Julia Wilkes

The Law Society brought a motion for civil contempt against the respondent for breaching a permanent injunction that prohibited him from engaging in the unauthorized provision of legal services.

Despite the order, the respondent continued to represent clients in provincial offences court, provide legal advice, and advertise his services, often claiming to act as an agent for a licensed lawyer.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt and found beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent intentionally breached a clear and unequivocal order of which he was fully aware.

The respondent was found in contempt of court, with a separate hearing scheduled to determine the penalty.

The Judgment Creditors brought a motion within a receivership proceeding seeking a declaration that they held valid, independent unsecured debt claims against two insolvent corporations, 230 and MM, arising from a consent order and minutes of settlement.

The Receiver and a preferred shareholder opposed, arguing the claims were equity claims.

The court applied the Van Laun principle to look behind the consent order and found that the obligations to purchase the shares and pay accrued dividends contravened the solvency and cross-holding provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

Consequently, the claims were unenforceable as debt, except for the costs component, which was remitted to the Receiver for a reasonableness review.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing, in part, their motion for summary judgment in a solicitor's negligence action.

The defendants argued the motion judge failed to apply the 'but for' causation test and that the claim was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflict in principle with other cases and agreeing with the motion judge that a factual dispute regarding when the loss arose required a trial.

The court also found the issue was not of such importance to warrant leave.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a property in Iran.

The defendant argued that payment was conditional on clearing a cloud on title and, alternatively, that the claim was statute-barred.

The court found no evidence of the alleged condition and held that the limitation period was extended under s. 11 of the Limitations Act because the parties had engaged a third party (the Baha'i National Spiritual Assembly) to assist in resolving the dispute.

The court ordered the defendant to pay the balance owing, converted to Canadian dollars on specific dates.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Vaughan Council to suspend his pay for 90 days based on a report by the Integrity Commissioner.

The Commissioner found the applicant had improperly interfered with municipal tendering processes and attempted to obstruct her investigation.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Commissioner refused to disclose the names and statements of 32 witnesses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, applying the Baker factors to find that the Commissioner properly balanced the applicant's right to know the case against him with the need to protect cooperating staff from reprisals.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and the Commissioner's jurisdiction.

This costs endorsement followed an appeal by the defendants regarding a Master's decision on production of documentation for damage claims.

The appeal was partially successful in obtaining some documentation but failed on the principal issue of 'flow-through costs.' The plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing their settlement offer would have avoided costs.

The court found Rule 49.10(2) inapplicable to appeals but considered the plaintiffs' offer and the defendants' own costs submissions.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $33,000 in partial indemnity costs, finding them fair and reasonable given the case's complexity, importance, and the parties' conduct.

The plaintiff commenced an action against his former lawyers for professional negligence, alleging they failed to commence a claim against his insurer for damaged equipment.

The action was struck from the trial list and a status notice was issued.

At the contested status hearing, the court found the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay of over seven years and failed to show that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's lawyer of record, arguing the lawyer was in a conflict of interest and a potential witness.

The plaintiff opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a timetable.

The court found no evidence of a conflict of interest and concluded the motion was premature regarding the lawyer's potential status as a witness.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed without prejudice, and the cross-motion for a timetable was granted on consent.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging solicitor negligence arising from a share purchase transaction involving a property previously used as a gas station.

The solicitor defendants admitted a breach of duty for failing to disclose the property's prior use but sought summary dismissal on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act.

The court held that reasonable discoverability arose when a prospective purchaser abandoned a resale transaction due to contamination concerns, triggering the two‑year limitation period.

Because the action was commenced after the limitation period expired, the claim against those defendants was dismissed.

Claims against other lawyer defendants raised genuine issues of fact regarding the scope of retainer and limitation warnings and were permitted to proceed to trial.

The regulator sought a permanent injunction prohibiting an individual from providing legal services and holding himself out as entitled to practise law despite not being licensed.

The evidence showed that the respondent prepared documents, conducted legal research, advised on strategy, and sold materials and videos intended to assist clients in legal proceedings, particularly in family law matters.

The court held that these activities constituted the provision of legal services within the meaning of the Law Society Act and that contractual disclaimers and characterizations of the work as educational or intellectual property could not avoid statutory prohibitions.

Applying the statutory framework for injunctions under the Act, the court concluded that the respondent was contravening the prohibition on unlicensed legal practice.

A permanent injunction was granted prohibiting the respondent from providing legal services, advertising such services, or operating a website offering them.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to enforce a settlement agreement, and alternatively, leave to appeal the costs order.

The motion judge had found that there were material issues of fact regarding whether the applicant had sustained the alleged investment losses, which was a condition of the settlement.

The Divisional Court held there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and no conflicting decisions on principle.

The application for leave to appeal both the substantive order and the costs order was dismissed.

The plaintiff vendor sold a property to the defendant purchaser under an agreement that included a $550,000 bonus payable if the purchaser obtained a 'favourable decision' on its 'current application' for rezoning to permit a supermarket.

The purchaser appealed the town's refusal to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) but ultimately settled for a zoning amendment that permitted retail use but not a supermarket.

The plaintiff sued for the bonus.

The court held that the bonus clause was triggered because the purchaser achieved the zoning it desired and urged upon the OMB, which constituted a 'favourable decision' on the appeal.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking judgment enforcing a settlement agreement allegedly reached through email correspondence.

The respondents argued the purported settlement was conditional upon financial documentation substantiating specific “inflows and outflows” related to investments in a failed business venture and that the documentation provided did not support those representations.

The court held that the moving party bears a heavy burden on a Rule 49.09 motion and that the motion should be approached similarly to summary judgment, requiring the absence of genuine issues for trial.

Given conflicting affidavit evidence, disputed financial records, and credibility issues regarding losses, inventory values, and completeness of production, the court concluded that a full appreciation of the evidence required a trial.

The court therefore declined to enforce the alleged settlement.

The applicant, a unitholder in an income fund, sought an order requiring the fund's trustees to call a special meeting of unitholders to vote on a proposed transaction involving the restructuring of preference shares and secured notes.

The court found that the proposed transaction was objectively 'materially adverse' to the unitholders because it postponed payments on the secured notes.

Consequently, under the Declaration of Trust, the trustees lacked the authority to vote the fund's common shares in favour of the transaction without unitholder approval.

The court ordered the special meeting of the company to be adjourned pending a unitholder vote.

The Law Society of Upper Canada sought an injunction to prevent the respondent from practicing law or holding himself out as a lawyer.

The respondent operated McGuire Law Corporation and provided legal services in estates, divorce, and immigration matters, claiming he was acting as a clergyman assisting his congregants.

The court found the respondent was practicing law for profit and holding himself out as a lawyer, contrary to s. 26.1 of the Law Society Act.

The court granted the statutory injunction and awarded costs to the applicant.