COURT FILE NO: CV-12-463798
DATE: 20130125
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
The Law Society of Upper Canada
Applicant
- and –
Gideon McGuire Augier
Respondent
Julia Wilkes & John Camp,
for the Applicant
Gideon McGuire Augier,
On his own Behalf
HEARD: January 17, 2013
GOLDSTEIN J.:
[1] The Applicant Law Society of Upper Canada (“the Law Society”) seeks an injunction to prevent the Respondent from practicing law or holding himself out as a lawyer.
[2] The Respondent operates McGuire Law Corporation. Despite his protestations to the contrary the evidence establishes that he controls McGuire Law Corporation either directly or indirectly: the corporation profile reports, website, and other documents show that he is the face of the corporation and that he uses his relatives as nominees. The website of McGuire Law Corporation indicates that it is in the business of providing legal services. The evidence establishes that the Respondent has negotiated an estates settlement, has represented a client in divorce and immigration proceedings, and has held himself out to be either a lawyer or someone who provides legal services. He is neither a licensed paralegal nor a lawyer.
[3] McGuire Law Corporation operates out of the same business premises as Abba Uno Church. The Respondent denies that he controls McGuire Law Corporation; rather, he says that he is the pastor of Abba Uno Church and that he is simply ministering to his flock. He has filed an affidavit in support of this contention.
[4] The Respondent’s own correspondence and the McGuire Law Corporation website contradict the assertion that he only assists congregants as a clergyman, and that his actions are directed towards the spiritual health of individual members of his congregation. The evidence is crystal clear that he has been practicing law for profit. The negotiations that he carried on in respect of the Harrison estate matter make it clear that he both practiced law and held himself out to be a lawyer. Mr. Allan, the lawyer representing the opposing side in that matter, believed that the Respondent was a lawyer. The banner on his letterhead is “McGuire Law Corporation”. The Respondent’s middle name is McGuire, and he signs correspondence as “Gideon McGuire Augier”. In his correspondence with Mr. Allan the Respondent did not refer to Mr. Harrison as a congregant, but rather as a client. When the Respondent was asked by another lawyer in that matter if he was also the solicitor for the wife of Mr. Harrison, he simply ducked the question. He did not provide a direct answer. The very clear impression that was created was that the Respondent was a lawyer. The fact that his client signed documents indicating that he authorized the Respondent to do certain things does not change the nature of what he was doing.
[5] In the immigration matter, the Respondent had his client, Ms. Acacio, sign a direction to the immigration authorities giving “Gideon (Glen) McGuire Augier”, with the email address of gma@mcguirelawcorp.com, the authority to act as her agent. The Respondent also acted for Ms. Acacio in her divorce proceeding. There was no indication to the immigration authorities that the Respondent was merely assisting Ms. Acacio as her pastor.
[6] Mr. Augier also tried to argue that he is a legal mediator and therefore meets an exemption in The Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 (“the Act”). The evidence is clear that he acted for a party; he has not acted as a mediator in any of the material before me, although he certainly has signed his name as a “Legal Mediator”. See: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Boldt, 2006 9142 (Sup.Ct.).
[7] I read the decision of Justice Hoilett in Protsko v. Angel Edward & Associates, McGuire Lewis & Associates, 967635 Ontario Inc. and Gideon (Glen) McGuire Augier, 2004 2550 (Sup.Ct.) with great interest, in particular paras. 25 and 26. I quote:
[25] Mr. Augier gave evidence and simply put, it is easier to characterize his evidence than it is to summarize it. Mainly, it was characterized by rhetoric, evasion, half-truths and prevarication. What emerged from his evidence, however, is that he is not a lawyer; he is not a priest; he had no special or meaningful qualifications in matters relating to immigration and he had no meaningful role with either of the corporate defendants, contrary to what the independent record would indicate. Mr. Augier represented himself as, in essence, an errand-boy around the office. Concerning who the associates were and what they did, his evidence was, at best, vague. Mr. Augier’s quibbled and prevarication went so far as to question whether the money paid by Ms. Protsko to Mr. Yusfin, and which was unquestionably sent to the Hamilton address he provided was ever received. He sought to burden Mr. Yusfin with sole responsibility for any impropriety, assuming there were any, in respect to the dealings with Ms. Protsko. Conveniently, he offers that he was unable to communicate with Ms. Protsko, because of the language barrier between them, and points to the fact that all the communication was between the plaintiff and Mr. Yusfin.
[26] It is patently clear from all the evidence that the plaintiff became the hapless victim of a scheme that was fraudulent in its inception and in its execution. That Mr. Augier was the author of the scheme, there can be no doubt. One needs look no further than the business card and other stationery used by him to see the callous disregard Mr. Augier showed for the truth. There can be no doubt that the unsuspecting and particularly those not conversant with the English language would likely conclude, particularly from Mr. Augier’s business card, that he had legal qualifications: and may have been, indeed, a lawyer. Mr. Augier’s targeted market were the relatively poor and vulnerable; as appears from evidence given by Mr. Yusfin. The flagrance of Mr. Augier’s callousness is underscored by the fact that, having provided no meaningful service for the money he had already bled from the plaintiff, he sought to extort a further $5,000.00 (U.S.) and $2,300.00 [Can.], by refusing voluntarily to yield her file to Mr. Bilyk after the plaintiff had retained his services.
[8] I am satisfied that the Respondent both practices law and holds himself out to be a lawyer, contrary to s. 26.1 of the Act. Negotiating an estates matter and representing a client in a divorce proceeding are classic examples of practicing law. Representing a client to the immigration authorities as an agent is a classic example of work properly performed by a licensed and regulated paralegal. The affidavit of Ms. Acacio makes it clear that she believed he was a lawyer. The lawyers on the estates matter believed that he was a lawyer. The website gives a strong impression that McGuire Law Corporation is a law firm. It says nothing about ministering to congregants or the Abba Uno Church. Mr. Augier may never have stated directly that he was a lawyer, using that precise term, but the evidence establishes that he created the impression that he was a lawyer.
[9] The Law Society has an important role in protecting the public from the activities of unlicensed and unregulated persons holding themselves out to be lawyers and paralegals. The Respondent, for example, is not required to carry professional liability insurance, keep books and records for inspection by the Law Society, or maintain a trust account for client funds that can be audited by the Law Society. Indeed, the Law Society would have no right or ability to carry out a spot audit or any other kind of check in relation to the activities of the Respondent, as it would for a licensed legal professional. That is why the Law Society has a duty to seek remedies against unauthorized persons practicing law or holding themselves out as legal professionals.
[10] There can be no doubt that the licensing regime is directed at people exactly like Mr. Augier: charlatans who take advantage of vulnerable people to enrich themselves. The evidence establishes that that is what Mr. Augier is, and that is what he does. The idea that he is a selfless minister who is simply helping his congregants is not borne out by the evidence at all – the evidence establishes that he charges an hourly rate for his legal services. He even wrote a demand letter to Ms. Acacio demanding a further retainer in order to proceed with her divorce proceeding. He claims that he simply passed the money on to McGuire Law Corporation, but there is no evidence to support that and, in any event, as I have already found he directly or indirectly controls McGuire Law Corporation.
[11] The test for issuing a statutory injunction is set out in: R. v. IPSCO Recycling Inc., 2003 FC 1518, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1950, [2004] 2 F.C.R. 530 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 51. I adopt the test set out by Dawson J. of the Federal Court in that case:
[51] On the basis of the authorities cited by the parties I am satisfied that where a statute provides a remedy by way of injunction, different considerations govern the exercise of the court’s discretion than apply when an attorney general sues at common law to enforce public rights. The following general principles apply when an injunction is authorized by statute:
(i) The court’s discretion is more fettered. The factors considered by a court when considering equitable relief will have a more limited application. See: Prince Edward Island (Minister of Community and Cultural Affairs) v. Island Farm and Fish Meal Ltd. 1989 276 (PE SCAD), (1989), 79 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 228 (P.E.I. S.C. (A.D.)); Maple Ridge (District) v. Thornhill Aggregates Ltd. 1998 6446 (BC CA), (1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 203 (B.C.C.A.).
(ii) Specifically, an applicant will not have to prove that damages are inadequate or that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is refused. See: Shaughnessy Heights Property Owners’ Association v. Northup (1958), 1958 289 (BC SC), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 760 (B.C.S.C.); Manitoba Dental Association v. Byman and Halstead (1962), 1962 392 (MB CA), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 602 (Man. C.A.); Canada (Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board) v. Canadian Press, [2000] N.S.J. No. 139 (S.C.) (QL).
(iii) There is no need for other enforcement remedies to have been pursued. See: Saskatchewan (Minister of the Environment) v. Redberry Development Corp., 1987 4588 (SK QB), [1987] 4 W.W.R. 654 (Sask. Q.B.).
(iv) The court retains a discretion as to whether to grant injunctive relief. Hardship from the imposition and enforcement of an injunction will generally not outweigh the public interest in having the law obeyed. However, an injunction will not issue where it would be of questionable utility or inequitable. See: Saskatchewan (Minister of the Environment) v. Redberry Development Corp., supra; Maple Ridge (District) v. Thornhill Aggregates Ltd., supra; Capital Regional District v. Smith 1998 6490 (BC CA), (1998), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (B.C.C.A.).
(v) It remains more difficult to obtain a mandatory injunction. See: Canada (Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board) v. Canadian Press, supra.
See also: Ontario (Minister of Agriculture and Food) v. Georgian Bay Milk Co., [2008] O.J. No. 485 (Sup.Ct.).
[12] I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated that the Respondent’s conduct meets the test for an injunction pursuant to the Act. Accordingly, an injunction will issue in this matter. Mr. Augier is enjoined from practicing law or holding himself out to be a lawyer or paralegal. McGuire Law Corporation will also be permanently restrained from holding out Mr. Augier as a person who may practice law or provide legal services.
[13] Costs in the amount of $15,000.00 are awarded to the Applicant, payable within 30 days by the Respondent.
GOLDSTEIN, J.
DATE: January 25, 2013
COURT FILE NO: CV-12-463798
DATE: 20130125
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
The Law Society of Upper Canada
Applicant
- and –
Gideon McGuire Augier
Respondent
JUDGMENT
GOLDSTEIN J.
Released: January 25, 2013