Morris Manning

The moving parties sought leave to appeal from an unreported order of Koehnen J. dated March 6, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing, awarding costs of $2,500 to the responding parties.

The plaintiff and defendant are siblings disputing the estate of their late mother, who died leaving over $21 million in assets.

The mother had historically treated her children equally in her estate planning.

In May 2013, she executed a new will leaving 75% of her estate to the defendant and 25% to the plaintiff.

Subsequently, between August 2013 and September 2014, the mother executed numerous documents that effectively transferred all her wealth to the defendant, primarily through a joint investment account with a right of survivorship, and disinherited the plaintiff entirely.

The plaintiff challenged the validity of the May 2013 will and the subsequent documents, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The court found that the mother had testamentary capacity throughout.

However, the court concluded that the post-August 2013 documents and inter vivos gifts were procured through the defendant's undue influence and were therefore invalid.

The court upheld the May 2013 will as valid and ordered that the assets transferred to the defendant be held in a resulting trust for the estate, to be distributed 75% to the defendant and 25% to the plaintiff.

The appellant, an audiologist with a doctorate degree, appealed a discipline panel's finding of professional misconduct for using the title 'Doctor' in her clinical practice, contrary to s. 33 of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

She argued that the prohibition violated her freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and raised several jurisdictional challenges against the College.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent finding no s. 2(b) violation for similar professional title restrictions.

Alternatively, the Court found that any infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to prevent public confusion.

The Court also dismissed all jurisdictional arguments, finding the tribunal's decisions on procedure, penalty, and costs to be reasonable.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Vaughan Council to suspend his pay for 90 days based on a report by the Integrity Commissioner.

The Commissioner found the applicant had improperly interfered with municipal tendering processes and attempted to obstruct her investigation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Commissioner refused to disclose the names and statements of 32 witnesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, applying the Baker factors to find that the Commissioner properly balanced the applicant's right to know the case against him with the need to protect cooperating staff from reprisals.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and the Commissioner's jurisdiction.

The successful respondent on an appeal sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $93,000 for the action, various motions, and the appeal, in addition to the $75,000 already awarded for the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal applied principles of reasonableness and proportionality, noting that both sides had unnecessarily complicated a simple collection case.

The court reduced the requested costs to $64,500 and then applied a further reduction for overall disproportionality, ultimately awarding the respondent $44,500 in costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding they had entered into a settlement agreement to pay the respondent for a load of carrots.

The appellants argued there was no consensus ad idem on the monthly payment rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that an implied agreement had been reached based on the parties' post-negotiation conduct.

On cross-appeal, the Court found the motion judge erred by allowing the appellants' counterclaim to proceed, holding that the settlement of the main action implied an obligation to release the counterclaim.

The Canadian Doctors of Audiology Association brought a motion for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning a finding of professional misconduct against an audiologist for using the title 'Doctor'.

The proposed intervenor sought to support the appellant's constitutional challenge to s. 33 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the application was brought very late, the proposed argument substantially echoed the appellant's argument, and the intervention would not make a useful and distinct contribution sufficient to justify disrupting the scheduled appeal.

Following a prior summary judgment decision finding that a settlement had been reached between the parties, the defendants brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence concerning the date on which two settlement cheques were negotiated.

The moving parties relied on Rules 52.10 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that bank statements showing the cheques were cashed earlier than assumed would materially affect the findings regarding their intention to be bound by the settlement.

The court held that the proposed evidence could have been obtained and presented with reasonable diligence during the original summary judgment motion and therefore did not satisfy the requirements for admitting fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

The court further concluded that, even if admitted, the evidence would not have changed the outcome because the defendants never demanded repayment of the funds after the plaintiff proposed revised payment terms.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The Member, an audiologist, was alleged to have committed professional misconduct by using the title 'doctor' or 'Dr.' in her practice, contrary to section 33 of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Member brought a motion challenging the College's jurisdiction, the validity of the professional misconduct regulation, the referral process, and the constitutionality of the title restriction under sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.

The Discipline Committee dismissed the motion, finding the regulation valid and the Charter rights not infringed, relying on binding precedent that professional title restrictions do not violate freedom of expression or security of the person.

The Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct, ordered a reprimand, a three-month suspension (one month remitted), an ethics course, practice inspections, and costs of $97,595.

The Member, an audiologist, was alleged to have committed professional misconduct by using the title 'doctor' or 'Dr.' in her practice, contrary to section 33 of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Member brought a motion challenging the College's jurisdiction, the validity of the professional misconduct regulation, the referral process, and the constitutionality of the title restriction under sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.

The Discipline Committee dismissed the motion, finding the regulation valid and the Charter rights not infringed, relying on binding precedent that professional title restrictions do not violate freedom of expression or security of the person.

The Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct, ordered a reprimand, a three-month suspension (one month remitted), an ethics course, practice inspections, and costs of $97,595.

Following a trial in which the defendants successfully defended multiple claims including breach of contract, spoliation, unjust enrichment, and property-related torts, the court determined costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs and recovery of professional fees for several witnesses characterized as participating experts.

The court confirmed that participating experts may justify reasonable compensation where their expertise arises from involvement in the underlying events.

Applying Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles of proportionality, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the defendants’ offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Following a successful summary judgment motion concerning a debt dispute and alleged settlement, the plaintiff sought substantial costs for the motion and the broader action.

The court held that the defendants had unnecessarily complicated what was a relatively straightforward settlement issue through procedural steps and a counterclaim.

However, the court emphasized proportionality and the principle that the losing party should not reasonably expect to pay for two senior counsel on a relatively simple motion.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles in Boucher v. Public Accountants for the Province of Ontario, the court reduced the claimed costs and fixed partial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court deferred determination of the remaining action costs pending resolution of issues relating to the counterclaim.

The applicant sought appointment of an arbitrator to determine post‑closing purchase price adjustments under a share purchase agreement after the respondents refused to engage the designated accounting firm arbitrator and raised allegations of bias based on the accounting firms having previously retained the applicant’s law firm in unrelated matters.

The court reviewed the legal test for reasonable apprehension of bias applicable to arbitrators and held that the mere fact that an accounting firm had retained counsel for one party in unrelated insolvency matters does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court found the respondents’ allegations meritless and concluded their conduct had derailed the agreed arbitration process.

Although a former judge was ultimately appointed as arbitrator on consent, the court determined the applicant had lost its contractual right to the designated arbitrator due to the respondents’ unjustified conduct.

Significant costs were ordered against the respondents for acting in bad faith and breaching earlier court orders.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce an alleged settlement agreement arising from a dispute over unpaid invoices for agricultural produce.

The defendants argued that no binding settlement existed because the parties never reached agreement on a fundamental term, namely the schedule of repayment.

The court held that the parties had reached a binding settlement on the principal compromise amount through email exchanges and subsequent conduct, including the issuance and negotiation of cheques consistent with the proposed settlement.

Silence in response to a counter‑proposal combined with partial performance supported an inference that the repayment terms were accepted.

Summary judgment was granted enforcing the settlement against certain corporate defendants but not against the individual defendants.

In a Commercial List application arising from a share purchase transaction, the applicant sought to compel arbitration of post-closing inventory, working capital, and holdback adjustment disputes, along with declarations concerning ownership of inventory and equipment.

The respondents argued that arbitration was premature because the court first had to determine what constituted inventory and whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction.

The court rejected that position, applied the competence-competence principle, and held that the arbitral process mandated by the SPA had to proceed.

The court also declared that the applicant owned the disputed inventory and equipment, vacated prior interim access orders, and refused to convert the application into an action.

The appellant sued the police and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn but a peace bond was imposed over his objection.

The motion judge struck most of the claims, finding that the criminal proceedings had not terminated in the appellant's favour.

The appellant appealed, and one police officer cross-appealed the motion judge's decision to allow an abuse of process claim against her to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, concluding that the imposition of a peace bond was not a favourable termination and that the abuse of process claim was inextricably tied to the failed malicious prosecution claim.

The Integrity Commissioner investigated a complaint against Regional Councillor Michael Di Biase alleging interference in municipal procurement processes and inappropriate pressure on City staff.

The Commissioner found that the Respondent breached multiple rules of the Code of Ethical Conduct by inquiring about tenders during the blackout period, using confidential information provided by a private citizen to criticize competitors, and intimidating staff who refused to bypass procurement rules.

The Commissioner recommended a 90-day suspension of remuneration.

The appellants purchased a yacht for over $1 million and later sued for fundamental breach, returning the yacht.

After the close of pleadings, the action languished for over ten years with minimal steps taken.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent jurisdiction, finding the delay inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for delay as an abuse of process when the delay is of such magnitude.

The appellant sought to set aside an arbitral award regarding a commercial dispute over the sale of carrots.

The application judge dismissed the application because it was brought outside the 30-day time limit under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA), which has a three-month time limit, should apply, or alternatively, that the court should extend the 30-day limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Arbitration Act applied because both parties were Ontario businesses and the dispute was domestic.

The Court also held there is no judicial discretion to extend the 30-day time limit under section 47 of the Arbitration Act.

The plaintiff sought an order staying or adjourning a scheduled trial pending the outcome of an appeal from an earlier interlocutory order dismissing an application related to enforcement of debt acknowledgments.

The plaintiff argued that Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure automatically stayed the proceeding, or alternatively that the court should exercise discretion under Rule 63.02(1) to stay the trial.

The court held that Rule 63.01(1) applies only to orders for the payment of money and therefore did not mandate a stay.

Considering the procedural history, repeated adjournments, and the age of the action, the court concluded that the interests of justice favored allowing the trial to proceed despite the pending appeal.