Lindsay A. Woods

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeals did not meet the three-part test for granting leave.

In accordance with standard practice, no reasons were provided.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

A case management teleconference was held to schedule a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The court set a timetable for the service and filing of materials, directed that the hearing proceed by Zoom videoconference, and provided instructions for the electronic filing of documents.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs of the proceedings in the Superior Court on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents contested a disbursement for the appellants' expert witness on damages, arguing the expert's evidence was rejected by the application judge as a mere mathematical exercise.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondents, finding that disallowing the disbursement did not amount to an improper distributive costs order, and that the expert evidence provided no value as it consisted only of basic calculations using publicly available share prices.

Costs were awarded to the appellants excluding the expert disbursement.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for damages arising from the respondent's refusal to honour the exercise of stock options.

The options were granted under a consulting agreement with a two-year term but specified a five-year exercise period.

The respondent argued the options expired six months after the consulting agreement ended, relying on an incorporated stock option plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in contractual interpretation.

The specific five-year exercise period in the grant took priority over the general termination provision in the incorporated plan.

Damages were awarded to the appellants in the amount of $2,820,000.

Case management endorsement setting out procedural directions for two motions for leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal.

The court scheduled the motions to proceed by videoconference and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of materials, including factums, compendiums, and authorities.

This decision addresses the costs arising from two applications brought by the Town of Oakville that were struck out by the court.

Clublink, the successful party, sought $137,903.70 in partial indemnity costs, while the Town argued for no costs or, alternatively, $30,000.

The court rejected the Town's arguments for denying costs, noting that the Town's counter-applications created an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

While acknowledging the extensive litigation context and the involvement of multiple senior counsel, the court found Clublink's requested costs excessive for a relatively straightforward motion to strike.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $65,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant, Clublink, owned the Glen Abbey Golf Course in Oakville and sought to redevelop it into a residential and mixed-use community.

The Town designated Glen Abbey as a cultural heritage property and passed five related by-laws, including a Cultural Heritage Landscape Conservation Plan By-law, authorizing the preparation of a conservation plan that required Clublink to seek Town approval for alterations to the golf course.

The application judge quashed all five by-laws and the conservation plan, finding them ultra vires, passed in bad faith, and void for vagueness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, upholding the validity of the five by-laws but quashing the conservation plan resolution on the basis that it effectively compelled Clublink to continue operating the golf course as a service, contrary to section 11(8)5 of the Municipal Act.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 15, 2019.

The parties agreed that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal but awarded no costs to the appellant, finding that the appellant did not prove forgone income and that the appeal was conceded shortly after counsel was retained without any additional work being performed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and the granting of the defendants' summary judgment motion, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The defendants sought a combined total of approximately $150,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the plaintiffs argued for a significantly reduced amount of $60,000.

Applying the overriding principle of reasonableness, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $65,000 to the lead defendant and $30,000 to the remaining defendants.

The plaintiffs sought early redemption of their syndicated mortgage investments from Hi-Rise Capital Ltd. (HRC) and 54 Shepherd Road Inc., arguing HRC was contractually obligated to redeem.

HRC and 54 Shepherd Road Inc. brought cross-motions for summary judgment, asserting no such obligation existed and raising issues of standing and res judicata for one plaintiff.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding no unqualified right to early redemption based on a holistic interpretation of the Loan Participation Agreements (LPAs) and mandatory disclosure forms.

The court granted the defendants' cross-motions, dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

The applicant, a former CEO of Aphria Inc., sought damages for the company's refusal to honor his stock options and, in the alternative, relief from forfeiture.

The court found that the stock options had expired according to the terms of the Aphria Incentive Stock Option Plan, which was incorporated by reference into the applicant's agreements.

Furthermore, the applicant was found to have breached a non-competition agreement by leasing land to a medical marijuana producer during the restricted term.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, denying both the claim for damages and the request for equitable relief from forfeiture due to the applicant's breach of the non-competition agreement.

The appellants appealed from an order of the application judge that determined the respondents had not substantially interfered with an easement in favour of the appellants, assuming the easement to be valid.

The Court of Appeal found the evidentiary record before the application judge was insufficient to support any conclusions on the issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge's order, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for a fresh hearing or trial.

The court identified numerous unresolved questions regarding the validity of the easement, including issues relating to the title history, the precise location and dimensions of the easement, compliance with part lot subdivision control provisions, and whether the respondents' actions constituted substantial interference with the easement rights.

A motion for leave to intervene in an appeal was dismissed.

The proposed intervener, a non-profit organization with expertise in architectural conservation, sought to participate in an appeal concerning a municipal decision.

The court found that the proposed intervener failed to clearly articulate how its submissions would differ from those of the appellant, and that granting leave at such a late stage in the proceedings would cause unfairness to the respondents who had already filed their materials.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Horse Racing Appeal Panel, which had overturned the applicant's decision to waive a horse's disqualification following a positive drug test.

The applicant argued the standard of review was correctness as it involved a true question of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, as the Panel was interpreting its home statute.

The Court found the Panel's conclusion that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal was reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee for the late Sophia De Jonge, appealed the disallowance of a property claim by the bankruptcy trustee of the estate of Jeffrey Wilson.

Jeffrey, who was the executor of Sophia's estate, had transferred real property to himself without satisfying a significant tax liability owed by Sophia's estate.

Jeffrey subsequently died bankrupt.

The court found that Jeffrey breached his fiduciary duty as executor by failing to pay the estate's debts before distributing assets to himself.

The court imposed a constructive trust over the real property in favour of Sophia's estate to remedy the unjust enrichment of Jeffrey's bankrupt estate, allowing the appellant to trace the beneficial interest into the net sale proceeds.