Natalie Kolos

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion to extend the time permitted for cross-examinations of the defendants' affiants on pending anti-SLAPP motions.

The defendants had filed 14 affidavits across four separate motions.

The court found that limiting the plaintiffs to the statutory seven hours would prevent meaningful cross-examination and that it was in the interests of justice to extend the time to 15 hours.

The moving party, a student who sued his college over grades, sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an order enforcing a $4,000 settlement agreement.

The motion was brought nearly a year after the original decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the delay was unreasonable and unexplained, the proposed appeal lacked merit, and the underlying claim was likely frivolous.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the responding parties.

The appellant, a former police officer, was investigated for corruption and bribery.

Police obtained a wiretap authorization based on an affidavit that deliberately misdescribed a police agent as a confidential informant.

The appellant was charged criminally based on intercepted communications, but the charges were eventually withdrawn by the Crown due to anticipated Charter breaches regarding the wiretap.

The appellant then sued the investigators and police board for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other civil wrongs.

The trial judge dismissed the action, admitting the wiretap evidence and finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the wiretap evidence was properly admitted in the civil trial to establish the truth of the grounds for the charges, and that the trial judge made no error in finding that the investigators had both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds.

This was an application for a Norwich order seeking disclosure of an unredacted complaint and the identity of its anonymous author from Metrolinx, a non-party.

The applicants, Brandon Taylor, Sarah Taylor, and JAAX Inc., intended to sue the complainant for defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and intentional interference with economic relations, alleging significant personal and business harm.

Metrolinx opposed disclosure, citing confidentiality and privacy policies, and the complainant's refusal to consent due to safety concerns.

The court applied the five-part Norwich test, finding that the applicants had a bona fide claim and that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns, particularly because the communication did not originate in confidence and confidentiality was not essential to the relationship between an unsolicited complainant and a Crown corporation.

The application was granted, ordering Metrolinx to disclose the complainant's identity.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for the production of a Crown Disclosure Brief from the defendants Vasos Georgiou and John Aquino.

The original motion was adjourned sine die after the Attorney General provided key undertakings.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($20,000) but not on entitlement.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57, decided that no costs should be awarded to any party.

The decision considered the novelty of the issues, the timing of the Attorney General's undertakings, and the fact that the outcome was not primarily based on the arguments presented by the defendants seeking costs.

The plaintiff, a retired teacher, brought an action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional suffering against a school board and its chairman after she was stopped from presenting at a board meeting and the chairman subsequently made public comments characterizing her presentation as transphobic and hateful.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the defamation claim, finding it had substantial merit, there were no valid defences, and the harm to the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the chairman's expression.

The claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering was dismissed.

The plaintiff in a civil rescission action sought an order compelling the defendants to produce the Crown disclosure brief they received in related criminal proceedings concerning the same alleged fraud in a hospital procurement process.

The Attorney General opposed immediate production, arguing it could taint witnesses before they testified in the criminal trial.

The court balanced the interests under the Wagg framework and adjourned the motion sine die, accepting the Attorney General's undertaking to conduct a Wagg review and produce the documents within eight weeks after a verdict in the criminal proceedings.

The defendants, Unity Health, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to strike paragraphs of the plaintiff Noram's Amended Statement of Claim, arguing that new claims for conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty were statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

Noram had added these claims as alternative grounds for relief to an existing unjust enrichment claim.

The court dismissed Unity Health's motion, finding it was not "plain and obvious" that the Limitations Act applied to amendments made as of right to an existing proceeding, particularly given the unsettled nature of the law on this specific point of statutory interpretation.

The court preserved Unity Health's right to raise the limitations defence at a later stage.

Dr. Musson faced four counts of sexual assault and sexual touching of a person under 16.

He brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his Section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found the total delay of 683 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 547.5 days.

The court found no defence-caused delay.

While an unexpected Crown leave of absence (11 days) was an exceptional circumstance, the significant delay (175 days) caused by the Crown's unlawful disclosure of youth records was not considered exceptional, as it was foreseeable and unavoidable, and the Crown did not act proactively to remedy it.

Consequently, the court found the delay unreasonable and stayed all four counts against Dr. Musson.

This motion concerned an application by the accused, Robert Scott Musson, under section 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) for access to and production of two sets of youth records: one related to an alleged "stranger assault" in 1997 and another related to a break and enter at Dr. Musson's home in 1998, involving the complainant A.L. and witness L.W. The court dismissed access to the 1997 "stranger assault" records, finding that a police caution constituted an extrajudicial measure under the YCJA, making section 119(4) applicable and precluding access.

For the 1998 break and enter records, the court found that Dr. Musson met the test under section 123 of the YCJA for access, demonstrating a valid and substantial interest and necessity in the interest of justice.

However, due to the nature of the allegations against Dr. Musson (sexual offences), the court ruled that the Mills regime applied, requiring a separate application under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code for actual production of these records, which were ordered to remain under seal.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury during an urgent caesarean section.

The plaintiffs sued the treating obstetricians, anesthesiologist, and the hospital for medical negligence.

The court found the initial obstetrician negligent for failing to diagnose the pregnancy early, failing to discuss termination, and failing to document severe risk factors associated with the plaintiff's morbid obesity.

The anesthesiologist was found negligent for prematurely converting to a general anesthetic and failing to adequately manage the airway, directly causing the cardiac arrest.

The hospital was found vicariously liable for a triage nurse's failure to follow protocols during a telephone call.

Liability was apportioned equally among the three negligent defendants.

The plaintiffs brought two defamation actions against the defendants arising from tweets and emails that characterized the plaintiffs' own tweets as homophobic and transphobic.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expressions related to matters of public interest and that, while the defamation claim had some merit, the defendants had a valid defence of fair comment given the highly politicized and hyperbolic nature of Twitter.

The actions were dismissed as strategic litigation against public participation.

This motion addressed whether a main action and a third-party action, stemming from a property dispute involving an encroaching structure, should be heard concurrently or sequentially.

The Plaintiffs sought a combined hearing, while the Defendants and Third Parties preferred separate proceedings.

The court, emphasizing judicial efficiency and fairness, determined that the intertwined factual and legal issues, particularly concerning the appropriate equitable remedy for the admitted trespass and the allocation of financial responsibility among all parties, necessitated a single, consolidated trial.

The motion for concurrent hearings was granted to avoid multiplicity of actions and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson Airport from Colombia with two rum bottles in his luggage.

One bottle was confirmed to contain over 1 kilogram of liquid cocaine.

The Crown failed to prove the contents of the second bottle due to continuity issues with the police exhibits.

On the issue of knowledge, the court found that the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's candid customs declaration and the lack of inculpatory evidence, did not exclude the reasonable inference that he was a blind courier unaware of the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The court addressed scheduling for a package of motions, including the defendant's motion to strike and the plaintiff's motions to add parties and seek leave to plead malicious prosecution.

The court determined that the two hours booked were insufficient and that the motions needed to be sequenced, with pleadings finalized before the motion to strike could be heard.

The plaintiff's motion to lift a publication ban from related criminal proceedings was directed to the criminal court judge who issued it.

The remaining motions were adjourned and scheduled for future dates.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court applied the governing framework requiring proof of the material facts, incompetence, and a resulting miscarriage of justice, and found that although the appellant did not prove counsel failed to advise him of immigration consequences, counsel's lack of preparation and failure to put the defence theory and key allegations to Crown witnesses amounted to incompetence.

The court held that these omissions materially affected credibility findings and undermined both the reliability and apparent fairness of the trial.

The conviction was quashed.

The third parties brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to disclose their real estate lawyer's files relating to the purchase of their property.

The plaintiffs opposed, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that the plaintiffs' former counsel had previously undertaken to produce the files and had thereby waived any claim to privilege.

The motion was granted and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the files.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson Airport from Colombia.

He was referred to secondary inspection as a contraband target.

A border services officer searched his luggage and found cocaine in a rum bottle.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude his statements and the cocaine, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the accused was detained when the officer formed a strong and particularized suspicion, and that his s. 10 rights were breached by a subsequent question.

The court also found that the RCMP breached his s. 10(b) rights by failing to facilitate contact with a lawyer of his choosing.

Statements made after the breaches were excluded under s. 24(2), but the cocaine and earlier statements were admitted.

The defendant obstetricians brought a motion for partial summary judgment in a medical negligence action, arguing the plaintiffs' expert reports were insufficient to establish standard of care or causation.

The motion was brought shortly before a scheduled ten-week trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment would not be proportionate, cost-effective, or timely, and risked inconsistent findings and duplication of resources.

The court also noted that the sufficiency of the complex expert evidence was better assessed in the context of a full trial.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from enforcing the deemed terminations of 34 Feed-In Tariff (FIT) contracts and discontinuing payments.

The court found that the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had deemed the contracts terminated.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction but failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the issues of termination had been decided in prior litigation.

The court also found the plaintiffs' evidence of irreparable harm to be speculative.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.