Matthew Rajan Walwyn

The plaintiff, Lou Maieron, sued Ugo Guila (and related corporate defendants) and the Town of Erin, alleging an improper easement on his land.

The dispute arose from a 1997 settlement agreement between Maieron and Guila for the transfer of land (Block 56) subject to a water monitoring easement.

In 2003, Guila and the Town of Erin entered a Subdivision Agreement granting an expanded, permanent easement for stormwater management, including construction, over Block 56, without Maieron's involvement.

Maieron objected to this expanded easement in the deed and did not register it, but paid property taxes on the land.

At trial, Maieron sought to amend his claim to remove the expanded easement, replace it with the original monitoring easement, obtain reimbursement for taxes paid, and gain the right to remove installations.

The court dismissed the amendment request due to lengthy and unexplained delay, finding presumed prejudice to the defendants and that the claim was stale-dated.

The court also dismissed all of Maieron's claims, finding the Town of Erin was not a party to the original 1997 agreement and had statutory authority for its easement.

While Guila breached the 1997 agreement, Maieron failed to prove any damages.

The Superintendent of Private Career Colleges sought a restraining order against Island Air Flight School & Charters Inc. for allegedly operating as an unregistered private career college and offering vocational programs in contravention of the Private Career Colleges Act, 2005.

The court found that Island Air did violate the Act by providing vocational training until August 2019, but not thereafter.

The court declined to issue a restraining order, exercising its discretion based on the lack of reasonable grounds to believe future violations would occur, the absence of public safety or significant consumer protection concerns, and the availability of adequate alternative remedies under the Act.

This is a consolidated appeal from anti-SLAPP motions dismissing defamation actions.

The actions arose from tweets and an email suggesting the appellant's medical clinic discriminated against the LGBTQ community.

The motion judge dismissed both actions, finding the communications were fair comment.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred regarding Evans-Bitten's fair comment defence, concluding there were grounds to believe malice would defeat it.

After conducting the public interest weighing, the Court found the public interest in allowing the appellant's action against Evans-Bitten to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting her expression, given the substantial harm and low public interest in protecting gratuitous personal attacks.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the action against Kirkconnell and Smith, finding no grounds to believe their fair comment defence would fail due to recklessness.