing that its payment of funds into court as security stayed the interest clock.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that the payment into court was merely security and did not vary the terms of the determination.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to calculate the balance owing and ordered the applicant to pay the remaining interest accrued, less the income earned on the funds held in court.

The appellant appealed a motion decision finding its claim for lien had expired for failing to set the action down for trial within two years as required by s. 37 of the Construction Act.

The appellant argued its lien was saved because another lien claimant on the same project had set its action down in time, asserting they were part of the same 'improvement'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an 'improvement' is tied to the specific lands described in the claim for lien.

Because the appellant and the other claimant registered liens against different lands, the appellant could not enforce its lien in the other claimant's action.

Following the dismissal of its application, the applicant sought to make further submissions regarding recent amendments to the definition of 'written notice of lien' under the Construction Act.

The Divisional Court declined the request, finding that the amendments, which came into effect after the applicant's payment obligations arose, did not apply retrospectively.

The court also declined to provide general guidance on the new amendments, noting that such guidance should be reserved for cases where the issue is material to the result.

The applicant owner sought judicial review of an adjudicator's determination ordering it to pay the respondent contractor $685,574.91 under the prompt payment regime of the Construction Act.

The owner argued the adjudicator erred by rejecting its set-off claim for delay, misinterpreting notice holdback obligations, and conducting a procedurally unfair hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator reasonably concluded the contract did not support the delay claim and correctly held that actual notice of registered liens does not trigger notice holdback obligations.

The court also found no procedural unfairness or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a certiorari application to quash a youth court judge's order that rescinded prior orders granting the Law Society access to the respondent's youth record for a good character investigation.

The Superior Court granted the application, finding that the youth court judge exceeded his jurisdiction by reconsidering his own prior orders without a material change in circumstances.

The court also found that the youth court judge committed an error of law on the face of the record by incorrectly interpreting section 82 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act as an absolute prohibition on accessing and using a youth record after the completion of a sentence, failing to read it in harmony with section 119 which permits such access.

The court sentenced Renzo Gomez for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following his guilty plea.

The facts established that Mr. Gomez drove at excessive speed, under the influence of alcohol, and with a history of prior driving offences, resulting in a fatal collision and serious injuries.

The court reviewed the impact on the victims and their families, the offender’s personal circumstances, and the applicable legal framework.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 6 years for causing death (with a 16-year driving prohibition) and 4 years for causing bodily harm (with a 14-year prohibition), to be served concurrently, along with a DNA order.

The defendant, Franklin Kusi, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude fentanyl evidence obtained from a vehicle search, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown argued the vehicle was "apparently abandoned" and the search was a lawful inventory search under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found the vehicle was "apparently abandoned" and the inventory search was authorized by law and conducted reasonably, thus no s. 8 Charter breach occurred.

Alternatively, if a breach did occur, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the Grant factors favoured admission.

The defendant's Charter application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's prompt payment determination under the Construction Act.

The Divisional Court adjourned the application because the applicant failed to serve notice on the Attorney General as required by s. 9(4) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court also directed the applicant to serve notice on the Ontario Dispute Adjudication for Construction Contracts (ODACC) due to issues concerning jurisdiction, process, and the public release of adjudication decisions.

This criminal trial concerned charges of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm against Renzo Gomez, who had already pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The central issue was whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

Despite a high-speed collision, the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, and a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 53-105 mg/100ml, the court found reasonable doubt.

This was primarily due to expert evidence highlighting inter-individual variability in the effects of alcohol and the consistent testimony of three witnesses (a police officer and two paramedics) who observed no signs of impairment in the accused.

The court emphasized that a high BAC alone, especially below 100 mg/100ml, does not automatically prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal prosecution, and that such a threshold is a matter for Parliament.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charges.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to void the sale and mortgage transactions of two properties (Bradford and Caledon) previously owned by the plaintiff and sold under power of sale by the defendant Roy D'Mello and his companies.

The court found numerous "badges of fraud" and a strong prima facie case of sham or fraudulent transactions due to lack of documentation, questionable dealings, and evasive testimony from various defendants and related parties.

The court granted partial summary judgment, declaring the current ownership and mortgages on both properties void and directing the Registrar of Land Titles to restore the plaintiff as owner and discharge the fraudulent mortgages.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction and 9-month sentence for sexual assault.

The assault occurred in the workplace where the appellant was the spouse of the owner.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly relied on the complainant's delayed reporting, and erred in finding post-offence conduct.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly rejected the defence's reliance on sexual assault behaviour myths and had ample evidence to conclude the appellant's actions demonstrated consciousness of guilt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 9-month custodial sentence was fit given the appellant's prior record and position of authority.

The plaintiff sought the continuation of an interim Mareva injunction against multiple defendants, alleging fraud and dissipation of assets.

The court found an overwhelming case of fraud by Stephen Lee Heimbecker and Nestig Inc., and a prima facie case of joint participation, willful blindness, or assistance in the fraud by Joanna Marie Heimbecker and Keystone Capital Inc. The court determined that irreparable harm would occur without the injunction and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The court granted the interlocutory Mareva Order, including the release of certain frozen funds to the plaintiff.

The court rejected Joanna Marie Heimbecker's requests to open a new bank account for future employment income and to sell jewellery for legal expenses and tuition, citing a lack of complete and accurate financial disclosure and serious inconsistencies.

The court also declined to reduce the living expense exemption for the Heimbeckers at this stage but left open the possibility if disclosure issues persist.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to discontinue its defamation action.

The defendant argued that his intended anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act triggered an automatic stay, precluding the plaintiff's motion as a 'further step'.

The court held that the anti-SLAPP motion had not yet been 'made' as it had not been served.

Furthermore, relying on appellate authority, the court found that a motion to discontinue is not a prohibited 'step' under s. 137.1(5), as it achieves the anti-SLAPP goal of terminating the proceeding efficiently.

The court ordered the plaintiff's motion for leave to discontinue to be heard first.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court awarded the AG Defendants costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court awarded the RBC Defendants costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct, including lengthy delays, unnecessary motions, and pursuing claims that were not maintainable after the original plaintiff's death.

The court reduced the requested amounts due to the lack of detailed dockets in the Bills of Costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment.

The court refused to hear the motion and temporarily stayed the action, citing the plaintiff's abusive conduct, which included unauthorized recording and posting of court proceedings, filing multiple duplicative actions across different jurisdictions, and improperly noting default against the defendant while a transfer motion was pending.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and ensure the efficient administration of justice.

The Respondent, Andrew Lambden, brought a motion for an interim order requiring the Applicant, Yessica Pamela Cevallos, to pay $30,000 as security for costs of the litigation.

The court found that the Applicant habitually resides outside Ontario and has no assets in Ontario, satisfying the preliminary onus under Rule 24(13)(a) of the Family Law Rules.

The court expressed serious reservations about the merits of the Applicant's spousal support claim, specifically regarding whether the parties continuously cohabited in a conjugal relationship for the statutory three-year period, citing significant interruptions in their cohabitation and the nature of their financial arrangements.

The court also noted the Applicant's inconsistent financial disclosure and inappropriate threatening statements made to the Respondent.

Despite the Applicant's submission that the order would prevent her from continuing the proceeding, the court found she had the ability to raise funds.

The motion for security for costs was granted in the amount of $20,000.

The applicant, Micheline Boutin, brought a motion to transfer and consolidate a civil proceeding commenced by the respondent, Victor Boutin, and his companies in Toronto with an existing family law proceeding in Brampton.

The Toronto proceeding alleged improvident sale of properties by the applicant, an issue previously addressed by the court as an adjustment to equalization in the family law case.

The court found that the Toronto proceeding's venue choice was unreasonable and that consolidation was desirable to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, promote expeditious resolution, and prevent inconsistent findings, given the substantial factual and legal overlap between the two cases.

This decision addresses multiple motions in a contentious family law dispute marked by the respondent husband's persistent non-compliance with financial disclosure and preservation orders.

The husband sought to vary existing preservation orders, obtain updated financial statements from the applicant wife, and release funds from a Receiver.

The wife sought orders compelling the husband's compliance with prior orders, the release of funds for property expenses, and further disclosure.

The court dismissed the husband's motion in its entirety, citing his long history of deliberate disregard for court orders, including unauthorized asset transfers and a lack of complete financial transparency.

The court granted the wife's urgent motion, ordering the husband to remit proceeds from an undisclosed property sale to the Receiver and directing the Receiver to obtain the relevant legal file.

Additionally, the court ordered the release of $180,000 from the Receiver's trust to the wife for the payment of outstanding expenses related to the matrimonial home and other jointly-owned properties.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the motor vehicle accident was an "inevitable accident" due to the defendant driver suffering a severe anaphylactic shock from an allergic reaction to naproxen (Aleve).

The plaintiff opposed, asserting that genuine issues of fact and credibility required a trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were complex and highly disputed factual issues, particularly regarding the timing of the anaphylactic reaction, the driver's potential negligence in taking a double dose of medication without reading instructions, and when unconsciousness occurred.

The court determined it could not make the necessary factual findings for a fair and just determination without a full trial, even with enhanced fact-finding powers.

The defendants, including Royal Bank of Canada, brought a motion to strike several claims (negligence, negligent investigation, defamation, breach of Charter rights, breach of statutory duty, conspiracy to breach statutory duty, interference with economic relations) and a motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.

The court dismissed all claims except malicious prosecution due to the expiration of the limitation period and failure to disclose a cause of action.

The defamation claim was also dismissed because it cannot be maintained by an estate trustee.

The court granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, finding that the defendants had reasonable and probable cause to report the matter to the police and did not act with malice.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.