Bruce E. Bussin

The court considered competing claims to an investment property in Toronto, where the applicant sought partition and sale and the respondent claimed the applicant held her 50% interest in trust for him.

The court found the respondent’s trust claim statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act, as he had notice of the applicant’s beneficial ownership since at least 1995.

The court also found that, even if not statute-barred, the trust claim would fail on the merits because the applicant made no financial contribution to the purchase or mortgage.

The court granted partition and sale, an accounting, and division of net income since September 20, 2021.

The Landlord appealed an order granting relief from forfeiture to the Tenant, who failed to provide timely notice to renew a lease.

The application judge found the Tenant made diligent efforts to renew and that the Landlord "studiously avoided" contact, motivated by racial stereotyping.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings or the exercise of discretion, including the relevance of anti-Black racism in the Landlord's refusal to negotiate.

The applicants and respondents own neighbouring cottage properties accessed by a shared laneway known as Brewers Close.

The respondents unilaterally relocated a portion of the laneway on their property and blocked the original route, preventing the applicants from traversing the full loop.

The applicants sought declarations confirming their deeded easements and an order requiring the respondents to restore the laneway.

The court interpreted the 1961 root deeds and found that valid easements were granted over the original location of the laneway.

The court ordered the respondents to restore the laneway for the applicants whose permission was never sought, and directed a trial on whether the other applicants had agreed to the relocation or were estopped from enforcing their rights.

This is a commercial landlord-tenant dispute where the applicant sought to restrain the respondents from terminating its tenancy.

The court established a schedule for filing materials and, on an interim interim basis, ordered that the tenancy remain at a standstill, allowing the applicant to remain in the premises and preventing the respondents from taking further eviction steps pending a further case conference.

The appellants appealed from an order of the application judge that determined the respondents had not substantially interfered with an easement in favour of the appellants, assuming the easement to be valid.

The Court of Appeal found the evidentiary record before the application judge was insufficient to support any conclusions on the issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge's order, and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for a fresh hearing or trial.

The court identified numerous unresolved questions regarding the validity of the easement, including issues relating to the title history, the precise location and dimensions of the easement, compliance with part lot subdivision control provisions, and whether the respondents' actions constituted substantial interference with the easement rights.

The applicants sought to enforce registered easements over a shared access road (Brewers Close) on the respondents' property, seeking injunctive relief to restore the road to its original condition after the respondents unilaterally relocated a portion of it.

The respondents argued the easements were invalid due to vagueness and, alternatively, that the relocation did not substantially impair the applicants' use.

The court found the easements were not invalid due to vagueness, considering extrinsic evidence, but could not declare them fully valid without tracing their roots.

Crucially, the court determined that the relocation did not substantially impair the applicants' reasonable use of the easement for its granted purpose.

Consequently, both the application and the respondents' counter-application for a declaration of invalidity were dismissed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to recover amounts owing under a small business line of credit and a personal guarantee.

The defendants argued that the bank had effectively created a new loan with different terms and that the claim against the guarantor was statute‑barred because the guarantee was described as “continuing, absolute and unconditional.” The court found there was no new loan, only an internal reclassification of the same demand credit facility, and the contractual interest rate remained unchanged.

It further held that where a guarantee requires payment on demand, the demand is a condition precedent to liability and to the commencement of the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

As the demand and action were brought within the limitation period and no genuine issue required a trial, summary judgment was granted.