Roy D’Mello

The appellant sought to appeal an order resulting from a reference under Rule 54 of the Rules of Civil Procedure directly to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, holding that there is no direct right of appeal from a reference order; a dissatisfied party must first exhaust the remedies provided under Rule 54, such as opposing confirmation of the report in the Superior Court, before appealing to the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to void the sale and mortgage transactions of two properties (Bradford and Caledon) previously owned by the plaintiff and sold under power of sale by the defendant Roy D'Mello and his companies.

The court found numerous "badges of fraud" and a strong prima facie case of sham or fraudulent transactions due to lack of documentation, questionable dealings, and evasive testimony from various defendants and related parties.

The court granted partial summary judgment, declaring the current ownership and mortgages on both properties void and directing the Registrar of Land Titles to restore the plaintiff as owner and discharge the fraudulent mortgages.

The appellant sought an adjournment of their appeal and motion to quash due to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship and uncertainty regarding new counsel's availability.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment, conditional on the appellant paying $7,000 in outstanding costs by a specified date, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.

Mortgagors brought an application to determine the amount owed to a mortgagee following default on a private mortgage loan secured against their home.

The mortgagee claimed approximately $95,000, including significant legal fees, administrative charges, and other penalties.

The court held that many of the additional charges were unsupported, unreasonable, or prohibited under the Interest Act, including excessive legal fees, lender administration penalties, and additional NSF charges.

Exercising its inherent jurisdiction to assess reasonable costs, the court substantially reduced the mortgagee’s claim and allowed only limited additional fees, interest, and admitted charges.

The mortgagors were found liable for a significantly smaller sum and were substantially successful at trial.