Leduc v. Rioux, 2026 ONSC 92

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Leduc v. Rioux, 2026 ONSC 92

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-12102

DATE: 2026-01-06

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

William Leduc

Plaintiff

– and –

Anastasia Rioux and the Corporation of the City of Greater Sudbury (Election Compliance Audit Committee)

Defendants

Aniket Bhatt, for the Plaintiff

Nilgiri Pearson, for the Defendant Rioux

John Pappas, for the Defendant Greater Sudbury

HEARD: Written Submissions

REASONS ON MOTIONS AND DECISION ON COSTS

P.J. BOUCHER, RSJ.

Introduction

1The defendants’ motions to dismiss these proceedings were granted, unopposed, on July 10, 2025 (Rioux) and July 11, 2025 (Greater Sudbury) respectively. The parties were unable to resolve the issue of costs. I received and considered their written submissions.

2The plaintiff also brought a motion in writing requesting that any costs ordered payable by him to the defendants, be paid by his former counsel, Timothy Harmar, pursuant to Rule 57.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194. On October 29, 2025 Timothy Harmar was served personally with this motion as well as the costs submissions of the parties pursuant to my endorsement dated October 21, 2025. Timothy Harmar did not file responding materials.

3This is my decision on costs. I also take this opportunity to provide reasons with respect to the granting of the motions.

Background

4The plaintiff is an incumbent municipal councillor in Greater Sudbury. He was re-elected to represent Ward 11 on October 24, 2022.

5The defendant Rioux is a resident of Ward 11.

6The defendant Greater Sudbury established the election compliance audit committee (the “Committee”) pursuant to s. 88.37(1) of the Municipal Elections Act, SO 1996, c 32, Sched. (“MEA”).

7Rioux had concerns about a “Grandparents’ Day” event held on September 11, 2022. Some of the advertising for the event stated it was sponsored by “Ward 11”. However, other advertising suggested it was sponsored by “Ward 11 CAN.” Rioux believed the latter to mean the event was sponsored by a publicly funded “Community Action Network” or “CAN” which would be contrary to the campaign financing provisions of the MEA.

8Rioux accordingly brought an application pursuant to s. 88.33(1) of the MEA which provides as follows:

An elector who is entitled to vote in an election and believes on reasonable grounds that a candidate has contravened a provision of this Act relating to election campaign finances may apply for a compliance audit of the candidate’s election campaign finances, even if the candidate has not filed a financial statement…

9The application was heard by the Committee on April 27, 2023. After hearing from Rioux and the plaintiff the Committee ordered a compliance audit of the plaintiff’s election campaign finances. An independent auditor, KPMG, was appointed by the Committee. The auditor prepared a report that identified possible contraventions of the MEA by the plaintiff.

10At the compliance audit hearing held on July 03, 2024, the Committee considered the following allegations involving the plaintiff:

a. That he accepted a contribution of cash in excess of the limit established by subsection 88.8(8) of the MEA;

b. That he accepted contributions from a single contributor in excess of the maximum amount established by subsection 88.9(1) of the MEA;

c. That he failed to ensure all payments for campaign expenses were made from the campaign bank account, contrary to clause 88.22(1)(d) of the MEA; and

d. That he failed to accurately record all campaign expenses and campaign contributions in the financial statement, particularly in relation to the Grandparents’ Day 2022 event, contrary to clause 92(1)(b) of the MEA.

11Notably, hearings conducted by the Committee are subject to the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c S 22 (SPPA): French v. Township of Springwater, 2018 ONSC 94 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 72-74. The Committee is a quasi-judicial body, and a duty of fairness is accordingly owed to the parties involved in the proceedings.

12Both Rioux and the plaintiff (through counsel) made submissions at the compliance audit hearing. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Committee authorized a legal proceeding against the plaintiff for the apparent contraventions, pursuant to s. 88.33(17) of the MEA.

13The plaintiff brought an application for judicial review of the Committee’s decision, alleging errors in law, a denial of procedural fairness, and bias, which remains outstanding. He subsequently commenced this action, claiming defamation as against Rioux, and the tort of misfeasance in public office as against Greater Sudbury.

The motions

Rioux’s motion

14Rioux bought what is commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion. SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990 c C43 governs these motions.

15The purpose of this provision is to encourage expressions on matters of public interest and public debate, and to discourage the use of litigation to limit these goals. In short, the provisions seek to “reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action”: s. 137.1(1)(a)-(d) Courts of Justice Act.

16The legislation sets out a two-stage test. First, the moving party must satisfy the court the expression was made in the public interest. The test in s. 137.1(3) is set out below:

On motion by [Rioux] against whom [the defamation] proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against [Rioux] if [Rioux] satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by [Rioux] that relates to a matter of public interest.

17I am persuaded that Rioux met this test. Her application to the committee, and her statements to the media and at the Committee meetings fit within s. 137.1(2)’s expansive definition of “expression.” Further, her expressions pertain to matters “some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on…”: 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22 at para. 27. In my view, the public has an interest in the conduct of candidates for public office and elected officials, where, as here, allegations are raised regarding their use of public funds and compliance with election finance legislation.

18The onus then shifts in the second stage for the plaintiff to satisfy the test set out in s. 137.1(4)(a) and (b), failing which the motion must succeed:

A judge shall not dismiss [Leduc’s defamation] proceeding under subsection (3) if [Leduc] satisfies the judge that,

a) There are grounds to believe that

i) The [defamation] proceeding has substantial merit, and

ii) [Rioux] has no valid defence in the [defamation] proceeding, and

b) The harm likely to be or have been suffered by [Leduc] as a result of [Rioux’s] expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the [defamation] proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting [Rioux’s] expression.

19The plaintiff did not oppose the motion and so the court can infer that he did not intend to meet this test. In any event, I am persuaded on this record that the test would not have been met.

20First, the defamation proceeding does not have substantial merit. To establish the tort of defamation, the plaintiff must show that the words complained of were published by Rioux, that they referred to the plaintiff, and that they were defamatory, in the sense that “they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person”: Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at para. 28.

21I have already concluded that Rioux’s expressions pertained to matters of public interest. After hearing from the parties at two hearings, and after considering the KPMG audit, the Committee concluded it appeared the plaintiff had contravened the MEA and authorized legal proceedings against him. In this context it is difficult to understand how Rioux’s expressions could be considered defamatory.

22Second, even if the claim has substantial merit, Rioux had valid defences to the claim. In my view, Rioux’s application to the Committee is protected by qualified privilege, because it had high social utility and was communicated to an audience with a legitimate interest in receiving it: Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23 at para 121.

23In addition, her communications made during the Committee hearings are covered by absolute privilege, which protects witnesses from being sued because of their evidence given during proceedings: Web Offset Publications Ltd. v. Vickery, 4462 (ON CA) at p. 537.

24I am also persuaded that Rioux’s comments to the media were substantially true, justified or fair comment. With respect to the former, after two hearings and an independent audit, the Committee concluded it was in the public interest to start proceedings against the plaintiff because of, in part, the allegations raised by Rioux.

25Regarding the latter, her statements constituted fair comment on matters of public interest. The comments were based on facts she provided to the Committee, they could have been expressed honestly by any person on the proved facts, and there was no malice in the comments: WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2 SCR 420 at 28.

26Assuming the plaintiff could establish his defamation action had substantial merit and Rioux did not have valid defences, the plaintiff would fail on the last part of the test, which involves a balancing of the public interest. In short, the question to be asked is whether the public interest would favour proceeding with the defamation action or protecting Rioux’s expression. In determining this question, the court must “assess the quality of the expression, including the motivation behind it, the medium through which it was expressed, and its subject matter”: Benchwood Builders Inc. v. Prescott, 2025 ONCA 171 at 62.

27In my view, the public interest strongly favours protecting Rioux’s expression over the plaintiff’s defamation action. Rioux began her expression with the application made to the Committee. She provided to the committee the evidence upon which her concerns were based. She was motivated by compliance with election financing legislation. Her statements to the media were based on the evidence she had compiled.

28The Committee conducted hearings into the matter, heard from Rioux and the plaintiff and commissioned and considered an independent auditor’s report. On the strength of the evidence gathered, the Committee concluded legal proceedings against the plaintiff were warranted in the public interest.

29It is for these reasons that I granted Rioux’s motion.

Greater Sudbury’s motion

30Greater Sudbury moved to dismiss the proceedings, arguing the Committee is immune from civil liability. In the alternative, Greater Sudbury argues the subject matter of the claim contains the same allegations as the judicial review proceedings and the claim is thus duplicative and an abuse of process. The following reasons explain why I granted Greater Sudbury’s motion.

31Judicial immunity may be extended by statute or the common law to administrative decision-makers exercising quasi-judicial functions: Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, at para 50. Here, a statutory immunity clause does not protect the Committee.

32However, in my view, the common law extends immunity from civil liability to the statutorily constituted Committee. The court in Westlake v. The Queen in right of the Province of Ontario, 1971 680 (Ont. H.C.); aff’d 1972 515 (Ont. C.A.) considered six categories of statutory entities in determining whether they are immune from civil liability. The court defined the sixth category as follows

These are non-corporate bodies which are not by the terms of the statute incorporating them or by necessary implication liable to be sued in an action for damages, but who are legal entities in that their actions may be reviewed in proceedings brought against them by way of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

33The Committee fits squarely within this definition and is accordingly immune from civil liability. The MEA does not contain a statutory immunity clause, the Committee is not incorporated, its proceedings are on the record and subject to the SPPA, and its decisions are subject either to appeal (at the application stage) or to judicial review (at the compliance audit stage). In fact, as I have discussed, there is an outstanding judicial review proceeding instituted by the plaintiff. In short, the legislature could not have intended in these circumstances that this quasi-judicial body could be sued.

34And even if the Committee could be subject to civil liability, I would dismiss this action because it amounts to an attempt to litigate the issues under judicial review through the guise of a private wrong: Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, at para 78.

35The plaintiff asserts the private tort of misfeasance in public office. In Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, at para. 32, the Supreme Court defined this tort as follows:

(i) deliberate unlawful conduct in the exercise of public functions; and (ii) awareness that the conduct is unlawful and likely to injure the plaintiff. Alongside deliberate unlawful conduct and the requisite knowledge, a plaintiff must also prove the other requirements common to all torts. More specifically, the plaintiff must prove that the tortious conduct was the legal cause of his or her injuries, and that the injuries suffered are compensable in tort law.

36The unlawful conduct alleged against the Committee by the plaintiff lies upon the same foundation as the judicial review proceedings: excess of statutory authority, failure to provide procedural fairness, bias, and improper political motive. The action is accordingly an improper attempt by the plaintiff to litigate these very issues in the wrong forum. Allowing the action to continue would lead to unnecessary duplicative proceedings, could result in inconsistent results, and would be an abuse of the process of the court.

37It is for these reasons that I granted Greater Sudbury’s motion.

Costs

Introduction

38Modern costs awards address several important principles. They partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation, they encourage settlement, and they discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour. Awards should reflect what the court views is a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party, rather than an exact measure of the actual costs of the successful party. Part of this assessment includes considering what the unsuccessful party could expect to pay in the circumstances: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, 2004 14579 (ON CA) at para 26. Costs awards must be proportionate and reasonable: Beaver v. Beaver, ONCA 2018 840 at para. 4.

39Costs awards are entirely within the discretion of the court. Rule 57.01 provides some guidelines that may be considered when exercising that discretion, in addition to the result in the proceeding and any offers to settle

Procedural history

40This action was instituted mere weeks after the plaintiff’s application for judicial review of the Committee’s decision. In response, the defendants moved for dismissal of the action. A consent timetable with respect to Rioux’s motion was ordered by the court on November 15, 2024. It anticipated cross-examinations and pleadings would be completed by March 15, 2025. The timetable regarding Greater Sudbury’s motion was ordered on March 28, 2025, in the absence of counsel for the plaintiff, though served. Pleadings were to be delivered by April 24, 2025.

41Rioux’s motion was set to be argued on April 17, 2025. On that date, counsel for the plaintiff, Timothy Harmar, did not attend court at the appointed time, but eventually appeared by audio. He mistakenly believed the motion was to be argued the next day, and he took responsibility for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the timetable and deliver a responding affidavit and factum. He advised the court he had recently experienced a mental health crisis. The time to deliver the plaintiff’s materials was extended to May 02, 2025, and the matter was returnable in court on April 25, 2025 to confirm a new date for the motion.

42Both motions were before the court on April 25, 2025. Counsel for the parties were in attendance. The court was advised Rioux’s motion was ready for argument. The timetable for Greater Sudbury’s motion was varied to extend to April 28, 2025 the time for the plaintiff to deliver his factum.

43Counsel for the parties appeared before the court on May 16, 2025 to set dates for the motions. The court was advised that Timothy Harmar may have been administratively suspended by the Law Society of Ontario. The court expected to find time for the motions the week of May 26, 2025 and the matter was adjourned a week to confirm the dates.

44The matters were before the court on May 21, 2025. Aniket Bhatt appeared for the plaintiff and advised the court that Timothy Harmar’s administrative suspension with the Law Society of Ontario was expected to be rectified presently. The intention was that Timothy Harmar would represent the plaintiff at the argument of the motions. Counsel for Rioux asked that the motion proceed the following week. In the circumstances, and considering valuable court time had already been lost, Rioux’s motion was set for argument on August 25, 2025, and the plaintiff was given until June 06, 2025 to deliver a book of authorities. A case conference date for Rioux’s motion was set for July 10, 2025. Greater Sudbury’s motion was adjourned to June 13, 2025, at which time the hearing of that motion was scheduled for January 19, 2026.

45At the case conference on July 10, 2025, Aniket Bhatt advised the court he had been retained by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff would not be opposing Rioux’s motion. I granted the motion and set a timetable for the delivery of submissions with respect to costs.

46On July 11, 2025, Aniket Bhatt appeared again and confirmed his retainer and advised the court the plaintiff would not be opposing Greater Sudbury’s motion. I granted the motion and set a timetable for the delivery of submissions on costs.

47As I have mentioned, in addition to submissions on costs, the plaintiff delivered a motion asking that any costs he may be ordered to pay to the defendants be instead payable by his former counsel, Timothy Harmar. Timothy Harmar did not respond to the motion, though he was served personally with the materials.

Rioux’s motion

48I will deal with the motions separately at this point because, in addition to the general principles on costs I have discussed, other principles come into play given some important differences regarding the motions.

49It is not surprising that given the purposes of the anti-SLAPP provisions, there is a presumption that successful moving parties are entitled to their costs of the action and the motion on a full indemnity basis, unless the court determines that “such an award is not appropriate in the circumstances”: s. 137.1(7) Courts of Justice Act.

50Rioux seeks all-inclusive full indemnity costs of $33,055.63 for the action and her successful motion.

51The plaintiff disputes this amount, arguing the costs are unreasonable, alleging double-billing and unnecessary disbursements. He submits the proceedings were not complex and undeserving of the attention given by Rioux’s counsel. He also argues his former counsel caused delays and failed to comply with court ordered timetables, thus unnecessarily driving up the costs.

52I am not persuaded that I should deviate from the legislative presumption of full indemnity costs for Rioux given her success on the motion. On the contrary, I find that full indemnity costs are entirely appropriate in the circumstances.

53While the plaintiff blames his former counsel for delays, these occurred after Rioux’s materials were delivered and after cross-examinations were completed. The failure to comply with the timetables necessitated about five attendances before the court, most of which were brief.

54Significantly, the plaintiff does not dispute that he provided instructions to his former counsel to commence the action and to oppose, until the last minute, the anti-SLAPP motion. I have already explained why the action fit squarely within that which the anti-SLAPP provisions seek to prevent: the stifling of public debate on matters of public importance out of fear of legal action. Similarly minded ratepayers, forced to expend their own funds to defend such a lawsuit, may think twice about speaking out about matters of public importance.

55And consider that Rioux’s expressions took place not only in the media but, importantly, in the context of a quasi-judicial proceeding. Would this lawsuit encourage other citizens to reconsider reporting such concerns to the statutorily constituted Committee governed by the SPPA and rules of procedural fairness and that allows both sides to be heard? And whose decisions are subject to appeal and judicial review? The action could have the dual effect of limiting public debate as well as recourse to a quasi-judicial decision maker.

56Rioux’s bill of costs is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The action publicly attacked Rioux’s integrity. Her response was proportionate. The bulk of the work on the file was completed by a junior lawyer at a reasonable rate. The disbursements are not excessive. Full indemnity costs in accordance with this bill of costs are in line with what the unsuccessful party ought to have expected to pay in the circumstances.

Greater Sudbury

57Greater Sudbury seeks substantial indemnity costs of $45,339.76 and in the alternative partial indemnity costs of $30,454.61.

58The plaintiff argues substantial indemnity costs are not warranted. He submits Greater Sudbury’s fees are duplicative, and they are unreasonably high, considering no affidavit materials were filed and examinations were not undertaken.

59Costs awards on a substantial indemnity or full indemnity scale are exceptionally reserved for conduct that attracts the court’s disapproval. This includes conduct that is reprehensible either in the circumstances giving rise to the proceedings, or in the conduct of the proceedings themselves. Elevated costs “are not to be used as a means of shoring up a damages award, nor are they a means to ensure that a plaintiff is not put to any expense”: Hunt v. TD Securities Inc., (2003), 2003 3649 (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.) at paras. 123-124.

60As I will explain, elevated costs are warranted in this case.

61In essence, this action asserted that the statutorily constituted Committee was capable of being sued because of the application it considered, the hearings it conducted, and the decisions it made. And all of this was in the context of a ratepayer lawfully seeking a determination of whether an incumbent municipal councillor had conducted himself in accordance with municipal election finance laws. The determination of this issue was accordingly significant not only to the Committee and its work as a quasi-judicial body but also to municipal law generally: r. 57.01(1)(d) Rules of Civil Procedure.

62For centuries, cases have been heard locally, with the least disruption and expense to litigants and witnesses. This is a Sudbury action, and it was properly started and determined here. Local tariffs are one of the factors that must be considered in assessing what an unsuccessful party could expect to pay in the circumstances of a particular case. I have carefully considered Greater Sudbury’s bill of costs. I note that students at law in that firm bill at the same hourly rate as a lawyer with 11 years experience in Rioux’s firm, which is in Sudbury. I have also considered that the defendant Greater Sudbury engaged a firm with expertise in municipal law.

63In my view, an elevated costs award between partial and substantial indemnity costs is warranted in this case. I accordingly fix costs to Greater Sudbury in the amount of $30,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff’s motion

64Rule 57.07(1) of the Rules provides as follows:

(1) Where a lawyer for a party has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default, the court may make an order,

(a) disallowing costs between the lawyer and client or directing the lawyer to repay to the client money paid on account of costs;

(b) directing the lawyer to reimburse the client for any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to any other party; and

(c) requiring the lawyer personally to pay the costs of any party.

65The plaintiff asks that any costs award made against him be paid personally by Timothy Harmar to the defendants. He submits that Timothy Harmar is responsible for missing deadlines set out in the timetables as well as for several adjournments and unnecessary court attendances. He argues Timothy Harmar failed to properly maintain communication with him, contributing to delay and added expense.

66I am not persuaded I should exercise my discretion to order Timothy Harmar to personally pay the costs of the defendants. While his conduct created some delay and brief court attendances, overall, these attendances balance out the time that was not used to argue the motions (a day and a half was set aside). Further, the parties proceeded with cross-examination based on a draft version of the plaintiff’s affidavit, which did not result in delay. It was ultimately Timothy Harmar’s failure to be prepared for the April 17, 2025 attendance and the absence of the plaintiff’s factum and book of authorities that caused delay. The defendants’ materials were complete by that time.

67Further, while the plaintiff submits he lost communication with Timothy Harmar, his evidence is that this occurred only after May 20, 2025, mere days after he was advised he had been administratively suspended by the Law Society of Ontario.

68Notably, the plaintiff offers no other evidence questioning Timothy Harmar’s representation, such as whether the action should have been commenced and whether the motions should have been defended, including attending for cross-examinations. The plaintiff’s complaints about Timothy Harmar relate to the time after effectively all the work was completed by the defendants, save and except for brief attendances.

69In my view, the costs incurred by the defendants, and which I have fixed, were a result of the action commenced by the plaintiff and the successful motions brought by the defendants, which the plaintiff chose to defend until the eleventh hour.

Conclusion

70It is for these reasons that the defendants’ motions were granted, and the plaintiff’s motion is dismissed.

71The following costs orders are made:

a. The plaintiff shall pay full indemnity costs for this action and motion to the defendant Rioux fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $33,055.63; and

b. The plaintiff shall pay elevated costs of this action and motion to the defendant Greater Sudbury fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $30,000.00.

The Honourable Regional Senior Justice P.J. Boucher

Released: January 06, 2026

CITATION: Leduc v. Rioux, 2026 ONSC 92