Natalie D. Kolos

This five-judge appeal reconsidered the common law governing non-disclosure of partial settlement agreements in multi-party civil litigation.

The court held that the prior rule mandating an automatic finding of abuse of process and an automatic stay, without proof of prejudice or regard to proportionality, was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

The proper approach requires a contextual and discretionary abuse of process analysis focused on unfairness, prejudice, oppression, harm to the administration of justice, and a proportionate remedy, with r. 49.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reinforcing that framework.

Applying that approach, the court allowed two appeals and remitted those matters, while dismissing two others where the record was sufficient to determine the result.

The respondent, a retired teacher, commenced a defamation action against the school board and its chair after the chair stopped her presentation at a public meeting and subsequently made media statements characterizing her comments as transphobic and questioning the right of trans people to exist.

The appellants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, allowing the defamation claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in his weighing analysis by failing to consider the public interest in the appellants' speech, a fresh weighing demonstrated that the harm suffered by the respondent outweighed the public interest in the chair's speech, which had mischaracterized her actual remarks.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes moved to stay or dismiss the action against it, alleging abuse of process due to the plaintiffs' delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement with co-defendants.

The plaintiffs concurrently moved for court approval of this agreement.

The court examined the disclosure obligations for partial settlement agreements that alter the litigation landscape.

It found that while immediate disclosure is generally required, the moving party had sufficient prior knowledge of the agreement's essential terms to avoid "litigation by ambush." Consequently, the motion to stay was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion to approve the cooperation agreement was granted.

A separate consent motion to dismiss the action against The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company and John Doe was also granted.

The plaintiff, A.C., sought leave under section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue a civil action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Ontario.

This claim arose after criminal charges against A.C. for sexual misconduct, which had resulted in a mistrial, were subsequently withdrawn by the Crown due to no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that A.C. failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success, specifically by not providing sufficient evidence of malice on the part of the Crown.

The court emphasized that mere inconsistencies in evidence, lack of forensic evidence, or late disclosure (without proof of deliberate intent to subvert justice) do not meet the high threshold for proving malice required for malicious prosecution claims against the Attorney General.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of the school board's decision finding he breached its Code of Conduct and imposing sanctions.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to in camera meetings and alleged bias of the Chair, and that the decision unreasonably infringed his freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant was afforded adequate procedural fairness, the in camera meetings were statutorily permitted due to related litigation, and the board reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter rights with its statutory obligations.

The applicant sought judicial review of a school board's decision to stop her presentation at a public meeting.

The applicant had been approved to speak about transparency in a library review process but digressed to critique specific books discussing gender identity.

The chair stopped her presentation on the basis that it could violate human rights legislation and board policies.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision was reasonable, did not breach procedural fairness, and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the board reasonably balanced the applicant's freedom of expression with its statutory objectives and policies regarding equity and inclusion.

The appellants, a newspaper publisher and his company, appealed the dismissal of their defamation and other tort claims against city councillors, school trustees, and media entities under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The appellants had published articles critical of the Toronto Catholic District School Board's LGBTQ2S+ policies, using derogatory language.

The respondents, in turn, took action to have the City of Toronto cease advertising in the appellants' newspaper, alleging the articles promoted homophobia and transphobia.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the respondents' expressions related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the respondents had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment).

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the fair comment defence was viable, and that the appellants' constitutional arguments regarding freedom of expression and religious protection were without merit.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed.

This is a consolidated appeal from anti-SLAPP motions dismissing defamation actions.

The actions arose from tweets and an email suggesting the appellant's medical clinic discriminated against the LGBTQ community.

The motion judge dismissed both actions, finding the communications were fair comment.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred regarding Evans-Bitten's fair comment defence, concluding there were grounds to believe malice would defeat it.

After conducting the public interest weighing, the Court found the public interest in allowing the appellant's action against Evans-Bitten to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting her expression, given the substantial harm and low public interest in protecting gratuitous personal attacks.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the action against Kirkconnell and Smith, finding no grounds to believe their fair comment defence would fail due to recklessness.

The plaintiff, a former Toronto police officer, sued the defendants for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Charter breaches following his arrest and prosecution for corruption and other offences.

The criminal charges were ultimately stayed or withdrawn.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the absence of reasonable and probable grounds for the charges, which was fatal to the malicious prosecution and negligent investigation claims.

The court also found no evidence of malice, deliberate unlawful conduct intended to harm, or conduct calculated to cause mental suffering.

The claim for Charter damages was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to strike portions of their Response to a Request for Particulars and Reply.

These struck portions re-introduced allegations of negligence from 2008 and 2009, which a Case Management Master had previously ruled were new causes of action and denied leave to amend the statement of claim to include them.

This Master's decision was upheld on appeal.

The motion judge struck the pleadings based on res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that re-litigation doctrines apply to decisions of associate justices (Masters) on pleadings motions, and that the motion judge correctly applied the "plain and obvious" test.

This decision addresses a request to coordinate two appeals arising from a single lower court decision that dismissed defamation actions under anti-SLAPP legislation.

The appellants sought separate hearings, while the respondents requested the appeals be heard together.

The appeal management judge ordered the appeals to be heard concurrently, emphasizing judicial economy and efficiency, and finding no principled reason to hear them separately despite the appellants' arguments regarding factual and legal dissimilarities between the two cases.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving party defendants sought their costs.

The plaintiffs argued that the court should apply the appropriateness exception under s. 137.1(7) to award partial indemnity costs instead of the presumptive full indemnity costs.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding no basis to depart from the full indemnity presumption, and awarded the defendants their costs on a full indemnity basis (and substantial indemnity for one defendant on a pro bono retainer), totaling over $383,000.

The plaintiff sued the defendant police officers and their employer for negligent investigation after criminal charges of a sexual nature against him were withdrawn.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the motion judge dismissed on the basis that expert evidence was required to determine the standard of care and whether reasonable and probable grounds existed.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the motion judge erred in law; expert evidence is not required for a court to assess reasonable and probable grounds, as this is within the routine experience of a judge.

Finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds based on the complainant's statements, the court allowed the appeal, granted summary judgment, and dismissed the action.

The plaintiffs, a newspaper publisher and his company, brought an action for defamation, misfeasance in public office, inducing breach of contract, and wrongful interference with economic relations against several city councillors, school board trustees, and a media company.

The action arose from statements made by the defendants criticizing articles published by the plaintiffs as homophobic and transphobic, and advocating for the cessation of city advertising in the plaintiffs' newspaper.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The court granted the motions, finding that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the other claims had merit, and failed to show that the defendants had no valid defences, including fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication.

Furthermore, the court found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' Response to Demand for Particulars and portions of their Reply.

The plaintiffs had previously been denied leave to amend their statement of claim to add causes of action relating to events in 2008 and 2009, with the court finding those claims were not already pleaded.

The plaintiffs subsequently attempted to assert in their particulars and reply that the original claim did include those causes of action.

The court granted the defendants' motion, holding that the plaintiffs were bound by the prior final decisions under the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of Toronto, which was based on his failure to provide timely notice under s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in her conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the three-year delay in providing notice, despite having sufficient information to investigate earlier.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a civil claim alleging negligent police investigation and failure to test the contents of a needle that punctured the plaintiff while she was working at a women’s shelter.

The plaintiff alleged the police negligently failed to lay criminal charges and failed to arrange testing of the needle’s blood contents, causing prolonged anxiety about possible infection with communicable diseases.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and applied the summary judgment framework articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The evidence demonstrated the police had consulted Crown attorneys who advised there were no reasonable grounds to prosecute, and the police had no authority under the Mandatory Blood Testing Act, 2006 to compel testing.

Any failure to obtain testing was attributable to the plaintiff’s own inaction rather than negligence by the defendants.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing his personal injury action for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The action had been ongoing for nearly 10 years with virtually no steps taken, no discoveries held, and the action not set down for trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumption of prejudice arising from the lengthy delay had not been rebutted, as the plaintiff filed no evidence to show the absence of prejudice or to support his contention that he was the only material witness.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.