Granville Nolley Cadogan

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent a shortfall of $58,067.48 following the sale of a property under power of sale.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in determining the sale price by 'rectifying' a Land Transfer Tax statement contrary to the Land Titles Act and reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not rectify the document but simply weighed the evidence to determine the actual consideration received, and that s. 78(4) of the Land Titles Act did not apply.

The moving parties sought a panel review to set aside a motion judge's order requiring them to pay security for costs within 30 days, failing which their appeal would be dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or misapprehension of material evidence in the motion judge's discretionary decision, agreeing that the appeal lacked merit and the justice of the case supported the order.

The motion to set aside the order, and an alternative request for an extension of time to post security, were dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant contractor registered a construction lien against the respondent's property but failed to perfect it by registering a certificate of action in a timely manner.

The motions judge declared the lien expired and vacated it pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the Construction Act, and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the appellant.

On appeal, the Divisional Court affirmed the decision, holding that the failure to perfect a lien is a statutory breach that cannot be cured by procedural rules or equitable doctrines.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The respondents and third parties brought a motion for security for costs against the appellants pending an appeal of a summary judgment order in a mortgage enforcement action.

The motion judge found that the appeal had a low prospect of success and that the appellants were unlikely to pay a costs award, satisfying the 'other good reason' requirement under Rule 61.06(1)(c).

The court ordered the appellants to post security for costs, though the amount for the plaintiff was reduced as a party should not have to give security simply to defend an order obtained below.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Bemco Financial Services Ltd., for a deficiency on a mortgage loan after a power of sale.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the sale price, accounting for rents, management fees, property taxes, or real estate commissions.

The court disallowed a three-month interest penalty as a prohibited penalty under the Interest Act, but otherwise accepted the plaintiff’s accounting and entitlement to the deficiency.

The plaintiff, Pushpinder Dhanoa, sought enforcement of a mortgage loan against the defendant, Bharati Ramnarine, who defaulted on payments.

Ramnarine argued the mortgage contract was void due to alleged misrepresentation by the mortgage agent, Satinder Gill, and counterclaimed for damages.

The court found no misrepresentation or breach by Dhanoa, held that Ramnarine understood the terms, and ordered her to pay the outstanding amount and deliver possession of the property to Dhanoa.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Canguard Group Limited and others from a partial summary judgment order declaring a mortgage on the respondent’s property void as a fraudulent conveyance.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s reliance on the evidentiary record, including affidavits, and held that the appellant’s failure to respond or provide discovery justified summary judgment.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the scope of the order and the appropriateness of partial summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of World Financial Solutions Inc. for possession and sale of a Toronto property under a collateral mortgage, dismissing the defences, counterclaim, and third party claims of 2573138 Ontario Ltd. and Marguerite Alfred.

The court found the mortgage was in default, rejected arguments of co-venturer status, conspiracy, and improper sale, and ordered a reference for accounting of sale proceeds.

The decision clarifies the application of summary judgment principles in mortgage enforcement and the limits of technical and equitable defences.

This decision resolves the financial and support issues arising from the breakdown of an 18-year marriage between Grace Terna Ogunmekan and Kehinde Olusegun Ogunmekan.

The court addresses equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, child support, section 7 expenses, and spousal support.

The respondent’s lack of financial disclosure and inconsistent evidence led the court to treat certain undisclosed assets as cash for equalization purposes and to deny his spousal support claim.

The court orders significant equalization and support payments in favour of the applicant.

The appellants sought to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice that directed the deletion of their third-party claim registered on title under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative, raised the question of jurisdiction.

After hearing submissions, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act specifies that appeals from orders made by a judge under that Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed motions by Canguard Group Limited and 11039342 Canada Inc. for a stay of orders expunging their mortgages, pending their appeals of those orders.

The motions judge found the grounds of appeal weak, no irreparable harm (especially with a no-transfer term imposed on the property owner), and the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay.

The underlying orders were based on findings that the mortgages were fraudulent and no funds were advanced.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Akazaki J. dated August 12, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties.

The appellant, Muhammad Jawaid, appealed a trial judgment in a mortgage action.

The appellant argued that he was not adequately informed about the scope of the trial, was denied procedural fairness, and that the trial judge's decision constituted a collateral attack on an earlier interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was aware of the trial's scope, was not denied procedural fairness, and that an interlocutory order setting aside default judgment is not binding on a subsequent trial judge as it only determines procedure, not the rights of the parties.

The court found no error of fact or law in the trial judge's decision.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal was advised that the trial, which addressed equalization, child support, and spousal support, had recently concluded but the trial reasons for decision had not yet been released.

The appellant argued that the appeal should not proceed without these reasons, a position the respondent's counsel acknowledged as arguably premature.

Given the significance of equalization and the issues before the panel, the Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal until after the trial reasons are released.

The parties were ordered to bear their own costs for the attendance.

The third parties, a lawyer and his professional corporation, moved to strike a third party claim brought against them by the defendants.

The defendants alleged negligence and other torts regarding the lawyer's preparation of a mortgage and subsequent enforcement proceedings on behalf of the plaintiff.

The court struck the claim, finding that opposing counsel owes no duty of care to the defendants, the claims regarding the mortgage were statute-barred, and the claims regarding enforcement proceedings were barred by absolute privilege.

Leave to amend was granted only for claims relating to a specific property transfer.

This case involved a dispute over the interpretation and enforceability of two settlement agreements (2016 Joint Agreement and 2020 Final Minutes of Settlement) between separated spouses.

The court upheld the validity and binding nature of the 2020 agreement, which ratified and amended the 2016 agreement.

The judgment resolved outstanding issues including spousal support, child support arrears, equalization, property division (matrimonial home and investment property), and post-separation adjustments.

The court dismissed the father's attempt to set aside the agreement based on non-disclosure or unconscionability and clarified various financial obligations.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment and to dismiss the action on the basis that the individual plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt and lacked capacity to sue or direct the corporate plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to remove the defendants' counsel, arguing he was in a conflict of interest and a potential witness.

The court dismissed the motion to remove counsel, finding no substantial risk to the administration of justice.

The court granted the motion to set aside the default judgment, noting the plaintiff failed to disclose her bankruptcy when obtaining it.

Finally, the court dismissed the action as a nullity and an abuse of process, as an undischarged bankrupt cannot commence an action or act as a corporate director under the Business Corporations Act.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's 60-paragraph statement of claim, which alleged a broad conspiracy of mortgage fraud involving numerous parties and properties.

The court struck the claim in its entirety under Rule 25.11, finding it unduly prolix, confusing, and likely to prejudice a fair trial.

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to re-plead specific, legally viable claims related to her own property, while denying leave to re-plead claims that constituted a collateral attack on a prior judgment or sought relief on behalf of third parties.

In a divorce proceeding, both parties brought motions to enforce a settlement agreement, but advanced divergent interpretations of its terms.

The court noted that neither party addressed the appropriate legal test for determining if a binding agreement was reached, nor the correct procedural mechanism under the Family Law Rules (Rule 16 or Rule 18(13)).

The court adjourned the motions and directed counsel to provide further submissions on these procedural and substantive issues before making a final decision.