Deanna Samantha Gilbert

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful 25-day medical malpractice trial where they "beat" a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants proposed a lower costs amount.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $3 million in costs, finding their request consistent with similar complex medical malpractice cases and justified by the defendants' conduct, which unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and increased the plaintiffs' legal work.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' complete success, and the defendants' late disclosure and attempts to introduce contradictory evidence.

The appellant, Randolph Burns, appealed a motion judge's order striking out his statement of claim against two corporate employees (Lauren McLean and Anna Oslizlok) without leave to amend, and granting RBC Life's request for a discovery order.

The appeal concerned the adequacy of claims pleaded against corporate employees for torts allegedly committed in the course of their employment.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge correctly determined that the statement of claim failed to plead specific material facts to support individualized claims against the employees, but erred in denying leave to amend.

The appeal was allowed in part, granting Mr. Burns leave to amend his statement of claim.

The defendants, RBC Life Insurance Company, Lauren McLean, and Anna Oslizlok, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis totaling $7,108.52 after successfully striking out the claim against McLean and Oslizlok and succeeding on a discovery order motion.

The plaintiff, Randolph Burns, argued for a reduced award of $2,265.00, citing uncontested portions, disproportionate time spent by defendants' counsel, and unreasonable settlement discussions.

The court found the motions important and capably argued, rejecting the plaintiff's arguments regarding work product and settlement discussions.

The court awarded $6,000, all inclusive, to the defendants.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking payment of a $300,000 judgment from either Gore Mutual Insurance Company or Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, following a motor vehicle accident.

The central issue was whether Gore's insured (the driver and owner) breached their insurance policy's cooperation clause.

The court found that the policy owner, Ms. Bass, did not breach her obligation to cooperate, despite Gore's difficulties in locating her, attributing these issues to Gore's own errors in communication and search efforts.

Consequently, the court ordered Gore Mutual Insurance Company to pay the judgment.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company.

The plaintiff, Reggie Babcock, was found to be the successful party regarding costs, as the court's order for a defence medical and dismissal of the balance of Wawanesa's relief equalled or beat the plaintiff's offer to settle costs.

The court deemed Wawanesa's motion entirely unnecessary and attributed its necessity to Wawanesa's conduct.

The plaintiff was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $27,810.16, payable by Wawanesa.

The defendant Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company brought a motion seeking orders for the plaintiff to undergo several independent medical examinations (IMEs) in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing delay and the need for leave under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found Wawanesa did not require leave under Rule 48.04 as it had not set the action down for trial or consented to its placement on the trial list.

However, the court criticized Wawanesa's significant delay in seeking IMEs, noting its failure to list expert witnesses in pretrial briefs.

The motion for a neurological examination was granted with strict deadlines for report service, while requests for occupational therapy, otolaryngology, and psychiatric examinations were dismissed due to lack of evidence regarding their necessity or the plaintiff not relying on such evidence.