Jeremy Martin

The appellants, owners of a dental clinic, appealed the dismissal of their action against a former independent contractor dentist who left to start his own practice.

The appellants alleged conversion, improper solicitation of patients and employees, appropriation of confidential information, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the dentists carried on independent practices, the departing dentist only contacted his own patients to fulfill professional obligations, and the patient information accessed was not confidential.

The court also rejected claims regarding breach of fiduciary duty and the contractual duty of good faith.

The plaintiffs in a class action sought to certify additional common issues.

The Landlord Defendants brought a preliminary motion to prevent this, arguing that a previous "Further Certification Order" (FCO) was a final certification order, or alternatively, that the plaintiffs required leave under s. 8(3) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, which should be denied.

The court dismissed the preliminary motion, finding no objective agreement that the FCO was a final certification order and that, consequently, no leave under s. 8(3) was required as the proposed motion was a continuation of the certification process, not an amendment to a final order.

The appellant, a municipal councillor and later mayor, appealed a decision finding he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by attempting to influence the location of a municipal project near his commercial property.

The application judge ordered his removal from office and a two-year disqualification.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction, the finding of a pecuniary interest, the admission of expert evidence, the penalty, and the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the application judge's objective assessment of the conflict, her reliance on the expert valuation report, or her discretionary decisions on penalty and costs.

The moving defendants sought leave to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiffs to allow a corporation to grant a second mortgage to the Royal Bank of Canada.

The plaintiffs and other defendants opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grounds for discharging the CPL did not satisfy the criteria under section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, nor did the equities favour the moving parties, as ownership interests remained in dispute and the proposed mortgage would dilute the plaintiffs' interests.

The appellants sought to develop land pursuant to an amended development agreement with the Town of Ajax.

The agreement contained repurchase terms that could be invoked if the developer failed to take reasonable steps to proceed with construction by a specified deadline, provided it was not awaiting comments or confirmation of approval on any application from the Town.

The Town terminated the agreement and exercised its repurchase rights, claiming the developer's revised site plan application was incomplete and the construction deadline had passed.

The trial judge found in favour of the Town.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in failing to apply the Planning Act's definition of a complete site plan and in conflating completeness with readiness for approval.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the site plan application was incomplete as a matter of contract interpretation because the developer had not submitted all requested materials and was not awaiting Town approval but rather the Town was awaiting responses from the developer.

The plaintiffs, Central Park Ajax 1 Developments Phase 1 Inc. and LeMine Real Estate Consulting Inc., brought a claim for $300 million in damages and declaratory relief against The Corporation of the Town of Ajax and Rob Ford, alleging breach of contract, defamation, and unlawful interference.

The core dispute revolved around the Town's right to repurchase development lands due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to commence construction by a contractual deadline.

The court was asked to determine two key issues: (1) whether LeMine was awaiting approval for a site plan application from the Town on or prior to July 17, 2017, which would invalidate the repurchase notice, and (2) if not, whether the Town had the right to repurchase the lands due to LeMine's failure to start construction by July 16, 2017.

The court found that LeMine had not submitted a complete site plan application sufficient for council consideration and was therefore not "awaiting confirmation of approval." Furthermore, the court interpreted the development agreement, considering both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, to conclude that LeMine was contractually obliged to commence construction by July 15, 2017, and failed to do so.

Consequently, the Town's repurchase notice was deemed valid, and the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on these issues.

The prospective appellant sought leave to appeal an order requiring its representatives to re-attend an examination and pay costs.

The appellant argued the underlying contempt motion was a nullity because it was brought on the civil motion list rather than in Bankruptcy Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the motion was properly brought in both emanations of the Superior Court.