Joanne Clouston

The applicant child protection society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection under ss. 74(2)(h) and 74(2)(i) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, due to parental mental health, substance use, neglect of medical needs, and unsanitary home conditions.

The respondent mother opposed the application.

The court found the children were not in need of protection under the pleaded grounds of emotional harm but found them in need of protection under ss. 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) due to the parents' failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise, or protect the children, and a pattern of such behavior, particularly concerning unsanitary living conditions and exposure to adult conflict.

This decision addresses a voir dire application by the Kenora-Rainy River Districts Child and Family Services to admit out-of-court utterances made by two young children (ages 7 and 5) in a child protection proceeding.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule from R. v. Khan, assessing both necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that requiring the children to testify would cause emotional harm, satisfying necessity.

It admitted statements made to child protection workers due to their training, contemporaneous notes, and lack of fabrication motive.

However, statements reported by the children's grandmother were deemed inadmissible due to reliability concerns.

The court also admitted the "voice of the children" memo from the Office of the Children's Lawyer, but cautioned against counsel acting as a witness and recommended best practices for future interviews.

This is a sentencing decision for Skye Blackburde, an Indigenous woman, who pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing the death of Marcella Jourdain.

The incident involved high blood alcohol and cannabis levels, reckless driving at excessive speed (147 km/h on a gravel road with an 80 km/h limit), and prior related driving convictions.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the accused's criminal record and dangerous driving, alongside substantial mitigating factors.

These mitigating factors included her late but genuine guilty plea, sincere remorse, and extensive rehabilitative efforts, including successful completion of residential treatment and active participation in community aftercare, leading to a pro-social lifestyle and employment.

The court also gave due weight to Gladue principles, acknowledging her horrific upbringing and its impact on her moral culpability.

While emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, the court balanced these with rehabilitation and the Gladue factors, ultimately imposing a six-year custodial sentence, reduced to three years and eleven months after accounting for pre-trial custody, treatment time, and restrictive bail conditions.