Julia Wilkes

The appellant tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board but failed to file materials and indicated an intention to discontinue the appeal.

The tenant appeared self-represented at the hearing and consented to the dismissal of the appeal.

The respondent landlord sought substantial indemnity costs of $11,255, arguing the appeal was an abuse of process to delay eviction.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, instead ordering partial indemnity costs of $7,500, finding the amount reasonable and proportionate given the work required by the landlord's counsel.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of two decisions by City Council to sanction him based on reports from the Integrity Commissioner.

The Integrity Commissioner found the applicant breached the Code of Conduct by making disparaging comments in emails and by disclosing confidential complaint forms to other councillors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding no procedural unfairness in the investigations, no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Integrity Commissioner or City Council, and that the findings and sanctions were reasonable.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a 90-day suspension of pay imposed by City Council for breaching the Code of Conduct.

The sanction followed an Integrity Commissioner's report finding the applicant made false statements and mishandled personal information at a town hall meeting.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the factual findings were reasonable.

The court also dismissed the applicant's Charter claims, noting they were not raised before the decision-maker and that the limits on her expression were justified by the need to protect public trust and staff dignity.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of two decisions by the city council to suspend her pay for 30 and 60 days, respectively, based on reports from the Integrity Commissioner finding she breached the code of conduct.

The first breach involved a social media post targeting residents who opposed her minor variance application, and the second involved conduct promoting homophobic and transphobic attitudes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Integrity Commissioner performs an investigative rather than adjudicative function, and that the council's decisions to accept the Commissioner's reports and impose the recommended sanctions were reasonable.

The court also denied the applicant's motion to amend her application to allege bias against the mayor.

Following a successful appeal against the respondent Samir Chhina, the self-represented appellants sought costs of $35,000 for the appeal and the motion below.

The respondent argued the appellants failed to establish they had forgone remunerative activity to justify a fee allowance.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants did not meet their evidentiary onus but awarded a lump sum of $10,000 all-inclusive for costs of the motion and the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a mortgage brokerage and a lawyer under Rule 21.01.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the brokerage, finding no factual connection pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the lawyer, holding that the motion judge erred in finding the lawyer immune from liability for allegedly participating in a fraud while acting on client instructions, and erred in concluding the claim was barred by res judicata without sufficient evidence that the same cause of action was previously argued.

This application concerned a dispute over an earn-out calculation following a share purchase agreement.

The applicant sought an order compelling the respondents to refer the dispute to KPMG, as stipulated in the agreement.

The respondents argued the applicant's notice of objection was untimely and lacked particularity, and that the objections raised were contractual, not accounting, issues.

The court found the applicant's notice was timely, given the need for additional financial information, and that the objections, properly interpreted, fell within the scope of the expedited dispute resolution process.

The application was allowed, and the dispute was ordered to be submitted to KPMG.

Costs were not awarded to the successful applicant due to her role in protracting the process.

The applicant, a municipal councilor, sought to add the Integrity Commissioner as a respondent to his application for judicial review of a decision imposing penalties for his participation in the Freedom Convoy.

The motion was brought months after the 30-day limitation period under the Judicial Review Procedures Act had expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide a cogent explanation for the delay and failed to demonstrate apparent grounds for relief, as the Commissioner's findings regarding the unlawfulness of the demonstration and the applicant's breaches of the Code of Conduct were reasonable.

The applicants brought a Charter challenge against the public funding of Roman Catholic separate schools for non-Catholic students and high school students in Ontario.

The respondent moved to strike the application under Rule 21.01.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada had already determined these issues in the Reference re Bill 30 decision, which held that minority education rights under section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are immune from Charter scrutiny.

The court concluded there was no new legal issue or fundamental change in circumstances that would allow it to depart from binding precedent, rendering the application doomed to fail.

The applicant, a city councillor, sought judicial review of a decision by the city council to suspend his remuneration for 270 days based on a report by the integrity commissioner finding he engaged in sexual harassment.

The applicant alleged bias against both the commissioner and the council.

The Divisional Court dismissed the claims against the commissioner, finding he acted fairly and reasonably accommodated the applicant's health issues.

However, the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias against the city council due to public statements and conduct by members before the investigation concluded.

The court quashed the council's sanction decision but, rather than remitting it, imposed the same 270-day suspension itself due to the severity of the misconduct and the lack of an unbiased decision-maker.

The applicant, an immigration lawyer, sought judicial review of Legal Aid Ontario's decision to remove him from its immigration and refugee panel due to billing irregularities.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair because he was denied an oral hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the decision maker's reliance on admitted billing errors to establish a pattern of violations was reasonable.

The court also held that the administrative nature of the decision and the statutory scheme did not require an oral hearing, as the decision was based on admitted facts rather than credibility findings.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a city council decision and an integrity commissioner's report finding he engaged in sexual misconduct and obstructed an investigation.

The integrity commissioner recommended, and the city council imposed, a 90-day suspension of pay, a formal reprimand, and other remedial actions.

The Divisional Court upheld the integrity commissioner's findings and process, finding no breach of procedural fairness and that the investigation was properly commenced.

The court upheld most of the remedial actions imposed by the city council but quashed one measure that restricted the councillor to communicating with the public solely via his city email address, finding it overly broad and unreasonable.

The plaintiff, a former investment and retirement planner, sued the defendants for constructive dismissal.

In his statement of claim, he pleaded details of two prior settlements between the defendants and the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike these paragraphs as irrelevant, prejudicial, and an abuse of process.

The court agreed that the paragraphs lacked a pleaded nexus to the plaintiff's cause of action and struck them, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend the claim to properly plead how the regulatory history impacted his treatment by the defendants.

Following a trial where both the plaintiffs' construction claim and the defendants' counterclaims were dismissed, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had claimed $100,000 for deficiencies and breach of contract, while the defendants counterclaimed for mental distress and injurious falsehood.

Despite divided success, the court found the plaintiffs should not have pursued their claim and that the defendants were entitled to costs for defending the main action.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court awarded the defendants $70,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The plaintiffs hired the defendant contractor to build a dwelling on their property.

The contractor ceased work when the dwelling was 50% complete, citing the plaintiff's constant interference and abusive behaviour.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence, arguing the contract was unenforceable because the contractor was not a registered Tarion builder.

The contractor counterclaimed for breach of contract and injurious falsehood based on internet posts and a complaint to Tarion.

The court found that the plaintiff breached the contract by interfering with construction methods.

However, the court dismissed all claims and counterclaims, finding no damages were proven by either party and that the Tarion complaint was protected by absolute privilege.

The plaintiff, an 83-year-old woman, brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction to freeze the contents of a safe deposit box held by her daughter-in-law.

The plaintiff had loaned her son and daughter-in-law over $300,000, of which approximately $205,000 remained unpaid.

The plaintiff sought to prevent the daughter-in-law from selling a valuable diamond ring located in the safe deposit box before returning to California.

The court found a strong prima facie case and satisfied the five-part test for a Mareva injunction, granting the order on an interim basis.

The Law Society of Upper Canada sought costs against Aspasios Paul Hatzitrifonos following a finding of contempt for breaching a prior order enjoining him from providing unauthorized legal services.

The Law Society argued for substantial indemnity costs due to the respondent's wilful breaches and conduct that lengthened the hearing.

The respondent cited modest income and existing financial obligations.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, recognizing the Law Society's public interest role and the respondent's deliberate flouting of court orders, but also considering the respondent's financial means.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario sought a permanent injunction against Alan Canon and his associated corporations to prevent them from performing controlled acts and using prohibited professional titles without proper licensing.

Canon, who had a history of breaching undertakings and disciplinary actions from another college, failed to appear or file evidence.

The court granted the statutory injunction, finding clear breaches of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and the Medicine Act, 1991, and awarded costs to the College.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligent legal advice, arguing it was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended the limitation period did not commence until the full extent of legal costs was known.

The court found that the plaintiff discovered all material facts for the claim by November 2010, including the injury, its cause by the defendant's omission, and that a proceeding was an appropriate remedy.

Consequently, the action, commenced in May 2015, was well outside the limitation period and was dismissed.

The respondent was previously found in civil contempt for breaching a court order that enjoined him from providing unauthorized legal services.

The Law Society sought a 30-day period of incarceration.

The court declined to order incarceration or a fine, noting the respondent's apology, remorse, and limited financial means.

The court ordered the respondent to complete 40 hours of community service and make monthly payments towards outstanding costs orders.