Jason Stuart Beitchman

The plaintiff, a German-trained lawyer with a PhD in law, sued his former family law counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a motion to change a parenting order.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to investigate the facts, warn him of the case's weaknesses and cost risks, and ensure he understood the legal advice.

The defendants represented the plaintiff in a motion to change a 2012 consent order that limited his parenting time with his two sons.

The motion was based on a claimed material change in circumstances—the plaintiff's new employment with reduced travel requirements.

The motion was dismissed by Justice McWatt, who found no material change in circumstances because the plaintiff testified at trial that his new job required international travel, contradicting his affidavit and employer's letter.

The court dismissed the negligence and fiduciary duty claims, finding the defendants met the standard of care, the plaintiff was aware of the risks, and he would have proceeded with the motion regardless of advice.

The plaintiff, Morgan Canada Corporation, sought extensive injunctive relief against former employees and their new employer, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, breach of confidence, and spoliation.

The court found that Morgan Canada failed to establish a strong prima facie case for any of its claims, including that the former employees owed fiduciary duties or misused confidential information.

The court also found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favored the defendants.

The motion for injunctive relief, appointment of an inspector, and a sealing order were dismissed.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's 60-paragraph statement of claim, which alleged a broad conspiracy of mortgage fraud involving numerous parties and properties.

The court struck the claim in its entirety under Rule 25.11, finding it unduly prolix, confusing, and likely to prejudice a fair trial.

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to re-plead specific, legally viable claims related to her own property, while denying leave to re-plead claims that constituted a collateral attack on a prior judgment or sought relief on behalf of third parties.

The City of Windsor appealed a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) decision awarding the respondents approximately $2.8 million in compensation for expropriated lands and injurious affection.

The City argued the LPAT breached natural justice by copying the respondents' submissions and erred in its treatment of Provincial Policy Statements (PPS) regarding environmentally sensitive lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the extent of copying did not rebut the presumption of independent decision-making.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the LPAT's factual findings regarding the impact of the PPS on the lands' development potential, the valuation of the properties, or the award of interest.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to correct misnomers and substitute "Doe" defendants with named individuals, alleging fraud and misappropriation.

The motion was unopposed for five proposed defendants and granted.

For the five vigorously opposed proposed defendants, the court applied Rules 5.04 and 26.01, considering prejudice and the "litigating finger" test.

The court found that the claims against Parray and Khanlarov were too vague and outside the relevant time period, and against Kovalov, the "litigating finger" was not sufficiently pointed, and potential prejudice was noted.

Therefore, the motion to substitute Parray, Khanlarov, and Kovalov was dismissed.

However, the motion to substitute Halatullah and Kolesnik was granted, as the claims against them were sufficiently particularized or their first name matched a "Doe" defendant, and any prejudice was deemed inherent to litigation.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for breach of confidence, invasion of privacy, and aggravated/punitive damages under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court struck the claims for breach of confidence and aggravated damages with leave to amend, finding that the breach of confidence claim failed to plead misuse to the plaintiff's detriment, and the aggravated damages claim lacked sufficient particulars of the conduct's effects.

The claims for invasion of privacy and punitive damages were not struck, as they were deemed sufficiently pleaded based on the alleged intentional entry into the plaintiff's home and removal of confidential documents.

In a securities class action arising from the collapse of a forestry company, the plaintiffs sought approximately $2.6 million in costs following certification and leave motions brought under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and the Securities Act.

Several defendants argued that costs should not be awarded because the plaintiffs had already recovered legal expenses through settlements with other defendants and because the claimed costs were excessive.

The court held that the plaintiffs were largely successful but not entirely successful due to an unresolved assignment issue affecting certain class members.

The court also ruled that disbursements could not be recovered again because they had already been indemnified through settlements.

Exercising its discretion, the court ordered a hybrid costs award: part payable immediately and part payable in the cause.

The defendant law firm moved under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a professional negligence and conflict of interest action for delay.

The action had been commenced in 1993 concerning legal advice provided in a 1987 building code appeal and alleged conflict arising from representation of another developer in 1990.

Over more than two decades the plaintiff repeatedly failed to move the case forward, delayed discoveries, postponed expert evidence for many years, and allowed significant periods of inactivity.

The court found the delay both inordinate and inexcusable and concluded that the presumption of prejudice to the defendant had not been rebutted.

The court also held the delay constituted an abuse of process under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14(1).

The action arose from alleged environmental contamination by the defendants' dry cleaning operations.

The court applied the four-factor test for setting aside a dismissal order.

While finding no prejudice to the defendants, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to adequately explain the litigation delay or their failure to meet the set down deadline.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs' claims were already preserved in a crossclaim in a related, more advanced action.

To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed.

In three related wrongful dismissal actions, the employer sought consolidation to reduce duplicative discovery while the plaintiffs were pursuing summary judgment motions.

The court expressed concern that the parties' motion practice might be obscuring the real dispute about the scope of necessary discovery and emphasized efficiency, affordability, and proportionality.

A timetable was set for delivery of motion materials, identification of proposed cross-examinations and summonses, and a further case conference at which consolidation, hearing together, and the scope of examinations could be addressed.

The provincial regulator applied for a declaration that a financial product marketed as a “Basic Line of Credit” constituted a payday loan under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The respondents argued that the product was a true line of credit and therefore outside the statutory definition and provincial jurisdiction.

The court applied the statutory direction to examine the real substance of the transaction rather than its outward form.

Despite structural features resembling a line of credit, the product functioned in practice as a series of short‑term advances tied to borrowers’ pay cycles and subject to high interest and brokerage fees.

The court held that the arrangement was substantively equivalent to payday lending and therefore subject to the Act and related regulatory regime.

The applicant, a payday lender, brought an application for judicial review challenging the validity of amendments to a regulation under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The amendments redefined the total cost of borrowing to include directly or indirectly connected amounts, required lenders to provide cash for unused balances on devices, and prohibited the sale of third-party services in connection with payday loans.

The applicant argued that the government breached its legitimate expectations by failing to provide a 45-day consultation period and that the amendments were ultra vires.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the exercise of legislative powers and that the amendments were intra vires as they aligned with the consumer protection purpose of the Act.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel production of confidential financial and Key Performance Indicator data relating to seven non-party Lexus dealerships, which were in the possession of the defendant.

The plaintiffs argued the information was necessary to test the reliability of averages used by the defendant’s expert in calculating the plaintiffs’ alleged loss of profits following termination of a dealership agreement.

The court held that the individual dealer data was not producible under Rule 31.06(3) because the defendant’s expert had not received or relied on that underlying information.

Although the documents were relevant under Rule 30.02 to the issue of loss of profits, the court declined to order production after balancing proportionality and prejudice.

The court found that disclosure would cause significant prejudice to the non-party dealers, whose confidential financial information would be revealed to a direct competitor.

The plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to both the defendant and the non-party dealers.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the applicants' judicial review application for delay, or alternatively, to strike a recent amendment to the application.

The applicants had commenced the application to challenge regulations under the Payday Loans Act, 2008, but delayed advancing it while monitoring a related case and negotiating with government officials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicants provided an adequate explanation for the delay and the respondents suffered no prejudice.

The court also allowed the amendment to stand, noting the broader public interest issues involved, and appointed a case management judge to prevent further delay.

In a certified class action alleging price maintenance and conspiracy by a franchisor and its designated food supplier, the parties brought reciprocal motions regarding refusals on examinations for discovery.

The court applied the principles of relevance, materiality, and proportionality, emphasizing that the action was certified based on a 'top-down' systemic approach rather than a 'bottom-up' product-by-product analysis.

The court largely upheld the refusals, finding many questions to be irrelevant, disproportionate, or inconsistent with the certified common issues, while ordering a small number of questions to be answered.

The appeal concerned whether online music previews streamed before purchase are fair dealing for the purpose of research under the Copyright Act.

The Court held that research must be interpreted broadly and assessed from the user perspective, not only from the service provider perspective.

Applying the CCH framework, the Court found the previews fair in purpose, character, amount, alternatives, nature of the work, and market effect.

Because the previews were short, lower quality, temporary, and supported consumer selection without substituting for purchases, no additional royalties were payable for them.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a cost award made by the motions judge following the certification of their class proceeding.

The plaintiffs argued the motions judge ignored established principles, such as costs following the event and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, and improperly applied the principle of access to justice to the defendants.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion, considering all relevant factors and principles, and that there was no conflicting decision.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs appealed a decision upholding the defendants' claim of litigation privilege over an expert engineer's file.

Before the appeal was heard, the defendants produced the expert's report and underlying file, rendering the appeal moot.

The Divisional Court awarded the plaintiffs $15,000 in costs for the appeal, the leave motion, and the appeal below, finding that the defendants' tactical delay in obtaining the report and claiming privilege unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings and increased costs, particularly given the defendants' spoliation defence.