Shelley Kaufman

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) regarding the applicable legislative and policy framework for a subdivision development proposal.

The LPAT had determined that the current policy regime applied, relying on the retroactive application of s. 22.1 of the Planning Act to establish the request date.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the LPAT's determination involved questions of mixed fact and law, and that the issues raised were not of sufficient general or public importance to warrant the court's attention.

The Town of Grimsby appealed a decision declaring that a private works yard was a permitted use on the respondent's property, which was zoned as a 'Utility Zone'.

The Town argued the use must be related to a public or quasi-public utility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The zoning by-law unambiguously defined 'Works Yard' as a permitted use without restricting it to public or utility purposes, and the by-law's plain language governed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board approving a subdivision plan, arguing it was denied natural justice because it did not receive notice of the hearing.

The moving party held an easement over land near the proposed subdivision but was not on the municipal tax roll.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the Board followed its standard notice procedures and was not required to notify an easement holder it could not have known about.

The court also found no error in the Board Chair's refusal to review and re-open the decision.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) which denied their motion to dismiss the respondent's appeal without a hearing.

The moving parties argued that the OMB had improperly made final determinations on their defences of res judicata and laches.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's decision was interlocutory and merely determined that the issues were worthy of a full hearing, despite the OMB's reasons going further than necessary.

The Niagara Escarpment Commission appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision allowing a subdivision application to proceed to a hearing.

The central issue was whether the Board had jurisdiction under the Planning Act despite amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act requiring a development permit before any development decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to address the mandatory language of the amended legislation.

The Court further held that the respondent did not have a vested right to a hearing before the Board.

Following the dismissal of two related appeals brought by groups of developers, the successful municipal respondents sought costs.

The City of Mississauga sought partial indemnity costs of $70,379.25, while the Region of Halton and City of Burlington sought full indemnity costs of approximately $176,000.

The Court of Appeal determined that costs should follow the event on a partial indemnity scale.

Considering the complexity of the issues, the prior proceedings before the Ontario Municipal Board and Divisional Court, and the consolidated hearing, the court awarded $50,000 to Mississauga and $50,000 to Halton and Burlington.

Developers appealed decisions of the Divisional Court regarding the interpretation of 'conflict' under O. Reg. 82/98 between pre-existing subdivision agreements and municipal development charge by-laws.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court correctly applied a standard of correctness to the Ontario Municipal Board's decisions.

The Court affirmed that a conflict exists only if the subdivision agreement, properly interpreted, precludes the infrastructure charges imposed by the development charge by-law.

The appeals and cross-appeal were dismissed.