Morris Manning

Following an order dismissing both the action and the counterclaim for delay, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs and disbursements.

The plaintiffs argued that portions of the claimed fees resulted in double compensation for the same court appearance and that the hours claimed were excessive.

The court accepted that costs should follow the event but reduced the amount claimed in light of the circumstances and the parties’ shared responsibility for delay.

Partial indemnity costs and reduced disbursements were awarded to the defendant.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an action for delay arising from a dispute over the purchase of a yacht allegedly suffering engine defects.

The action had remained largely stagnant for more than a decade after pleadings were closed, with limited discovery activity and no meaningful prosecution by the plaintiffs.

The court held the delay was inordinate and inexcusable and raised a presumption of prejudice that the plaintiffs failed to rebut.

The defendant also demonstrated actual prejudice, including the loss of warranty claims against the engine manufacturer, the bankruptcy of a co-defendant manufacturer, and evidentiary issues arising from faded recollection and lack of preserved expert evidence.

The court dismissed both the claim and the defendant’s counterclaim for delay and, in the alternative, exercised its inherent jurisdiction to control its process.

Multiple defendants moved under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a lengthy statement of claim alleging fraud, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and unjust enrichment arising from unpaid German loan obligations allegedly concealed through asset transfers and trusts.

The court held that the pleading failed to set out material facts supporting the elements of the alleged causes of action and largely consisted of vague allegations and legal conclusions.

Several claims were struck as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, though the plaintiff was granted leave to amend.

The court emphasized the requirement to plead material facts and provide full particulars for allegations of fraud and related claims.

The plaintiff was also ordered to properly produce loan documents referenced in the pleadings.

Following a decision that granted a motion to strike certain affidavit evidence but dismissed an application challenging an arbitral award, both parties sought costs.

The respondent, successful on the application, sought substantial indemnity costs, while the applicant sought costs for its successful motion to strike.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to either party, finding the conduct did not reach the threshold of reprehensible behaviour and there were no settlement offers.

The court held that each side had partial success and that reasonable partial indemnity costs would be similar for both.

As a result, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The appellant homeowner made a claim against his insurer for flood damage, submitting a proof of loss without supporting documentation.

The insurer invoked the statutory appraisal process and successfully moved for an order compelling the appellant to submit to an examination under oath and produce documentation.

The appellant appealed, arguing the appraisal process extinguished the insurer's right to examine him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appraisal process does not oust the insurer's contractual right to examine the insured, and the court has inherent jurisdiction to make procedural orders to give effect to the statutory scheme.

The applicant sought an order quashing a municipal by-law that reduced the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours and holistic centres, and sought a declaration that the licensing by-laws had expired under the five‑year sunset clause in s.150(13) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the sunset clause no longer applied because Part IV of the Municipal Act, 2001 had been repealed by the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006 and replaced by broader licensing powers under the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which contained no sunset provision.

The court further held that municipal councils are not required to have “hard evidence” of harm before passing a by‑law and that the court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining legality rather than reviewing the reasonableness of municipal policy decisions.

The applicant failed to establish that the by‑law was illegal or enacted for an improper purpose.

The application was dismissed.

In a civil action involving allegations arising from a dispute between business competitors, a defendant by counterclaim brought a motion to sanction the counterclaim plaintiff for breaching the deemed undertaking rule by broadcasting discovery material on a radio show.

In connection with that motion, the moving party served a summons to examine the opposing party’s lawyer as a witness.

The counterclaim plaintiff moved to quash the summons.

The court held that the lawyer did not possess relevant or material evidence regarding the breach and that any communications would be protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court further emphasized that summoning opposing counsel requires exceptional circumstances demonstrating necessity and high materiality, which were absent.

The summons to examine the lawyer was therefore quashed.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitral award arising from a dispute between two agricultural businesses over the purchase and sale of carrot products conducted under the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation arbitration process.

The applicant argued jurisdictional errors, procedural unfairness, improper reliance on mediation materials, lack of arbitrator expertise, and the applicability of the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The court held that the Arbitration Act, 1991 applied because the dispute involved two Ontario businesses and the arbitration was not international.

The application to set aside the award was statute‑barred because it was brought outside the 30‑day limit under the Arbitration Act and the court had no jurisdiction to extend the time.

In any event, the court found no jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness warranting intervention.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, and her sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant poured scalding tea on the complainant, causing severe burns and permanent hearing loss.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying reasonable doubt, and reaching inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range for the vicious assault.

The defendants brought a partial summary judgment motion arguing that claims seeking enforcement in Ontario of German “Notarized Debt Acknowledgments” were barred by limitation periods.

The court characterized the acknowledgments as foreign agreements creating unilateral covenants permitting enforcement without a prior German court judgment, rather than foreign judgments.

Applying conflict-of-laws principles, the court held that German limitation law governed.

Under the German Civil Code, enforceable documents such as the acknowledgments are subject to a 30‑year limitation period.

As a result, the claims were not statute‑barred and the motion was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to compel the plaintiff insured to attend for an examination under oath or alternatively an examination for discovery regarding the scope and quantum of damages arising from a flood loss claim under a property insurance policy.

The plaintiff argued that because the insurer had invoked the appraisal process under s. 128 of the Insurance Act, issues of quantum were exclusively within that process and outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The court rejected that position, holding that the statutory right to examine the insured under oath was not displaced by the election to proceed through appraisal and that the court retained jurisdiction to make procedural orders facilitating the statutory scheme.

The court also found the plaintiff’s proof of loss materially deficient and concluded that disclosure regarding damages was necessary.

A separate motion by the defendants to quash a summons requiring their appointed appraiser, who had since become counsel of record, to be examined was granted as the proposed examination constituted an unnecessary fishing expedition lacking evidentiary relevance to the pending motion.

In a real estate commission dispute, the plaintiff brokerage sought leave to amend its statement of claim to add an additional plaintiff and defendant and to plead rectification or rescission of an assignment of a listing agreement.

The defendant brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the claim on the basis that the assignment transferred all rights to commission to another brokerage and left the plaintiff without privity of contract.

The court held that amendments should generally be permitted unless clearly untenable or prejudicial and found the proposed amendments raised legally tenable issues regarding the enforceability of the assignment agreement, limitation periods, and potential duties owed by the proposed defendant brokerage.

The court also concluded that it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period had expired.

Leave to amend and add parties was granted and the motion to strike was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claims against the respondents for knowing assistance in a breach of trust, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.

The claims hinged on whether a defendant breached a fiduciary duty and duty of confidence by acquiring a mining property allegedly on the appellant's behalf.

The Court of Appeal applied the 'full appreciation' test for summary judgment and upheld the motion judge's finding that the documentary evidence overwhelmingly contradicted the appellant's assertion of an agency relationship.

The appeal was dismissed.

At a Commercial List case conference in a civil action involving debt obligations and guarantees, the court addressed procedural scheduling and evidentiary issues relating to an upcoming summary judgment motion.

The principal issue on the anticipated motion was whether the plaintiff’s claims were statute‑barred under applicable limitation laws, potentially governed by German law.

The court directed the parties to produce supplementary expert reports addressing the applicable foreign law and its limitation periods, particularly in light of allegations of fraudulent concealment that might affect discoverability.

The court also addressed potential hearsay objections to affidavit evidence and ordered preservation and production of relevant documents for the period 1996–2004.

The applicant sought judicial review of the LCBO's decision to award an agency store authorization to a competitor following a Request for Proposal process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the LCBO's decision was a commercial arrangement not subject to judicial review, as it did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision and lacked a sufficient public interest element.

In the alternative, the Court found that the procurement process was fair and the LCBO's decision was reasonable.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the LCBO from terminating its temporary authorization to operate an agency store and from fulfilling a new contract with a competitor, Daisy Mart, pending a judicial review of the procurement process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding fairness in the procurement process, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as any financial loss was compensable in damages.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the competitor, who had already undertaken substantial renovations and incurred expenses in reliance on the contract.

The appellant, a mayor, faced a compliance audit of her election campaign finances which revealed apparent contraventions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The municipal council passed a by-law authorizing the commencement of legal proceedings and retained outside counsel to prosecute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to quash the by-law and strike down s. 81 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 81 is not impermissibly vague, does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, and that the delegation of prosecutorial power to outside counsel was lawful and administrative in nature.

The moving party brought a motion to quash two notices of appeal filed by the responding parties.

The responding parties sought to appeal a decision dismissing their application for an order that the moving party breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The court held that the Act is a complete code and only provides a right of appeal for orders made under section 10.

Since no section 10 order was made, there was no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The motion to quash was granted and the notices of appeal were quashed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages against them for failing to pay amounts owed under agreements for the purchase of an operating gravel pit.

The appellants argued they were induced to enter the agreements by oral warranties and promises made by the respondents, which were breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's factual findings that no such oral undertakings or warranties were made, noting the appellants were represented by experienced counsel and the alleged warranties were not included in the written documents.

The appellants, owners and patrons of adult entertainment parlours, challenged the constitutional validity of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act and sought damages under private law causes of action.

The motion judge struck most of the claims but allowed the division of powers claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the private law and Charter claims.

On cross-appeal, the Court held that the division of powers claim should also have been struck, as it is plain and obvious that the pith and substance of the Act is to promote health, which falls within provincial jurisdiction.