John Mascarin

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of two decisions by City Council to sanction him based on reports from the Integrity Commissioner.

The Integrity Commissioner found the applicant breached the Code of Conduct by making disparaging comments in emails and by disclosing confidential complaint forms to other councillors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding no procedural unfairness in the investigations, no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Integrity Commissioner or City Council, and that the findings and sanctions were reasonable.

The appellant, a municipal councillor and later mayor, appealed a decision finding he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by attempting to influence the location of a municipal project near his commercial property.

The application judge ordered his removal from office and a two-year disqualification.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction, the finding of a pecuniary interest, the admission of expert evidence, the penalty, and the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the application judge's objective assessment of the conflict, her reliance on the expert valuation report, or her discretionary decisions on penalty and costs.

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

The applicant, the Mayor of Hawkesbury, sought an interlocutory stay of a municipal council decision regarding potential sanctions following an Integrity Commissioner's report finding she breached the Code of Conduct.

She also sought a sealing order for certain documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, noting the statutory requirement that such reports be made public.

The request for a sealing order was also dismissed.

The applicant municipal council sought an order under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act to allow conflicted councillors to participate in litigation decisions.

A ratepayer had sued eight of the nine councillors personally for $210 million, leaving the council without a quorum to manage the litigation.

The court granted the order to ensure the municipality could function, but imposed a condition requiring the conflicted councillors to obtain judicial approval before agreeing to any settlement of the litigation, analogous to the process for parties under disability.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent, Mayor of Belleville, breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council debate and voting on a highway improvement project in which he had a pecuniary interest.

The court found that the respondent did breach the Act by voting on the project, which involved the acquisition of property owned by a company in which he held shares.

However, the court applied the saving provision under section 10(2) of the Act, finding that the contravention was committed through an honest error in judgment, and therefore declined to remove the respondent from office.

The Chief Building Official issued building permits for a body rub parlour in a specific zoning area.

A competing business appealed the decision to the Superior Court, where the appeal judge rescinded the permits, finding the CBO's interpretation of the word 'front' in the zoning by-law to be unreasonable.

The CBO and the permit holder appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review.

The CBO's interpretation of the by-law was reasonable.

The applicant, a body rub parlour operator, appealed the Chief Building Official's (CBO) decision to issue a building permit to a competitor (the respondent) in the same building.

The appeal concerned the interpretation of a zoning by-law that prohibited certain commercial uses on properties "fronting" on the west side of Victoria Park Avenue for a depth of 60m.

The building's main entrance was on a side street, but its side wall ran along Victoria Park Avenue.

The court found the applicant had standing as a business competitor and that the CBO's decision should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard.

Interpreting "front" in the context of the by-law's policy to organize land uses along the main thoroughfare, the court concluded that the building "fronted" on Victoria Park Avenue.

Therefore, the respondent's body rub parlour was not a permitted use in that zone, and the building permit was improperly issued.

A municipal elector sought a declaration under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act alleging that the mayor contravened s. 5 by speaking and voting on a motion requiring him to personally repay an alleged municipal budget over‑expenditure.

The court considered whether the application was brought within the limitation period under s. 9 and whether any exceptions under s. 4 applied.

The court held that although the application was timely and the statutory exceptions did not apply, the mayor did not possess a real pecuniary interest because the municipality lacked legal authority to require personal repayment.

As the proposed financial sanction was ultra vires and therefore a nullity, there was no genuine pecuniary interest engaging s. 5.

The application seeking removal from office and restitution was dismissed.

The Ombudsman investigated 60 complaints alleging that seven members of the City of London council held an improper closed meeting at a restaurant five days before a key budget vote.

The Ombudsman found that the gathering was purposeful and planned, and that discussions occurred regarding city business, including a Trillium Foundation grant.

The Ombudsman concluded that the gathering constituted an illegal closed meeting in violation of the open meeting requirements of the Municipal Act, 2001, and recommended that the city adopt a clear policy to discourage such conduct.

The appellants, developers of a residential subdivision, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision requiring them to pay $568,391 as their proportionate share of municipal infrastructure costs previously front-ended by a neighbouring developer.

The appellants argued that the Development Charges Act, 1989 prohibited the imposition of such charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Act prohibited imposing a charge by way of agreement, it did not prohibit the OMB from imposing the charge directly as a condition of draft plan approval under section 51(25) of the Planning Act to ensure a fair and equitable allocation of infrastructure costs.