Brendan O’Callaghan

The City of Toronto and its Clerk brought an application for declaratory relief regarding the coming into force of by-laws establishing a 47-ward structure for the 2018 municipal election and the resulting composition of city council.

The respondents had previously raised concerns about a potential 'legal vacuum' in their unsuccessful motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, declining to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief because there was no live legal dispute between the parties, affected voters had not been given notice, and the application effectively sought an inappropriate advisory opinion.

Gemterra Developments Corporation sought a refund of $408,400 from the City of Toronto, alleging overpayment of park levies.

The central issue was the interpretation of "development site" under the City's Park Levy By-law, specifically whether Gemterra's two-phase residential project on a 1.3-hectare parcel constituted one or two development sites.

The levy rate was 10% for sites less than one hectare and 15% for sites between one and five hectares.

Gemterra argued that each phase, for which separate building permits were issued, should be treated as a distinct site, qualifying for the lower 10% rate.

The City contended it was a single development site.

The court dismissed Gemterra's application, finding that "development site" is a fact-based determination, and in this case, the two phases comprised a single development site, irrespective of phased construction or separate building permits.

The applicant sought declaratory relief that it was exempt from a parkland levy imposed as a condition of obtaining a building permit for redevelopment of a restaurant on municipal lands.

The municipality argued the application improperly circumvented the statutory appeal mechanism under s. 25(1) of the Building Code Act, 1992, which provides a 20‑day appeal period from decisions of a chief building official.

The court held that the proper procedure was a statutory appeal, not an application for declaratory relief, and that the applicant had failed to pursue the appeal within the prescribed timeframe.

The court declined to convert the application into a statutory appeal or extend the appeal deadline, finding the delay unreasonable and prejudicial to the municipality.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.