Adam Goldenberg

The bank sued the defendants for default on a commercial loan, a home equity line of credit, and various credit cards.

The defendants counterclaimed for $8.8 million, alleging the bank's failure to fully advance a $350,000 small business loan caused the failure of their restaurant businesses.

The court found that while the bank breached the loan agreement, the breach was not the effective cause of the business failures.

The business failures were caused by a prior fire, massive existing debts, and a failed expansion restaurant that rendered a $500,000 internal loan uncollectible.

The court dismissed the counterclaim, preferred the bank's expert valuation, found no deceit or bad faith by the bank, and granted judgment to the bank for the outstanding loan amounts.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision and a reconsideration decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) that dismissed most of her discrimination and reprisal application for delay.

The HRTO had directed a combined summary hearing (to assess reasonable prospect of success) and preliminary hearing (to assess delay).

The Divisional Court found that the HRTO breached procedural fairness and rendered an unreasonable decision by conflating the two hearings, specifically by making substantive determinations about the merits of the applicant's timely allegations during the delay hearing without permitting viva voce evidence on the merits.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the HRTO decisions were set aside in part, and the matter was remitted to the HRTO.

The applicant employer sought a hearing before the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal regarding a Review Officer's order concerning the maintenance of pay equity using the proxy method of comparison.

The Tribunal was tasked with specifying procedures to ensure employees who established pay equity through the proxy method continue to have access to male comparators for maintenance, following a Court of Appeal decision.

The Tribunal held that an organization that established its pay equity plan using the proxy method must continue to use it for maintenance unless changed circumstances under section 14.1 of the Pay Equity Act permit another method.

The Tribunal directed the parties to identify a proxy employer, request information, evaluate key female job classes, and determine whether any pay equity gaps have re-emerged, noting that arguments regarding non-discriminatory factors for pay differentials should be addressed under section 8 of the Act.

The York University Staff Association (YUSA) and the Black Legal Action Centre (BLAC) brought motions for leave to intervene in a judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

YUSA sought to intervene as an added party under Rule 13.01, while BLAC sought to intervene as a friend of the Court under Rule 13.02.

The applicant consented, but the respondent university opposed.

The Divisional Court granted both motions, finding that YUSA had a significant interest in the workplace procedures at issue and that BLAC would provide a useful systemic perspective on anti-Black racism without expanding the issues or causing undue delay.

Two organizations, York University Staff Association (YUSA) and Black Legal Action Centre (BLAC), sought leave to intervene in an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The underlying decision dismissed most of the applicant's discrimination claims for being outside the one-year limitation period.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to intervene.

The court found that YUSA did not have a direct interest in the narrow limitation period issue before the court, and that BLAC would not provide a distinct perspective from the applicant and risked introducing irrelevant peripheral issues.

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

In this putative securities class action arising from alleged misconduct by the former CEO of Endeavour Mining, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring defendants to deliver statements of defence and produce insurance information by November 21, 2025.

The defendants opposed both requests, arguing that no statement of defence is required before leave to proceed is granted under the Securities Act, and that insurance information disclosure is premature.

The court dismissed both aspects of the motion, finding that prior to OSA leave being granted, the statutory claim is a nullity and therefore no defence is required, and that insurance disclosure is premature absent settlement discussions or leave being granted.

The applicant, an adjunct professor, sought judicial review of the respondent university's decision not to proceed with her complaint regarding an open letter signed by students concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict.

The university had appointed an external reviewer who concluded the students did not breach the student code of conduct.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to decline to hear the judicial review application, finding that adequate alternative forums, such as a grievance under the collective agreement or an application to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, were more appropriate to address the applicant's concerns.

The plaintiff sought an extension of the set down deadline and directions on scheduling a motion to compel the defendant to produce additional documents, arguing these were required by a prior production order.

The court found the plaintiff's motion was out of time, as the parties had agreed to a timetable for all pre-trial motions, and the plaintiff had not acted within those deadlines.

The court emphasized the importance of case management and procedural fairness, but held that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to bring the motion and declined to grant leave for it to proceed.

The court was asked to settle the wording of a formal order after the associate judge who made the underlying discovery ruling had retired.

The dispute arose because the parties’ previously agreed draft order did not match the wording of the original reasons, and the registrar refused to sign it.

The court held that in settling the order, it could not revisit the merits, infer a different intention, or implement the parties’ own understanding of what had been meant; it had to ensure the order tracked the reasons as written.

The court therefore signed the plaintiff’s revised draft order with some clarifying amendments and made no order as to costs of the settling process.

In an administrative law appeal concerning federal telecommunications regulation, the Court interpreted the term “transmission line” in ss. 43 and 44 of the Telecommunications Act and the scope of the CRTC’s access-regime jurisdiction over public property.

The majority held that “transmission line” refers to wireline infrastructure and does not include 5G small cell antennas, so the CRTC cannot adjudicate access disputes for antenna siting under that regime.

The Court emphasized text, context, legislative history, and statutory purpose, including Parliament’s allocation of antenna site-approval powers under the Radiocommunication Act.

A two-judge dissent would have interpreted the term to include 5G small cells based on ordinary meaning, statutory coherence, and technological neutrality.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to specified respondents.

The appellant, a gay single man, claimed the medical expense tax credit (METC) for expenses incurred in 2015 for egg donation and gestational surrogacy services.

The Minister disallowed the claim.

The Tax Court of Canada held that the egg donor and surrogates did not meet the statutory definition of 'patient' under the Income Tax Act, as they were not the appellant's spouse, common-law partner, or dependant.

The Court also found that the denial of the METC did not infringe section 15 of the Charter, as the legislation did not treat the appellant differently from others in 2015.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a concession made by the Crown regarding DNA fragmentation expenses.

This endorsement from a case conference addressed several procedural issues in a complex litigation involving Indigenous land claims.

The court provided directions regarding preparatory materials for upcoming out-of-court expert examinations, including the appointment of a hybrid commissioner and deadlines for expert report summaries and legal arguments.

The court also addressed a dispute regarding the scope of cross-examination of an expert witness, directing the parties to narrow issues concerning adversity of interest before seeking further judicial determination.

Finally, the court confirmed the appointment of a pre-trial judge and scheduled the next case conference.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to adduce evidence and for a confidentiality order in the context of a reference regarding the legality of an online provincial lottery scheme permitting international play.

The court granted leave to the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Canadian Lottery Coalition Members to file their proposed evidence, finding it potentially helpful for the reference panel.

The court dismissed the Canadian Gaming Association's motion for a confidentiality order, ruling that alleged reputational harm was a private interest insufficient to override court openness, especially as the information was largely public.

The defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation action was unsuccessful.

This decision addresses the plaintiffs' request for costs.

Despite a statutory presumption against costs for unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court exercised its discretion to award partial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs.

The court found that the original lawsuit did not exhibit the characteristics of strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP) and the impugned expression was not public interest speech.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity and importance of the issues, the court awarded $10,000 in costs to the plaintiffs, reducing the amount claimed due to concerns about the hours spent and the number of lawyers involved.

This endorsement from a case conference addresses procedural issues in a complex litigation, specifically disputes regarding the admissibility of expert reports and estimates of trial length.

The court noted progress in resolving these issues and scheduled a further case conference to revisit them and receive an update on an expert witness's health.

This endorsement from a case conference addresses several procedural issues in a complex litigation.

It sets a timetable for a forthcoming motion by the Attorney General of Canada regarding the taking of evidence from certain witnesses before trial.

The court also noted Ontario's expected late delivery of expert reports, discussed the parties' differing estimates for trial length and scheduled a follow-up conference, and provided guidance on addressing concerns about trial presentation software (CaseLines).

The appellant contested the denial of statutory accident benefits following a 2010 automobile accident, bringing simultaneous proceedings before the Divisional Court by way of statutory appeal on questions of law and judicial review on questions of fact and mixed fact and law.

The courts below held that, where there is a limited statutory right of appeal, judicial review should only be exercised in exceptional or rare cases.

The Supreme Court of Canada held this was an error: a circumscribed statutory right of appeal on questions of law does not restrict the availability of judicial review on questions of fact or mixed fact and law, and the Strickland framework does not support imposing a heightened threshold for judicial review in such circumstances.

The Court further found that the LAT adjudicator's reconsideration decision was unreasonable because he failed to consider the effect of the reinstatement of income replacement benefits on the validity of the initial denial and failed to have regard to relevant tribunal jurisprudence on the point.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the LAT adjudicator for reconsideration.

This costs endorsement followed a partial success on appeal where the appellant, Justice of the Peace Lauzon, had her appeal from the merits decision dismissed but her appeal from the disposition decision allowed, resulting in a reprimand and 30-day suspension instead of removal from office.

While the parties agreed on costs for the appeal, Divisional Court, and leave motion, they disagreed on the costs of the original hearing before the Hearing Panel.

The appellant sought full reimbursement for these hearing costs, arguing her appeal success effectively overruled the reasons for their previous reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this request, finding that the appellant had not sought leave to appeal the Divisional Court's decision on the Hearing Panel's costs recommendation, nor had she demonstrated any reversible error.

The court concluded that the partial success on appeal did not affect the reasonableness of the Hearing Panel's original costs recommendation, and therefore made no order regarding those costs.

This appeal concerns a share-purchase transaction under a unanimous shareholders' agreement (USA) that went awry.

The appellants, Leeder Automotive Inc. and 2786818 Ontario Inc., sought to compel the respondent, Douglas Warwick, to sell his shares.

The application judge dismissed their application, finding that Leeder had repudiated the share-purchase agreement by failing to comply with the USA's valuation provisions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding of repudiation, although it corrected her legal error by clarifying that the share-purchase transaction constituted a standalone contract capable of repudiation, rather than merely an implementation of the USA.

The Court found that Leeder's failures to obtain an independent real estate appraisal and to prepare financial statements in accordance with GAAP, including the improper exclusion of a significant settlement, amounted to fundamental breaches, justifying the respondent's acceptance of repudiation.

The appeal was dismissed.