Robert W. Traves

The applicants sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Tribunal decision barring their civil action for a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant was struck by a dump truck driven by a co-worker while walking back from a personal bank errand during his workday.

The Tribunal found the applicant was in the course of employment because he was required to carry and answer a work-issued cell phone during his break, thereby retaining employer control.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of its policies and the resulting decision were reasonable and owed deference.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to strike portions of their Response to a Request for Particulars and Reply.

These struck portions re-introduced allegations of negligence from 2008 and 2009, which a Case Management Master had previously ruled were new causes of action and denied leave to amend the statement of claim to include them.

This Master's decision was upheld on appeal.

The motion judge struck the pleadings based on res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that re-litigation doctrines apply to decisions of associate justices (Masters) on pleadings motions, and that the motion judge correctly applied the "plain and obvious" test.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' Response to Demand for Particulars and portions of their Reply.

The plaintiffs had previously been denied leave to amend their statement of claim to add causes of action relating to events in 2008 and 2009, with the court finding those claims were not already pleaded.

The plaintiffs subsequently attempted to assert in their particulars and reply that the original claim did include those causes of action.

The court granted the defendants' motion, holding that the plaintiffs were bound by the prior final decisions under the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The City of Toronto, as Third Party, brought a motion to amend its Statement of Defence to the Third Party Claim to plead two statutory defences under the City of Toronto Act, 2006: failure to provide written notice (s. 42(6)) and that damages were caused by an object on an untraveled portion of the highway (s. 42(4)).

The Defendants opposed the motion, arguing presumed prejudice due to the late stage of the proceedings and that the proposed defences lacked merit.

The court, acting as case manager and trial judge, granted the motion, finding no actual or presumed prejudice and reiterating that the test for allowing an amendment to pleadings is not whether the defence will ultimately succeed at trial.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Pollak J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as the parties had reached an agreement on costs.

Oscar Sun, a minor, suffered catastrophic injuries after being hit by a car driven by Sergio Ferreira after exiting a TTC bus.

The plaintiffs (Sun, Chen, Sun) sued Ferreira, TTC, and the City of Toronto.

Ferreira also brought a third-party claim against TTC and the City.

The City, TTC, and Donald Carter brought two motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action against them and Ferreira's third-party claim, arguing the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed both motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the claims and whether it was appropriate to commence legal action earlier, particularly concerning the alleged negligent design of the bus stop and crosswalks.

The court also noted concerns about partial summary judgment.

The plaintiffs appealed an order dismissing their motion to amend their statement of claim against their insurance brokers.

The original claim alleged negligence in 2010 and 2011 regarding advice on insurance applications.

The proposed amendments sought to add allegations of negligence from 2008 and 2009.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the amendments constituted new causes of action outside the limitation period, rather than mere particulars of the original claim.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of a class action settlement under s. 29(2) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 arising from a Legionnaires’ Disease outbreak at a municipal long‑term care facility.

The settlement created a compensation fund for class members with tiered payments based on hospitalization and permitted challenges to categorization and references for additional damages.

The court applied established factors governing settlement approval and concluded the agreement fell within the zone of reasonable outcomes given litigation risk, delay, and the advanced age of many class members.

The court also approved class counsel fees and modest stipends for representative plaintiffs.

Due to a conflict with counsel and ongoing objections, one representative plaintiff was removed during the administration phase of the settlement.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 1991 motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The motion judge found inordinate delay, triggering a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which the appellants failed to rebut.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge should have considered the respondents' materials to rebut the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the respondents' materials were considered, they were inadequate to rebut the presumption of prejudice, particularly regarding the injured appellant's medical condition and income loss.

The deceased was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and died several months later.

His estate commenced an action more than two years after the accident but within two years of his death.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred.

On appeal, the estate argued that the limitation period should run from the date of death under the Trustee Act and the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the death of the injured party does not create a new cause of action and the limitation period runs from the date of the accident.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.

The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.