Ansuya Pachai

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to change child and spousal support orders.

The motion judge dismissed the motion under Rule 1(8)(b) of the Family Law Rules due to the appellant's failure to comply with prior support and costs orders, combined with an absence of good faith effort to pay.

The motion judge also rejected the appellant's fraud claim as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the assignee (City of Toronto) maintained party status to the extent of its financial interests, that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion to dismiss based on non-compliance, and that the fraud allegation was both irrelevant and statute-barred.

The applicant in a human rights proceeding filed several Requests for an Order During Proceedings seeking medical information from an individual respondent who was unable to attend the hearing, as well as the production of emails and police statements related to the incident.

The Tribunal dismissed the requests for medical information and emails, finding them unnecessary or that the documents could not be located.

The Tribunal ordered the Toronto Police Services Board to disclose the individual respondent's police statement.

Finding the applicant's repeated requests regarding the police board to be somewhat vexatious, the Tribunal ordered that the applicant must seek permission before filing further requests involving the police board.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his Charter application for delay.

The application challenged the Toronto Police Service's practice of 'carding' or 'street checks'.

The court found that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, noting that counsel being too busy is not a sufficient excuse.

The court also found a lack of bona fide intention to meet the time limits and presumed prejudice to the respondents.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, an elementary school teacher, brought requests for orders during proceedings seeking the production of documents and explanations from the respondents and the Toronto Police Service Board (an affected party).

The Tribunal ordered the respondents to produce arguably relevant e-mail messages and ordered the police board to provide a typed transcript of a detective's handwritten notes.

The Tribunal denied the applicant's requests for explanations, noting that pre-hearing procedures do not require parties to answer questions or provide explanations in advance of a hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to deny his organization a special event permit to host a Canada Day event in a public park.

The City had denied the permit due to a history of serious health, safety, and by-law infractions at the applicant's previous events.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no violation of the applicant's Charter right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as the City's regulation of park use was reasonable.

The applicant filed two human rights applications alleging discrimination based on race and other grounds by his employer, union, police, and various individuals, arising primarily from a 2013 workplace incident that led to criminal charges and a workplace violence investigation.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the allegations were untimely, dealt with in another proceeding, or had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that most of the allegations were untimely as they occurred more than a year before the applications were filed, did not form a series of incidents with the timely allegations, and lacked a good faith explanation for the delay.

The remaining timely allegations—a suspension without pay and the union's refusal to fund legal representation for a human rights complaint—were dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, as the applicant provided only speculation and no evidence linking the respondents' actions to a protected Code ground.

Following a divided outcome on an application regarding taxi licensing by-laws, the intervenor, Taxiworkers Association of Ontario, sought costs against the applicant.

The court denied costs for the intervention and injunction motions because the intervenor was not a necessary party and participated on its own initiative.

However, the court awarded the intervenor $2,500 in costs for the main application, recognizing that its evidence was critical to the court's determination of the notice issue.

The applicant challenged municipal resolutions and by-law amendments implementing a new one-tier taxi licensing regime, alleging lack of notice, breach of the City's procedural by-law, and bad faith.

The court held that City Council was acting legislatively, not administratively, so no common law duty of procedural fairness applied.

The court further held that Council could consider the referred recommendations and that adequate notice had been given for the general TTL reforms, but not for the newly introduced mandatory 2024 deadline requiring all licences to convert.

That notice failure was a substantive breach going to the root of validity, so only the mandatory conversion deadline was quashed; the remainder of the regime was upheld and the bad faith claim failed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the City of Toronto to disclose portions of a software maintenance log under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant argued the log contained confidential technical information exempt from disclosure under s. 10(1).

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's decision unreasonable, noting that the adjudicator applied the three-part exemption test inconsistently and failed to provide adequate justification for concluding the information was not supplied by the applicant.

The application was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a municipal by-law that restricted the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours.

The appellant argued the City acted unreasonably and lacked sufficient evidence connecting the nuisance to licensed operations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that under section 213 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the by-law is not reviewable on the ground of reasonableness, and finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's evidentiary findings.

Following a prior decision granting Rule 21 motions and permanently staying a counter-application, the court addressed costs.

The moving parties sought full indemnity costs, arguing the counter-application contained unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty, illegality, and conspiracy against participants in the Canadian justice system.

The court held that such allegations justified a full indemnity award.

After reviewing the claimed amounts and correcting a minor double-counting issue, the court fixed costs payable forthwith to both moving parties on a joint and several basis against certain self-represented litigants.

The appellants appealed an order permanently staying their Counter Application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's determination that the Counter Application had no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a clothing store owner who provided gowns for a beauty pageant, alleged discrimination on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, and disability after she was asked to leave the preliminary competition and denied entry to the final event.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's belief that her treatment was linked to a protected ground was based on speculation rather than evidence.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant sought an order quashing a municipal by-law that reduced the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours and holistic centres, and sought a declaration that the licensing by-laws had expired under the five‑year sunset clause in s.150(13) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the sunset clause no longer applied because Part IV of the Municipal Act, 2001 had been repealed by the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006 and replaced by broader licensing powers under the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which contained no sunset provision.

The court further held that municipal councils are not required to have “hard evidence” of harm before passing a by‑law and that the court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining legality rather than reviewing the reasonableness of municipal policy decisions.

The applicant failed to establish that the by‑law was illegal or enacted for an improper purpose.

The application was dismissed.

The moving parties brought Rule 21 motions seeking to stay or dismiss a counter-application alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy involving numerous judges, lawyers, public officials, and institutions.

The applicants alleged systemic corruption, crimes against humanity, and other misconduct within the Ontario justice system, and sought extensive relief including billions of dollars in damages.

The court found the allegations to be patently incredible, scandalous, and incapable of proof, concluding that the proceeding had no reasonable prospect of success and constituted an abuse of process.

Applying Rule 21.01(3)(c) and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control abusive litigation, the court permanently stayed the counter-application.

The decision emphasized the court’s role in preventing vexatious proceedings from consuming judicial resources.

Applicants sought a declaration that a municipal by-law banning the possession, sale, or consumption of shark fin products within the city was ultra vires.

The court examined whether the by-law had a valid municipal purpose under the City of Toronto Act, 2006, including whether it related to the environmental, social, or health well-being of the city.

While recognizing the deferential approach generally afforded to municipal by-laws, the court held that the alleged environmental objective of preventing shark extinction did not constitute a municipal issue and that the by-law would not produce an identifiable benefit to the city.

The court further found that cruelty to sharks occurring outside the municipality and speculative health concerns did not sufficiently relate to the social or health well-being of city residents.

The by-law was therefore beyond the city's legislative authority.

Two applicants sought judicial review of municipal by-laws implementing a volume-based solid waste user fee and associated rebate program introduced by the City of Toronto.

The applicants argued that the waste collection charge was in substance an unlawful tax affecting provincial tax ratio rules and that the rebate constituted an impermissible redistribution of property taxes contrary to the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court held that the waste charge was a valid user fee because a sufficient nexus existed between the amount collected and the cost of providing waste services.

The court further held that the rebate was properly characterized as a municipal grant authorized under s. 83 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 rather than a tax rebate.

The applications to quash the relevant by-law provisions were dismissed.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing by teleconference to determine if the application should be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing despite receiving notice.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

Eight police officers sought judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Police Services Board allowing the Chief of Police to delay serving Notices of Hearing for public complaints arising from the G20 summit.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for prematurity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interlocutory administrative decision.

The court noted the officers had an adequate alternative remedy to raise the issue of prejudice caused by delay through an abuse of process motion before the hearing officer.

The applicants challenged a City of Toronto by-law imposing an annual tax on third-party signs, arguing it was an ultra vires indirect tax, discriminatory, and that existing signs were grandfathered under the City of Toronto Act.

The application judge upheld the by-law but found existing signs were grandfathered and granted a sealing order over the applicants' financial information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeals, finding the tax was direct and not discriminatory.

The Court allowed the City's cross-appeal, holding that the grandfathering provision applies only to regulatory by-laws, not taxing by-laws, and that the sealing order was unjustified under the Dagenais/Mentuck test.