John George Pappas

The Town of Ajax sought an order requiring the respondents to demolish and remove above-grade construction carried out without a building permit at 599 Kingston Road West, Ajax.

The respondents acknowledged the unpermitted construction but resisted demolition, arguing they should be allowed to continue obtaining the requisite Record of Site Condition (RSC).

The property had a history of soil contamination from its prior use as an automotive facility.

The respondents had entered into a Conditional Building Permit Agreement allowing only below-grade work pending RSC approval, but proceeded to construct above-grade elements without authorization.

Despite multiple warnings, stop work orders, and a mandatory injunction, construction continued.

The court found the respondents' conduct was a calculated decision by an experienced developer to circumvent regulatory requirements and ordered demolition as the only appropriate remedy to enforce building code compliance and protect public safety.

This decision concerns an appeal under section 88.33(9) of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996, regarding the City of Ottawa Elections Compliance Audit Committee's refusal to order a compliance audit of a candidate's financial statement.

The court found that even a minor but substantive error in a candidate's Form 4 financial statement is sufficient to require an audit, and that the Committee erred in not ordering one.

The court ordered the Committee to appoint an auditor and clarified that the threshold for ordering an audit is low, focusing on transparency and accurate reporting rather than the magnitude of the error.

This is an appeal of a decision by the Joint Compliance Audit Committee for the Town of Oakville, which authorized a compliance audit of a municipal councillor's campaign finances.

The appellant argued that the applicant for the audit lacked standing because they were not an elector of the specific ward in which the councillor ran.

The court, applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and the presumption of consistent expression, found that the relevant statutory provision (s. 88.33(1) of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996) must be read in conjunction with s. 19(7) of the same Act, which limits an elector's voting entitlement to their ward of residence in ward-divided municipalities.

Consequently, the court held that only an elector residing in the specific ward has standing to request a compliance audit for a candidate in that ward.

The Committee's decision to order the audit was set aside due to the applicant's lack of standing.