Peter A. Howie

This is a costs decision following motions heard on June 30, 2025 in a family law proceeding involving parenting time, child support, and related issues.

The applicant sought costs for multiple attendances before the court.

The judge awarded costs totalling $3,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements to the applicant, declining to award costs for certain earlier attendances but awarding costs for the April 17, 2025 child support motion and the June 30, 2025 consolidated motions hearing.

In a family law trial following the separation of a common law couple of over 22 years with three children, the court dismissed the applicant's claim for repayment of an alleged $14,000 loan made to the respondent in September 2018.

The applicant sought repayment plus prejudgment interest, while the respondent denied the funds were a loan and claimed he had provided construction supplies and services in excess of that amount.

After resolving all other outstanding issues including retroactive child and spousal support and section 7 expenses, the court found the applicant had not met her burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that the transaction constituted an enforceable loan.

The court determined the funds were instead a transfer for consideration, representing compensation for the respondent's labour and materials provided for the applicant's business ventures.

During a family law trial, the applicant sought to introduce a handwritten document as evidence of a loan obligation.

The respondent objected on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that the document constituted an offer to settle a family law dispute and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 18(8)(b) of the Family Law Rules, which provides that settlement offers shall not be mentioned to the judge until all issues in dispute except costs have been dealt with.

The court also found that the document did not constitute an admission of the alleged debt, as it merely stated an amount would be paid at a particular time without acknowledging liability.

The plaintiffs, including a national not-for-profit HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C treatment information organization and its employees and board members, brought a defamation action against the defendant for an online libel campaign.

The defendant created profiles on his website labeling the plaintiffs as "groomers" and pedophiles, posted defamatory content on social media platforms, and left threatening voicemail messages at the plaintiffs' workplace.

The defendant's conduct was motivated by hatred stemming from the plaintiffs' association with the 2SLGBTQIA+ community.

The defendant failed to respond to the action and was noted in default.

The court granted default judgment, finding the statements were clearly defamatory, and awarded substantial general and aggravated damages.

A permanent injunction was issued requiring removal of all defamatory publications and prohibiting further defamatory statements.

The decision addresses a motion by The Corporation of the Town of Atikokan to set aside a noting in default in a civil action brought by Melissa Bates regarding property flooding.

The court reviews the procedural history, the conduct of the parties, and the applicable legal principles under Rule 19.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court finds that, although Atikokan’s delay in delivering its Statement of Defence was unwarranted, the litigation was progressing and the delay did not fundamentally prejudice the plaintiff.

The court grants the motion, sets aside the noting in default, and provides directions regarding costs.

The court considered written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' success in two related defamation actions against the defendant, Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the egregious nature of the defendant's conduct and the failure to accept reasonable offers to settle.

The court found the plaintiffs' costs reasonable and rejected the defendant's arguments for lower costs, emphasizing the importance and complexity of the proceedings and the impact on the drag community.

The court considered written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' success in two related defamation actions against the defendant.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs in both actions, reflecting the court's view of the defendant's egregious conduct and the importance of deterrence.

The court rejected the defendant's arguments for lower costs and found the plaintiffs' bills of costs reasonable, noting the complexity and significance of the proceedings, including the involvement of expert witnesses and an intervenor.

The court granted summary judgment in two related libel actions brought by Rainbow Alliance Dryden, Caitlin Hartlen, Felicia Crichton, and John-Marcel Forget against Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Webster published defamatory posts on Facebook, falsely associating them with grooming and sexual predation of children.

The court found the posts were defamatory, identified the plaintiffs, and were published to third parties.

The court rejected Mr. Webster’s defences, including fair comment, and found he acted with malice.

General and aggravated damages were awarded to each plaintiff.

The court granted summary judgment in two related libel actions brought by Felicia Crichton, John-Marcel Forget, Rainbow Alliance Dryden, and Caitlin Hartlen against Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs alleged that Webster's social media posts falsely labelled them as "groomers" and pedophiles, causing reputational harm and distress.

The court found the posts were defamatory, identified the plaintiffs, and were published to third parties.

Webster's defences, including fair comment, were rejected.

The court awarded each plaintiff $75,000 in general damages and $20,000 in aggravated damages, finding Webster's conduct was malicious and constituted hate speech.

The defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation action was unsuccessful.

This decision addresses the plaintiffs' request for costs.

Despite a statutory presumption against costs for unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court exercised its discretion to award partial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs.

The court found that the original lawsuit did not exhibit the characteristics of strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP) and the impugned expression was not public interest speech.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity and importance of the issues, the court awarded $10,000 in costs to the plaintiffs, reducing the amount claimed due to concerns about the hours spent and the number of lawyers involved.

Dawn Gustafson applied for a Recognizance to Keep the Peace order against her brother, Grant Gustafson, under section 810 of the Criminal Code, following an incident involving verbal altercations and a dispute over parental finances.

The court, applying a civil standard of proof, found that the applicant did not have reasonable grounds for fear, as her actions during and after the incident contradicted her testimony of fear, and the respondent's conduct did not involve physical threats or property damage.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a trial judge's order for retroactive non-compensatory spousal support and determinations regarding the matrimonial home, including ownership, expenses, and occupancy rent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the respondent was financially dependent on the appellant, that the retroactive support was notionally rather than actually paid due to prior expense contributions, and that the presumption of joint tenancy for the matrimonial home was not rebutted.

The court emphasized deference to the trial judge's factual findings and discretionary decisions in family law matters.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of an application alleging a contravention of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent, who successfully defended the application, sought costs on an actual or substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued for a significantly lower amount.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, applied the principle of reasonableness.

Despite the respondent's offer to settle for dismissal without costs, the court found the quantum sought by the respondent excessive given the limited complexity and duration of the proceeding.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, increased due to the respondent's offer to settle, for a total of $15,000.00 to be paid by the applicant.

The Anishinaabe Abinoojii Family Services applied for warrants for two children, leading to a child protection application.

The mother and First Nation challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing the agency failed to bring the application within the five-day statutory limit following two apprehensions (one in October 2023 and one in December 2023).

The court found that the October apprehension was without legal authority due to lack of consent and failure to comply with the five-day rule, but deemed it a discrete event that did not preclude a subsequent intervention.

For the December apprehension, the court applied the Family Law Rules for calculating time and found the agency complied with the five-day limit.

The court concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the current child protection proceeding.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent, a municipal councillor, contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) by participating in a council vote to indemnify himself and other councillors for legal expenses incurred in responding to a Human Rights Tribunal application.

The applicant argued the respondent had a pecuniary interest and sought to have his seat declared vacant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent's actions did not contravene the MCIA, particularly under the s. 4(i) exception for benefits related to a member's duties, and that the indemnification by-law was mandatory.

The court also noted that even if there was a contravention, the severity claimed was not warranted, and the respondent acted in good faith.

This decision addresses a voir dire application by the Kenora-Rainy River Districts Child and Family Services to admit out-of-court utterances made by two young children (ages 7 and 5) in a child protection proceeding.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule from R. v. Khan, assessing both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that requiring the children to testify would cause emotional harm, satisfying necessity.

It admitted statements made to child protection workers due to their training, contemporaneous notes, and lack of fabrication motive.

However, statements reported by the children's grandmother were deemed inadmissible due to reliability concerns.

The court also admitted the "voice of the children" memo from the Office of the Children's Lawyer, but cautioned against counsel acting as a witness and recommended best practices for future interviews.

Lee Mosley was convicted of four criminal offenses, including pointing a firearm, possessing a weapon contrary to a s. 109 prohibition order, failing to comply with a release order, and unauthorized weapon possession.

The charges stemmed from an incident where Mosley brandished a handgun at two unarmed men attempting to retrieve stolen tires from his property.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a real firearm, the existing prohibition order, and the threat posed to public safety, alongside mitigating factors like the absence of prior firearms convictions and a history of trauma.

The pre-sentence report indicated a lack of insight and remorse.

The court imposed a total sentence of three years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for firearms offenses, while rejecting the Crown's request for 4.5 years as disproportionate given the specific facts and the accused's record.

This endorsement from a case management conference addresses procedural issues in two related actions.

The court set a timeline for the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion in one action and ordered that any anti-SLAPP motion in the second action be heard concurrently, citing efficiency and consistency.

The court also set a timeline for the defendant's Rule 59 motion regarding a prior costs order.

The defendant's request for an out-of-town judge due to his media status was denied, with the court clarifying that such appointments are typically reserved for cases involving local lawyers to avoid perceived bias.

This sentencing decision concerns H.T., an Anishnaabe-ikwe, found guilty of three counts of simple assault and one count of mischief under $5000, arising from an intimate partner relationship.

The court considered extensive Gladue factors, including intergenerational trauma from residential schools, child welfare system involvement, sexual exploitation, and substance abuse, which significantly diminished her moral culpability.

Despite the Crown seeking incarceration, the court granted conditional discharges with probation, emphasizing H.T.'s significant rehabilitative efforts, sobriety, and commitment to parenting.

The decision highlights the importance of rehabilitation and restraint in sentencing Aboriginal offenders, particularly when systemic factors have contributed to their circumstances.