Brian Wei Fou Chung

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting text messages sent by the complainant to a friend under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge improperly used the text messages for substantive corroboration of the complainant's in-court testimony rather than merely to provide context to evaluate credibility.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their claim for non-vested stock options under a consulting agreement.

The motion judge found the agreement was not a fixed term contract and that entitlement to unvested options was contingent on the appellants remaining engaged with the respondents on each vesting date.

The appellants raised a new argument on appeal regarding breach of the duty of good faith, which was not advanced below.

The appellants also challenged the costs award.

The Town of Ajax sought an order requiring the respondents to demolish and remove above-grade construction carried out without a building permit at 599 Kingston Road West, Ajax.

The respondents acknowledged the unpermitted construction but resisted demolition, arguing they should be allowed to continue obtaining the requisite Record of Site Condition (RSC).

The property had a history of soil contamination from its prior use as an automotive facility.

The respondents had entered into a Conditional Building Permit Agreement allowing only below-grade work pending RSC approval, but proceeded to construct above-grade elements without authorization.

Despite multiple warnings, stop work orders, and a mandatory injunction, construction continued.

The court found the respondents' conduct was a calculated decision by an experienced developer to circumvent regulatory requirements and ordered demolition as the only appropriate remedy to enforce building code compliance and protect public safety.

The court considered written submissions on costs following the granting of summary judgment in favour of the defendant, The Corporation of the City of Timmins.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, while the self-represented plaintiff argued for no costs or, alternatively, costs in his favour for a disclosure motion.

The court reviewed the relevant legal framework, including the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, and found that the defendant was entitled to substantial indemnity costs throughout, given the plaintiff’s prior similar litigation and the defendant’s early offer to settle.

The court adjusted the quantum of costs to reflect partial success on a disclosure motion and awarded a total of $80,631.57 to the defendant.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' "boomerang" motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' claim.

The case involved a dispute over entitlement to shares and options following the termination of a consulting arrangement.

The court found that the contract was not a fixed-term contract and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to unvested shares or options after their engagement ended.

The court also addressed the application of res judicata, finding that the plaintiffs should have sought all relief in a single proceeding, but ultimately decided the matter on the merits of the contract.

The appellants, Temagami Barge Limited and its principal, Dashiel Lowery Delarosbel, moved for a stay of a permanent injunction issued by the Superior Court of Justice.

The injunction prohibited certain commercial activities on their property due to violations of municipal zoning by-laws.

Applying the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for a stay pending appeal, the Court of Appeal found a serious issue for appeal but determined that the appellants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as their evidence was vague and harm to third parties was generally irrelevant.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay, as the public interest in enforcing municipal by-laws outweighed the appellants' unproven claims of harm.

The motion for a stay was dismissed, and the appeal was directed to be expedited.

This endorsement addresses the question of costs for the applications below, following an appeal decision (2023 ONCA 524) where the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in granting an injunction against the appellants (Cowie et al.) based on a band council resolution.

The original injunction was granted to Hiawatha First Nation to prohibit construction of a gas station.

Although the appellants were successful on appeal, no costs were awarded for the appeal itself due to their concession regarding the applicability of a new Land Code.

The application judge had awarded Hiawatha First Nation $235,000 in costs.

This endorsement reduces that award to $117,500, all-inclusive, considering the conduct of both parties and the appellants' socially responsible concession.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 25, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami brought a motion seeking leave to file an additional affidavit (Picard Affidavit) after cross-examinations were completed, pursuant to Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The affidavit contained evidence regarding the historical land use of the property, discovered during an additional search requested by the respondents.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing it was fresh evidence and would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court granted leave, finding that the proposed evidence was relevant, responded to matters raised during cross-examinations, would not result in non-compensable prejudice, and the applicant provided a reasonable explanation for its late discovery.

The appellant, Oro-Medonte Property Owners’ Association, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action to quash a by-law imposing water system fees and to declare the water system municipal.

The by-law was passed by the respondent, The Corporation of the Township of Oro-Medonte, to fund upgrades to the Zone 1 water system.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the Zone 1 system was not assumed by the municipality and that the by-law was within the municipality's statutory authority under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents in an application for a permanent injunction regarding zoning by-law compliance brought a motion to compel the applicant municipality to answer undertakings and refusals from a cross-examination.

The court found that all requested items had either been satisfied by the municipality or were protected by litigation privilege, specifically a planning memorandum and notes on inspection photographs prepared for counsel.

The motion was dismissed, though the court ordered a brief supplementary affidavit to confirm the timing and purpose of the photograph notes.

The Chief Building Official of the City of Cambridge issued an emergency order for the immediate demolition of the designated heritage Preston Springs Hotel due to its unsafe structural condition and persistent trespassing.

The CBO applied to the court to confirm the reasonableness of this order and to recover demolition costs from the owner, Haastown Holdings (Preston) Inc., who consented to both orders.

The Architectural Conservancy of Ontario (ACO) intervened, challenging the reasonableness of the demolition order, arguing that the CBO failed to consider relevant factors (heritage status, appeal to CRB, alternative remediation options) and considered irrelevant factors (cost of remediation).

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the CBO's decision was well-informed by expert reports and his own inspections, and that the building posed an immediate danger that necessitated demolition.

The court confirmed the emergency order and the recoverability of demolition costs from the owner, dismissing the ACO's challenge and alternate relief requests as moot or unsupported.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the order of Sweeny R.S.J. dated May 26, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This appeal addressed whether a Band Council Resolution (BCR) could be enforced as a by-law under the Indian Act.

Hiawatha First Nation sought a permanent injunction to stop three of its members from building a gas station on the reserve, relying on a BCR that imposed a moratorium on new businesses.

The application judge granted the injunction, treating the BCR as a by-law.

The Court of Appeal found that a BCR is distinct from a by-law and does not have the force of law to create rights and duties for band members or third parties under the Indian Act.

The court emphasized that law-making authority under the Indian Act, particularly when affecting proprietary rights, requires adherence to specific by-law formalities.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the injunction based on the BCR was set aside.

The applicant purchaser sought declarations that the respondent vendor was not entitled to a 'Bonus Density' payment under their Agreement of Purchase and Sale, and an order discharging a $25 million security mortgage.

The dispute arose after a Minister's Zoning Order (MZO) approved an aggregate density for a combined transit-oriented development that included the subject property and adjacent third-party lands.

The court held that the MZO did not trigger the Bonus Density payment because it did not allocate density specifically to the subject property, making the determination premature.

The court also dismissed the applicant's request to discharge the security mortgage and the respondent's motion to convert the application into an action.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, which pleaded thirteen causes of action arising from an internet contract for bitcoin investment.

The court found the Statement of Claim to be based on fictionalized facts from the plaintiff's memory rather than the actual contract.

The court struck the Statement of Claim with leave to amend, but specifically struck claims against individual directors, conversion, breach of the Competition Act, and intentional infliction of mental distress without leave to amend.

The claim for breach of Colombian law was struck with leave to amend to properly plead foreign law.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

The plaintiffs moved for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a 108-acre parcel of land.

The plaintiff had agreed to purchase five acres of the land from one of the co-owners for $750,000 and advanced $640,000 before the defendant purported to terminate the agreement.

The defendant argued the agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and the Planning Act.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' interest in the land and held that the equities favoured granting the CPL, as the property was unique and the plaintiffs had advanced 85% of the purchase price.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Healey J. dated August 9, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all-inclusive to the responding party within 30 days.

The Architectural Conservancy of Ontario, Heritage Cambridge (ACO-Cambridge), an unincorporated entity, sought leave to intervene in an application by the Chief Building Official of the City of Cambridge to confirm an Emergency Order for the demolition of the Preston Springs Hotel, a designated heritage property.

The court first addressed ACO-Cambridge's legal status, substituting the parent organization, Architectural Conservancy of Ontario (ACO), as the proper moving party under Rule 26.01.

The court then considered the Rule 13 test for intervention, finding that ACO had a sufficient public interest in the matter, which was deemed to be of public importance.

While granting leave to intervene, the court imposed strict limitations on ACO's participation, restricting its evidence and submissions to the sole issue of the reasonableness of the CBO's Emergency Order and limiting affidavits to two, to prevent undue delay and expansion of the proceeding.

The court also determined ACO to be a public interest litigant but deferred the decision on its liability for costs of the main application to the application judge.