Jessica M. Starck

This appeal concerned a dispute over the purchase and sale of a luxury home, where the purchaser sought rescission of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale due to fraudulent misrepresentation and latent defect.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment for rescission and equitable damages against the seller.

The appellants (seller and co-defendants) argued errors in the finding of fraudulent misrepresentation, latent defect, and the appropriateness of partial summary judgment given a pending conspiracy claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding of fraudulent misrepresentation based on the seller's failure to disclose safety risks and false representations, and upheld the partial summary judgment, finding no risk of inconsistent findings between corporate and personal liability for fraud.

The appellant physician appealed a finding of professional misconduct and the resulting penalty (a reprimand and three-month suspension) imposed by the Discipline Committee.

The misconduct was based on criminal findings of guilt for domestic violence offences for which the appellant received an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued that the provincial legislation allowing discipline based on a criminal finding of guilt was unconstitutional on division of powers grounds because it conflicted with the federal Criminal Records Act provisions regarding discharges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no operational conflict or frustration of purpose between the statutes.

The Court also upheld the admission of the criminal records, the finding that domestic violence is relevant to a physician's suitability to practise, the penalty imposed, and the Committee's jurisdiction to award costs for preliminary motions.

The Town of Oakville sought to designate Glen Abbey golf course as a cultural heritage property.

Clublink, the owner, applied under section 34 of the Ontario Heritage Act to demolish and remove the golf course.

The Town argued the application should proceed under section 33, which provides different procedural protections and appeal routes.

The central issue was whether a golf course constitutes a "structure" within the meaning of section 34.

The Court of Appeal held that Glen Abbey, being a product of significant construction and engineering comprising constituent parts intended to remain permanently on the property, was a structure within section 34.

The purposive and contextual interpretation of the statute, considering its legislative history and the evolution of municipal heritage planning beyond a "building-centric" paradigm, supported this conclusion.

The applicant, Clublink, owned the Glen Abbey Golf Course in Oakville and sought to redevelop it into a residential and mixed-use community.

The Town designated Glen Abbey as a cultural heritage property and passed five related by-laws, including a Cultural Heritage Landscape Conservation Plan By-law, authorizing the preparation of a conservation plan that required Clublink to seek Town approval for alterations to the golf course.

The application judge quashed all five by-laws and the conservation plan, finding them ultra vires, passed in bad faith, and void for vagueness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, upholding the validity of the five by-laws but quashing the conservation plan resolution on the basis that it effectively compelled Clublink to continue operating the golf course as a service, contrary to section 11(8)5 of the Municipal Act.

The appellants purchased railway land in Niagara Falls from Canadian National Railway Company (CN) in 2008, with CN taking back a mortgage.

The appellants defaulted and CN sued.

The appellants brought a third-party action against their solicitors (McMillan LLP, Philip Thompson, and Marssa Giahi) for negligence, claiming they failed to properly advise about a Director's order under the Environmental Protection Act registered on title.

The respondents obtained summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in applying Rule 20 principles and that genuine issues for trial existed regarding the duty of care, knowledge of the Director's order, and causation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no negligence claim against McMillan due to lack of involvement in the final transaction, and no duty to warn Thompson and Giahi given the "as is" agreement and client's explicit instructions not to investigate environmental concerns.

The defendant, Integral Development LLC, moved to set aside a default judgment of $8.05 million arising from a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The defendant argued it had a plausible excuse for failing to defend the action and an arguable defence on the merits, specifically that a condition in the agreement of purchase and sale was never met.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside a default judgment and found that the defendant's excuse was plausible and its defence had an air of reality.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, allowing the defendant to defend the claim on its merits.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the proceeding, arguing that Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Ontario was forum non conveniens due to a forum selection clause designating England.

The court found jurisdiction simpliciter in Ontario based on contract formation principles but ultimately granted a stay on the basis of forum non conveniens, giving effect to the forum selection clause.

In an appeal from judicial review proceedings, the appellants challenged a law society decision refusing accreditation to a proposed law school because of a mandatory covenant restricting sexual intimacy to marriage between a man and a woman.

The majority held that the regulator had statutory authority to consider the covenant’s impact on equal access, diversity in the profession, and potential harm to LGBTQ prospective students.

Applying the Doré/Loyola framework, the Court found the decision proportionately balanced freedom of religion with statutory public-interest objectives and was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, with concurring reasons and a dissent that would have allowed the appeal.

The applicant, a chartered accountant, sought judicial review of an Appeal Committee decision that revoked his licence for professional misconduct related to a tax minimization plan.

The applicant argued the Appeal Committee applied the wrong standard of review and impermissibly interfered with the Discipline Committee's findings of fact.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeal Committee correctly applied a reasonableness standard and did not overturn factual findings, but rather reasonably concluded that the applicant's reliance on a colleague's tacit approval of the plan did not excuse his misconduct.