Adam Goldenberg

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Centa J. dated April 17, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant, a justice of the peace, wrote a newspaper article criticizing the conduct of Crown prosecutors in bail courts.

A Hearing Panel found she committed judicial misconduct and recommended her removal from office, finding she was irremediably biased against Crown prosecutors.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the Panel's finding of bias was unreasonable as it relied on a subjective test and lacked evidentiary support.

The Court further held that the recommendation for removal was grossly disproportionate, failed to properly apply the Doré framework to balance the appellant's Charter right to freedom of expression, and ignored mitigating factors.

The appeal was allowed, and a reprimand with a 30-day suspension without pay was substituted.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful 25-day medical malpractice trial where they "beat" a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants proposed a lower costs amount.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $3 million in costs, finding their request consistent with similar complex medical malpractice cases and justified by the defendants' conduct, which unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and increased the plaintiffs' legal work.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' complete success, and the defendants' late disclosure and attempts to introduce contradictory evidence.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion seeking leave to examine three expert witnesses before trial.

The parties largely resolved the motion, leaving the court to adjudicate the quantum of interim costs payable by Canada to the plaintiff (Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians) and the costs of the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in interim costs to indemnify for financial prejudice due to duplicated work and early incurred expenses from the pre-trial examinations.

The court declined to award costs for the motion itself, finding that all parties had compromised their positions and no exceptional circumstances warranted a costs award.

The plaintiffs in two medical negligence actions appealed a decision dismissing their motions to compel production of documents and answers to discovery questions related to hospital quality of care reviews.

The Associate Justice had found the information irrelevant and protected by common law quality assurance privilege.

On appeal, the court found the documents and questions to be relevant but upheld the Associate Justice's conclusion that a common law evidentiary privilege (Wigmore test) applied to the quality assurance communications, and that the Quality of Care Information Protection Act, 2016 (QCIPA) did not abrogate this common law privilege.

The appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a catastrophic brain bleed and traumatic brain injury during an elective multi-step medical intervention for an asymptomatic brain AVM.

The plaintiff brought a medical negligence action against the treating physicians, alleging a failure to obtain informed consent.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the physicians failed to adequately disclose the cumulative risks of the multi-step procedure, the likelihood of requiring surgical resection, and the risks of conservative management.

The court concluded that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have proceeded with the intervention had they been properly informed, and held the physicians liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to exclude the defendants' expert witness, a vascular neurosurgeon and interventional neuroradiologist, on the basis of bias.

The court conducted a voir dire and reviewed the expert's reports, past testimony, and relationship with the defendant physicians.

The court found that the expert was not impartial, acted as an advocate, failed to disclose his professional and personal relationship with one of the defendants, and assumed the defendants' evidence was credible while ignoring the plaintiffs' evidence.

The court concluded that the expert was unable and unwilling to comply with his duty to the court and excluded his evidence in its entirety.

The plaintiffs in two medical negligence actions brought refusals motions seeking production of information and documents from hospital case reviews and morbidity and mortality rounds.

The defendants argued the information was irrelevant and protected by common law quality assurance privilege.

The court dismissed the motions, finding the information irrelevant as it involved hindsight and potential remedial measures.

Furthermore, the court held that the Quality of Care Information Protection Act, 2004 did not abrogate common law privilege, and the communications satisfied the Wigmore criteria for protection.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from enforcing the deemed terminations of 34 Feed-In Tariff (FIT) contracts and discontinuing payments.

The court found that the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had deemed the contracts terminated.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction but failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the issues of termination had been decided in prior litigation.

The court also found the plaintiffs' evidence of irreparable harm to be speculative.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought motions to approve a $10 million national settlement in a class action regarding PayPal's foreign currency conversion practices, and to approve class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant litigation risks and the efficient direct-deposit distribution protocol.

The court also approved class counsel's 25% contingency fee request and awarded a $10,000 honorarium to the representative plaintiff for his exceptional efforts in initiating the litigation.

The Canadian Constitution Foundation challenged the constitutionality of section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibited making or publishing false statements about political figures with the intent to affect election results.

The provision was amended in 2018 to remove the word 'knowingly'.

The applicant argued this amendment rendered the provision an unjustifiable infringement on freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the removal of 'knowingly' was a substantive change, meaning the offence no longer required proof that the statement was known to be false.

Without this knowledge element, the provision failed the minimal impairment test under section 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act was declared to be of no force or effect.

The appellant contractor brought an action for breach of contract after the respondent condominium corporations exercised a contractual termination clause following months during which the respondents knowingly misled the appellant into believing the agreement would not be terminated.

The majority held that the duty of honest performance, as formulated in Bhasin v. Hrynew, precludes active deception and applies to the exercise of all contractual rights, including termination rights; the respondents breached that duty by failing to correct the false impression they had created, which was directly linked to performance of the contract.

A concurring minority agreed on liability but differed on the measure of damages, holding that the duty of honest performance vindicates the reliance interest rather than the expectation interest.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the respondents' conduct did not materially contribute to the appellant's mistaken belief and did not constitute the active dishonesty required for a breach of the duty of honest performance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge's award of damages was reinstated.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 91 of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibits certain false statements during an election period, and sought an urgent hearing timetable to have the matter decided before the end of the ongoing federal election.

The court dismissed the request for an expedited timetable, noting that the applicant delayed in bringing the application despite the legislation being in force for months.

The court emphasized that complex Charter challenges require careful preparation and should not be decided under artificial urgency, especially when a decision would likely not be rendered in time to materially impact the election.

The appellants purchased railway land in Niagara Falls from Canadian National Railway Company (CN) in 2008, with CN taking back a mortgage.

The appellants defaulted and CN sued.

The appellants brought a third-party action against their solicitors (McMillan LLP, Philip Thompson, and Marssa Giahi) for negligence, claiming they failed to properly advise about a Director's order under the Environmental Protection Act registered on title.

The respondents obtained summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in applying Rule 20 principles and that genuine issues for trial existed regarding the duty of care, knowledge of the Director's order, and causation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no negligence claim against McMillan due to lack of involvement in the final transaction, and no duty to warn Thompson and Giahi given the "as is" agreement and client's explicit instructions not to investigate environmental concerns.

The applicant physician faced disciplinary proceedings before the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding allegations of sexual abuse made by a former patient.

The applicant sought to disclose the complainant's psychiatric records, which he obtained both while acting as her treating physician and later in error, to challenge her credibility and reliability based on her diagnosis of borderline personality disorder.

The Divisional Court held that section 35(9) of the Mental Health Act applied to both sets of records, taking precedence over the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court ordered disclosure of the records, finding it was essential in the interests of justice to allow the applicant to make full answer and defence, while protecting the complainant's privacy through a publication ban.

The appellants appealed an order directing the liquidation of Tarn Financial Corporation under the oppression provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The application judge found that the appellant had engaged in self-dealing and diverted corporate funds for personal benefit, and ordered liquidation as the only viable remedy to separate the parties.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge should have ordered a forced buyout instead.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error and properly exercised his discretion, as a forced buyout would leave the appellant in control of the valuation process and fail to ensure fair market value.

On a motion to quash, the court held that orders granting leave to amend a statement of defence and adding a party defendant for limited purposes were interlocutory, not final.

The motion judge's discussion of res judicata and the Limitations Act, 2002 did not amount to a final determination of those issues on the merits, but only a preliminary assessment that the proposed defence was tenable under rule 26.01.

The court emphasized that appeals lie from orders, not reasons, and that the nature of the underlying motion governs the characterization of the order.

Because the litigation continued and no substantive right was finally determined, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeals were quashed and leave to appeal the costs award was refused.