Granville Nolley Cadogan

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Bemco Financial Services Ltd., for a deficiency on a mortgage loan after a power of sale.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the sale price, accounting for rents, management fees, property taxes, or real estate commissions.

The court disallowed a three-month interest penalty as a prohibited penalty under the Interest Act, but otherwise accepted the plaintiff’s accounting and entitlement to the deficiency.

The plaintiff, Pushpinder Dhanoa, sought enforcement of a mortgage loan against the defendant, Bharati Ramnarine, who defaulted on payments.

Ramnarine argued the mortgage contract was void due to alleged misrepresentation by the mortgage agent, Satinder Gill, and counterclaimed for damages.

The court found no misrepresentation or breach by Dhanoa, held that Ramnarine understood the terms, and ordered her to pay the outstanding amount and deliver possession of the property to Dhanoa.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Canguard Group Limited and others from a partial summary judgment order declaring a mortgage on the respondent’s property void as a fraudulent conveyance.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s reliance on the evidentiary record, including affidavits, and held that the appellant’s failure to respond or provide discovery justified summary judgment.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the scope of the order and the appropriateness of partial summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of World Financial Solutions Inc. for possession and sale of a Toronto property under a collateral mortgage, dismissing the defences, counterclaim, and third party claims of 2573138 Ontario Ltd. and Marguerite Alfred.

The court found the mortgage was in default, rejected arguments of co-venturer status, conspiracy, and improper sale, and ordered a reference for accounting of sale proceeds.

The decision clarifies the application of summary judgment principles in mortgage enforcement and the limits of technical and equitable defences.

This decision resolves the financial and support issues arising from the breakdown of an 18-year marriage between Grace Terna Ogunmekan and Kehinde Olusegun Ogunmekan.

The court addresses equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, child support, section 7 expenses, and spousal support.

The respondent’s lack of financial disclosure and inconsistent evidence led the court to treat certain undisclosed assets as cash for equalization purposes and to deny his spousal support claim.

The court orders significant equalization and support payments in favour of the applicant.

The appellants sought to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice that directed the deletion of their third-party claim registered on title under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative, raised the question of jurisdiction.

After hearing submissions, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act specifies that appeals from orders made by a judge under that Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed motions by Canguard Group Limited and 11039342 Canada Inc. for a stay of orders expunging their mortgages, pending their appeals of those orders.

The motions judge found the grounds of appeal weak, no irreparable harm (especially with a no-transfer term imposed on the property owner), and the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay.

The underlying orders were based on findings that the mortgages were fraudulent and no funds were advanced.

The appellant, Muhammad Jawaid, appealed a trial judgment in a mortgage action.

The appellant argued that he was not adequately informed about the scope of the trial, was denied procedural fairness, and that the trial judge's decision constituted a collateral attack on an earlier interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was aware of the trial's scope, was not denied procedural fairness, and that an interlocutory order setting aside default judgment is not binding on a subsequent trial judge as it only determines procedure, not the rights of the parties.

The court found no error of fact or law in the trial judge's decision.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal was advised that the trial, which addressed equalization, child support, and spousal support, had recently concluded but the trial reasons for decision had not yet been released.

The appellant argued that the appeal should not proceed without these reasons, a position the respondent's counsel acknowledged as arguably premature.

Given the significance of equalization and the issues before the panel, the Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal until after the trial reasons are released.

The parties were ordered to bear their own costs for the attendance.

This case involved a dispute over the interpretation and enforceability of two settlement agreements (2016 Joint Agreement and 2020 Final Minutes of Settlement) between separated spouses.

The court upheld the validity and binding nature of the 2020 agreement, which ratified and amended the 2016 agreement.

The judgment resolved outstanding issues including spousal support, child support arrears, equalization, property division (matrimonial home and investment property), and post-separation adjustments.

The court dismissed the father's attempt to set aside the agreement based on non-disclosure or unconscionability and clarified various financial obligations.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment against the defendant due to default under a mortgage.

The defendant opposed, seeking to bring the mortgage back into good standing and alleging bad faith by the plaintiff.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial but declined to grant summary judgment immediately.

Instead, it granted the defendant conditional relief under Section 23(1) of the Mortgages Act, allowing her to cure the default by paying $100 into court and all outstanding money by a specified date, failing which the plaintiff could move for judgment.

Costs were reserved.

Troy Rennie sought an order for partition and sale of a property and rectification of title, arguing he was a joint owner.

Maureen Rennie opposed, claiming Troy was not an owner, or alternatively, that the sale should be denied due to malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct.

The court found that Troy was a valid joint owner, the transfer was a gift, not subject to an oral trust or resulting trust, and there were no exceptional circumstances to deny the partition and sale.

The court ordered the sale of the property and awarded costs to Troy, with a portion to be paid personally by the respondent's counsel due to inappropriate conduct.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on Highway 401 while performing a stunt by speeding 218 km/h in a posted 100 km/h speed zone, contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought an application to stay proceedings alleging the Crown destroyed or failed to provide dispatch communications, thereby violating his Charter section 7 rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence that such communications ever existed.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendant and counsel failed to appear on the final trial date.

The court found the defendant guilty based on the officer's credible evidence of the speed measurement and identification.

The Plaintiff appealed a Master's order setting aside a default judgment to the Divisional Court, believing it to be a final order.

The Defendant moved to quash this appeal, arguing the Master's order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The Plaintiff also brought a cross-motion to extend the time for appeal to a single judge, should the initial appeal be quashed.

The court determined that an order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal to the Divisional Court was improper.

The court quashed the Plaintiff's appeal and denied the cross-motion for an extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal as the Master correctly lacked jurisdiction to vary a judge's peremptory order.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to set aside an order striking her pleadings for contempt due to failure to provide court‑ordered disclosure and to set aside a subsequent final order made after an undefended trial granting the respondent an equalization payment and other relief.

The court reviewed the procedural history, noting that the applicant had been repeatedly given opportunities to purge her contempt and comply with disclosure and costs orders but failed to do so.

The applicant did not appeal the earlier orders and did not bring a timely motion within the deadline permitted by the earlier order striking her pleadings.

The court held that the applicant was not entitled to notice of the subsequent undefended trial and failed to establish any basis to set aside the earlier orders.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

Following a four-day trial in which the applicant was granted sole custody of a child, the court determined costs payable by the unsuccessful respondent.

The applicant sought full recovery costs of $29,912.50, while the respondent argued no costs should be awarded, claiming the applicant behaved unreasonably and the costs were excessive and beyond her ability to pay.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments, finding neither party acted in bad faith and both sincerely believed custody was in the child's best interests.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000.00, considering the importance of the custody issue, the complexity of the case, and the respondent's modest financial circumstances.

A custody trial concerning a two-year-old child born in 2010.

The applicant, a non-biological father who has acted as the child's parent since birth, sought custody against the respondent, the child's maternal aunt, who sought custody on behalf of the biological family.

The biological mother, who suffers from serious drug addiction, supported the aunt's claim.

The court awarded sole custody to the applicant, finding that the child's best interests were served by maintaining stability with his psychological father and primary caregiver, rather than being transferred to the biological family.

The court considered factors including the child's strong attachment to the applicant, the length of time in a stable home environment, the permanence of the applicant's plan versus the temporary nature of the aunt's plan, and the child's biracial heritage.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.