Peter A. Howie

The self-represented moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order that had itself declined to extend time for him to appeal a default order in a support enforcement proceeding.

The panel applied the deferential standard requiring an error in law or misapprehension of material evidence before intervening.

Finding no such error, the panel upheld the motion judge's refusal of the extension, which was based on the proposed appeal being manifestly without merit and an abuse of process.

The panel noted that concerns regarding incarceration, support payment history, and arrears calculation had been previously decided and upheld on appeal, and could not be addressed through the proposed appeal in the context of a support enforcement proceeding.

The applicant brought a motion for permission to have his hearing before a single judge of the Court of Appeal transcribed to assist in his argument before a review panel.

The single judge had previously dismissed his motion for an extension of time to appeal an order for payment of spousal support arrears.

The court dismissed the motion for a transcript, noting the Practice Direction establishes a presumption against transcribing hearings and the applicant provided no argument as to why it would be in the interest of justice.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary his interim child support obligations, seeking a reduction due to his inability to work for medical reasons.

He also sought relief from garnishment proceedings and orders regarding joint debts.

The court found that a 30% reduction in income due to short-term disability constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court ordered a reduction in interim child support contingent upon the respondent providing confirmation of his receipt of short-term disability benefits.

The court declined to interfere with garnishment proceedings for outstanding legal costs, but noted the applicant's undertaking to cease child support garnishment upon confirmation of the variation.

The parties consented to make equal payments towards a joint line of credit.

The moving party sought an extension of time in family support enforcement proceedings after repeated prior litigation.

Applying extension criteria, the court found no merit and characterized the proposed appeal as another collateral attack on long-settled support issues, amounting to abuse of process.

The applicants, a law firm and its named partners, sought a permanent injunction requiring the respondent to remove defamatory online publications and prohibiting further defamatory material.

The respondent had published over one hundred posts on X and articles on a website targeting the applicants in reprisal for their representation of a client in a prior defamation action that resulted in a $1.75 million default judgment against the respondent.

The respondent did not dispute authorship of the posts and admitted to making the publications, though he claimed they were motivated by concern over inappropriate material reaching children.

The court found the posts were defamatory, lowering the applicants' reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person, and constituted relentless personal and professional attacks on lawyers for representing a client.

A permanent injunction was granted with costs fixed at $500.

This is a costs decision following motions heard on June 30, 2025 in a family law proceeding involving parenting time, child support, and related issues.

The applicant sought costs for multiple attendances before the court.

The judge awarded costs totalling $3,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements to the applicant, declining to award costs for certain earlier attendances but awarding costs for the April 17, 2025 child support motion and the June 30, 2025 consolidated motions hearing.

In a family law trial following the separation of a common law couple of over 22 years with three children, the court dismissed the applicant's claim for repayment of an alleged $14,000 loan made to the respondent in September 2018.

The applicant sought repayment plus prejudgment interest, while the respondent denied the funds were a loan and claimed he had provided construction supplies and services in excess of that amount.

After resolving all other outstanding issues including retroactive child and spousal support and section 7 expenses, the court found the applicant had not met her burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that the transaction constituted an enforceable loan.

The court determined the funds were instead a transfer for consideration, representing compensation for the respondent's labour and materials provided for the applicant's business ventures.

During a family law trial, the applicant sought to introduce a handwritten document as evidence of a loan obligation.

The respondent objected on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that the document constituted an offer to settle a family law dispute and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 18(8)(b) of the Family Law Rules, which provides that settlement offers shall not be mentioned to the judge until all issues in dispute except costs have been dealt with.

The court also found that the document did not constitute an admission of the alleged debt, as it merely stated an amount would be paid at a particular time without acknowledging liability.

The plaintiffs, including a national not-for-profit HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C treatment information organization and its employees and board members, brought a defamation action against the defendant for an online libel campaign.

The defendant created profiles on his website labeling the plaintiffs as "groomers" and pedophiles, posted defamatory content on social media platforms, and left threatening voicemail messages at the plaintiffs' workplace.

The defendant's conduct was motivated by hatred stemming from the plaintiffs' association with the 2SLGBTQIA+ community.

The defendant failed to respond to the action and was noted in default.

The court granted default judgment, finding the statements were clearly defamatory, and awarded substantial general and aggravated damages.

A permanent injunction was issued requiring removal of all defamatory publications and prohibiting further defamatory statements.

The decision addresses a motion by The Corporation of the Town of Atikokan to set aside a noting in default in a civil action brought by Melissa Bates regarding property flooding.

The court reviews the procedural history, the conduct of the parties, and the applicable legal principles under Rule 19.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court finds that, although Atikokan’s delay in delivering its Statement of Defence was unwarranted, the litigation was progressing and the delay did not fundamentally prejudice the plaintiff.

The court grants the motion, sets aside the noting in default, and provides directions regarding costs.

The Applicant mother brought a motion for interim child support and disclosure, which the Respondent father sought to adjourn to be heard alongside an upcoming parenting time motion.

The parties agreed to proceed solely on the issue of temporary child support pending the final hearing.

The court rejected the Respondent's arguments that he had a shared parenting arrangement and that his recent higher income years were non-recurring outliers.

Consequently, the court ordered the Respondent to pay interim child support of $1,613.90 per month commencing May 1, 2025, and adjourned the remainder of the motion to June 30, 2025.

The court considered written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' success in two related defamation actions against the defendant.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs in both actions, reflecting the court's view of the defendant's egregious conduct and the importance of deterrence.

The court rejected the defendant's arguments for lower costs and found the plaintiffs' bills of costs reasonable, noting the complexity and significance of the proceedings, including the involvement of expert witnesses and an intervenor.

The court considered written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' success in two related defamation actions against the defendant, Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the egregious nature of the defendant's conduct and the failure to accept reasonable offers to settle.

The court found the plaintiffs' costs reasonable and rejected the defendant's arguments for lower costs, emphasizing the importance and complexity of the proceedings and the impact on the drag community.

This endorsement addresses an uncontested motion to change a spousal support order.

The respondent, Otto Budziak, sought to terminate his spousal support obligations and recalculate or eliminate arrears.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a significant reduction in Mr. Budziak’s income and terminated his ongoing support obligation effective March 1, 2025.

However, the court declined to address arrears or withdraw the order from the Family Responsibility Office without further evidence and proper procedure.

The matter of arrears was adjourned, and the applicant, Audrey Duval, was to be served with this endorsement and any new materials.

The court granted summary judgment in two related libel actions brought by Rainbow Alliance Dryden, Caitlin Hartlen, Felicia Crichton, and John-Marcel Forget against Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Webster published defamatory posts on Facebook, falsely associating them with grooming and sexual predation of children.

The court found the posts were defamatory, identified the plaintiffs, and were published to third parties.

The court rejected Mr. Webster’s defences, including fair comment, and found he acted with malice.

General and aggravated damages were awarded to each plaintiff.

The court granted summary judgment in two related libel actions brought by Felicia Crichton, John-Marcel Forget, Rainbow Alliance Dryden, and Caitlin Hartlen against Brian Webster.

The plaintiffs alleged that Webster's social media posts falsely labelled them as "groomers" and pedophiles, causing reputational harm and distress.

The court found the posts were defamatory, identified the plaintiffs, and were published to third parties.

Webster's defences, including fair comment, were rejected.

The court awarded each plaintiff $75,000 in general damages and $20,000 in aggravated damages, finding Webster's conduct was malicious and constituted hate speech.

The defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation action was unsuccessful.

This decision addresses the plaintiffs' request for costs.

Despite a statutory presumption against costs for unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court exercised its discretion to award partial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs.

The court found that the original lawsuit did not exhibit the characteristics of strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP) and the impugned expression was not public interest speech.

Considering factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity and importance of the issues, the court awarded $10,000 in costs to the plaintiffs, reducing the amount claimed due to concerns about the hours spent and the number of lawyers involved.

Dawn Gustafson applied for a Recognizance to Keep the Peace order against her brother, Grant Gustafson, under section 810 of the Criminal Code, following an incident involving verbal altercations and a dispute over parental finances.

The court, applying a civil standard of proof, found that the applicant did not have reasonable grounds for fear, as her actions during and after the incident contradicted her testimony of fear, and the respondent's conduct did not involve physical threats or property damage.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a trial judge's order for retroactive non-compensatory spousal support and determinations regarding the matrimonial home, including ownership, expenses, and occupancy rent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the respondent was financially dependent on the appellant, that the retroactive support was notionally rather than actually paid due to prior expense contributions, and that the presumption of joint tenancy for the matrimonial home was not rebutted.

The court emphasized deference to the trial judge's factual findings and discretionary decisions in family law matters.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of an application alleging a contravention of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent, who successfully defended the application, sought costs on an actual or substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued for a significantly lower amount.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, applied the principle of reasonableness.

Despite the respondent's offer to settle for dismissal without costs, the court found the quantum sought by the respondent excessive given the limited complexity and duration of the proceeding.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, increased due to the respondent's offer to settle, for a total of $15,000.00 to be paid by the applicant.