Leah Ostler

The plaintiff brought a motion to prohibit Dr. John Bohnen from testifying as an expert for the defence, alleging issues with his expert reports (unsigned, invalid contact information) and potential bias due to his past relationship with a defendant and frequent retention by the defence law firm.

The court applied the two-stage test for expert admissibility from *White Burgess* and *Mohan*.

The judge found that the initial failure to sign a report was not a material omission, the contact information provided was valid, and the expert's professional relationships did not demonstrate a lack of independence sufficient to disqualify him.

The motion was dismissed, with the court concluding that the issues raised by the plaintiff pertained to the weight of the expert's evidence rather than its admissibility.

In a medical malpractice action arising from hernia procedures, the defendants brought a motion during trial to exclude certain evidence the plaintiff sought to introduce.

The plaintiff sought to admit decisions from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) regarding his complaint, as well as anonymous online reviews of the defendant physician.

The court ruled the CPSO documents were strictly inadmissible under s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The court also excluded the online reviews, finding they were hearsay and did not meet the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled exception.

The Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario (FSRA) appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its motion to stay a class proceeding initiated by Brewers Retail Inc. and a committee of pension plan members.

The class proceeding sought court approval of a comprehensive settlement regarding pension indexing issues, including amendments to the pension plan and trust, and compensation for known and unknown plan members.

FSRA argued that the Financial Services Tribunal (FST) had exclusive jurisdiction over these matters under the Pension Benefits Act (PBA) and the Financial Services Tribunal Act, 2017 (FSTA).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction, noting that neither the FSTA nor the PBA contained clear and unequivocal language ousting the court's inherent equitable jurisdiction to approve settlements and vary trusts.

The court affirmed that the class proceeding was the preferable procedure, as the FST lacked the power to approve the settlement or vary the pension trust, and the class action provided the necessary finality for all affected plan members.

This is an appeal by Dr. Dimitrois Giannoulias from an Associate Justice's order that partially struck paragraphs from a Statement of Claim alleging medical negligence, prior incompetence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appeal specifically challenged the Associate Justice's decision not to strike certain pleadings related to the appellant's alleged high surgical complication rates, criticism by experts, and knowledge of deficient skills, arguing these were bald allegations lacking material facts.

The court allowed the appeal, finding the Associate Justice erred in law by not applying the correct test for pleading similar fact evidence and breach of fiduciary duty, as these allegations lacked sufficient material facts or supporting evidence.

The plaintiffs in two medical negligence actions appealed a decision dismissing their motions to compel production of documents and answers to discovery questions related to hospital quality of care reviews.

The Associate Justice had found the information irrelevant and protected by common law quality assurance privilege.

On appeal, the court found the documents and questions to be relevant but upheld the Associate Justice's conclusion that a common law evidentiary privilege (Wigmore test) applied to the quality assurance communications, and that the Quality of Care Information Protection Act, 2016 (QCIPA) did not abrogate this common law privilege.

The appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiffs in two putative class actions sought leave to discontinue one action entirely and partially discontinue the second against all but one defendant group.

This procedural step aimed to streamline the proceedings by converting omnibus actions into separate class proceedings against distinct defendant groups.

The defendants did not oppose the requests.

The court granted leave for both discontinuances, recognizing the efficiency gains.

This decision provides supplementary reasons to a prior motion to strike pleadings in a medical malpractice case.

The court ruled on previously unaddressed paragraphs and clarified others in the Statement of Claim and Proposed Amended Statement of Claim.

It addressed allegations related to a doctor's deficient skills, failure to disclose, and the hospital's knowledge of complaints.

The court struck certain pleadings that improperly referenced unidentified prior conduct without sufficient material facts, while upholding others related to breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages where sufficient material facts were pleaded.

This is a costs endorsement following a judgment certifying a class action settlement.

The Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) intervened to oppose the certification and sought a stay, but was entirely unsuccessful on the merits.

The court considered costs submissions from Brewers Retail Inc. (Applicant), the Committee representing the proposed class of pensioners (Respondents), and FSRA (Intervenor).

The court denied FSRA's request for costs, finding its intervention caused additional costs for other parties.

The court awarded Brewers Retail Inc. $159,000 and the Committee $51,000, both inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be paid by FSRA, finding their efforts necessary and reasonable given FSRA's strenuous opposition.

Roger Poirier (appellant) sued multiple defendants for fraud and misrepresentation related to a failed business investment.

He settled his claim with one defendant, Jerry Friedberg, but failed to disclose this settlement to the other defendants for six months.

The motion judge stayed the action against the remaining defendants, finding the non-disclosure to be an abuse of process.

Poirier appealed, arguing the motion judge applied an incorrect legal test and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that immediate disclosure of settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape is mandatory, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings, regardless of prejudice to the non-settling parties.

The appellant, MAK, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of making treatment decisions for his bipolar condition and confirmed a Community Treatment Order.

MAK argued that the Board erred in law and fact by misapprehending evidence, failing to assess his capacity at the time of the hearing, and incorrectly concluding he met the requirements for a Community Treatment Order.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Board correctly applied the legal tests for capacity and Community Treatment Orders, and that its factual findings, including MAK's inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of non-treatment, were entitled to deference.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions related to a Mareva injunction in a class proceeding concerning the 'Freedom Convoy' funds.

The court extended the Mareva injunction with modifications, adjourned motions to dissolve the injunction and amend the statement of claim, and granted a Toronto Dominion Bank interpleader motion to transfer funds to an escrow agent.

The decision also clarified the interplay between the civil Mareva injunction and criminal restraint orders, and addressed issues concerning cryptocurrency seized by police and funds held by a third-party fundraising platform, GiveSendGo LLC.

The court emphasized the importance of keeping separate proceedings distinct while managing related matters.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend an ex parte Mareva injunction previously granted against organizers and funders of the Freedom Convoy.

The injunction aimed to restrain the dissipation of assets for potential civil liability to Ottawa residents and businesses.

The court granted a temporary extension and modification of the injunction by consent, allowing certain funds to be transferred to an escrow agent, and adjourned the motion for a further hearing.

The decision emphasized the civil nature of the proceeding, separate from criminal processes.

The applicant employer sought to certify a class action on consent for settlement purposes regarding a long-standing dispute over pension plan indexing amendments.

The provincial pension regulator, FSRA, intervened to oppose the settlement and sought to stay the court proceedings in favour of a regulatory hearing before the Financial Services Tribunal.

The court granted FSRA leave to intervene but dismissed the stay motion, finding it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the pension dispute and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to achieve finality for all known and unknown plan members.

The action was certified as a class proceeding.

The plaintiffs in two medical negligence actions brought refusals motions seeking production of information and documents from hospital case reviews and morbidity and mortality rounds.

The defendants argued the information was irrelevant and protected by common law quality assurance privilege.

The court dismissed the motions, finding the information irrelevant as it involved hindsight and potential remedial measures.

Furthermore, the court held that the Quality of Care Information Protection Act, 2004 did not abrogate common law privilege, and the communications satisfied the Wigmore criteria for protection.

This motion concerned the immediate disclosure of a settlement agreement between a plaintiff and one of several co-defendants in a deceit action.

The plaintiff, Roger Poirier, settled with defendant Jerry Friedberg, but failed to immediately disclose the settlement terms to the remaining co-defendants, Jeremy Logan, Hilary Goldstein, and Buchli Goldstein LLP.

The co-defendants brought a motion to dismiss Poirier's action as an abuse of process, arguing that the settlement fundamentally altered the litigation's adversarial orientation.

The court granted the motion, holding that the settlement, which included Friedberg providing an affidavit vetted by plaintiff's counsel, significantly changed the litigation landscape, and the delay in disclosure constituted an abuse of process, warranting dismissal of the action.

The plaintiff moved to certify a proposed class action against TD Asset Management Inc. (TDAM) alleging that TDAM improperly paid "trailing commissions" to discount brokers for "service and advice" that was not provided, thereby wasting Mutual Fund assets and causing investor losses.

The court granted certification for claims of breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, disallowance of improper expenses under s. 23.1 of the Trustee Act, and prospectus misrepresentation.

However, claims for knowing assistance, knowing receipt, and unjust enrichment were struck as analytically unworkable or lacking a proper basis in fact.

The court affirmed the plaintiff's standing as a unitholder to sue the trustee and manager, and found the class definition and common issues suitable for certification, reiterating that certification is a low hurdle not concerned with the merits.

Following the dismissal of Bell Canada's application, Cloudwifi's motion to dismiss/stay, and Cloudwifi's cross-application, both parties sought costs.

Bell sought partial indemnity costs of $122,572.78, and Cloudwifi sought $116,145.76.

The court declined to award costs to either party.

Bell was not entitled to costs as its application was dismissed.

Cloudwifi was denied costs despite its success on the jurisdictional issue because its actions in unlawfully utilizing Bell's equipment amounted to significant misconduct.

Bell Canada brought an application seeking declarations, an injunction, and a mandatory order against Cloudwifi Inc. and Gary Kenning for allegedly wrongful access and use of Bell's telecommunications equipment and breach of a prior settlement agreement.

Cloudwifi responded with a motion to dismiss or stay Bell's application, asserting the CRTC's exclusive jurisdiction, and a cross-application seeking declarations and damages against Bell.

The court dismissed Cloudwifi's motion to stay as moot due to a prior CRTC decision.

It found that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the regulatory aspects of equipment access, but the court retained exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged breach of the settlement agreement.

Ultimately, the court dismissed Bell's application, finding no breach of the settlement agreement and declining to issue declarations on regulatory matters.

Cloudwifi's cross-application was also dismissed, as it was conditional on the motion's outcome and involved claims better suited for an action.

An appeal concerning a freedom of religion challenge to the medical and legal criteria for determining death.

The appellant's substitute decision-makers sought to prevent the withdrawal of life support and to rescind a death certificate based on the appellant's religious belief that death occurs only when the heart stops beating, not upon total brain death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's conclusion that the claim could not succeed.

However, the court provided important guidance on the proper analytical approach to Charter rights and Charter values, clarifying that the appellant should have been presumed to be a Charter rights holder for purposes of the substantive analysis, and that the application judge erred in her methodology regarding freedom of religion analysis and Charter values application to the common law.

The applicant, though unsuccessful in the main application concerning the determination of brain death and the withdrawal of life support, sought partial indemnity costs from the respondent physician, arguing the case involved significant public interest issues.

The respondent, who was successful, did not seek costs but argued for each party to bear their own costs.

The court acknowledged the public interest dimensions of the case, particularly regarding the common law definition of death and Charter rights, but found it did not meet the "truly exceptional" standard for special costs as set out in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).

Crucially, the court noted a lack of authority for awarding costs to an unsuccessful litigant against a private individual respondent, as opposed to a government or public authority.

Consequently, the applicant's request for costs was denied, and parties were ordered to bear their own costs.