Jason Stuart Beitchman

The plaintiff, a German-trained lawyer with a PhD in law, sued his former family law counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a motion to change a parenting order.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to investigate the facts, warn him of the case's weaknesses and cost risks, and ensure he understood the legal advice.

The defendants represented the plaintiff in a motion to change a 2012 consent order that limited his parenting time with his two sons.

The motion was based on a claimed material change in circumstances—the plaintiff's new employment with reduced travel requirements.

The motion was dismissed by Justice McWatt, who found no material change in circumstances because the plaintiff testified at trial that his new job required international travel, contradicting his affidavit and employer's letter.

The court dismissed the negligence and fiduciary duty claims, finding the defendants met the standard of care, the plaintiff was aware of the risks, and he would have proceeded with the motion regardless of advice.

The plaintiff, Morgan Canada Corporation, sought extensive injunctive relief against former employees and their new employer, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, breach of confidence, and spoliation.

The court found that Morgan Canada failed to establish a strong prima facie case for any of its claims, including that the former employees owed fiduciary duties or misused confidential information.

The court also found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favored the defendants.

The motion for injunctive relief, appointment of an inspector, and a sealing order were dismissed.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to correct misnomers and substitute "Doe" defendants with named individuals, alleging fraud and misappropriation.

The motion was unopposed for five proposed defendants and granted.

For the five vigorously opposed proposed defendants, the court applied Rules 5.04 and 26.01, considering prejudice and the "litigating finger" test.

The court found that the claims against Parray and Khanlarov were too vague and outside the relevant time period, and against Kovalov, the "litigating finger" was not sufficiently pointed, and potential prejudice was noted.

Therefore, the motion to substitute Parray, Khanlarov, and Kovalov was dismissed.

However, the motion to substitute Halatullah and Kolesnik was granted, as the claims against them were sufficiently particularized or their first name matched a "Doe" defendant, and any prejudice was deemed inherent to litigation.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for breach of confidence, invasion of privacy, and aggravated/punitive damages under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court struck the claims for breach of confidence and aggravated damages with leave to amend, finding that the breach of confidence claim failed to plead misuse to the plaintiff's detriment, and the aggravated damages claim lacked sufficient particulars of the conduct's effects.

The claims for invasion of privacy and punitive damages were not struck, as they were deemed sufficiently pleaded based on the alleged intentional entry into the plaintiff's home and removal of confidential documents.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel production of confidential financial and Key Performance Indicator data relating to seven non-party Lexus dealerships, which were in the possession of the defendant.

The plaintiffs argued the information was necessary to test the reliability of averages used by the defendant’s expert in calculating the plaintiffs’ alleged loss of profits following termination of a dealership agreement.

The court held that the individual dealer data was not producible under Rule 31.06(3) because the defendant’s expert had not received or relied on that underlying information.

Although the documents were relevant under Rule 30.02 to the issue of loss of profits, the court declined to order production after balancing proportionality and prejudice.

The court found that disclosure would cause significant prejudice to the non-party dealers, whose confidential financial information would be revealed to a direct competitor.

The plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to both the defendant and the non-party dealers.

The appeal concerned whether online music previews streamed before purchase are fair dealing for the purpose of research under the Copyright Act.

The Court held that research must be interpreted broadly and assessed from the user perspective, not only from the service provider perspective.

Applying the CCH framework, the Court found the previews fair in purpose, character, amount, alternatives, nature of the work, and market effect.

Because the previews were short, lower quality, temporary, and supported consumer selection without substituting for purchases, no additional royalties were payable for them.