ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
PARVIZ VICTORY, on his own behalf and as Trustee for AMIR HOOSHANG VICTORY, MAHEEN-DOKHT VICTORY, IRADJ VICTORY, MEHRDAD VICTORY, FOROUGH VICTORY and KAMBIZ VICTORY
Plaintiff & Defendant to Counterclaim
– and –
FARHANG SATTAR
Defendant & Plaintiff by Counterclaim
Peter C. Wardle & Julia Wilkes, for the Plaintiff/Defendant to Counterclaim
Harvey S. Dorsey & Jayson Thomas, for the Defendant & Plaintiff by Counterclaim
HEARD: January 9, 10, 11 & 13, 2017
HOOD j.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
Overview
1The Victory family owned a house in Tehran, Iran. In 2008 the defendant, Farhang Sattar (“Sattar”), agreed to assist the family in facilitating the sale of the property. In 2009, Sattar became the buyer of the property agreeing to pay a net amount of 30 billion Rials with 15 billion being due May 20, 2010 and the other 15 billion at some future date.
2In June, 2010 in turn Sattar sold the property to a Mr. Safaeian for 47,512,500,000 Rials and Safaeian became the registered owner of the property. In January, 2010 Sattar paid Parviz Victory (“Parviz”) approximately $100,000 and in July, 2010 Sattar made two further payments to Parviz approximating $180,000. He has not paid anything more since then.
3Sattar puts forth two defences to Parviz’s claim for the balance owing on the 30 billion Rials. The first defence is that his agreement to pay a net amount of 30 billion Rials for the purchase of the property was conditional upon a cloud on title, known as the Bastanfar Power of Attorney (“Bastanfar POA”), being removed. Since it was not removed no payment is required until some future unspecified date. In effect, the claim by Parviz is premature.
4Sattar’s second defence is that, if there is no such condition, he was in fact obligated to pay for the property but the claim is now statute-barred. Sattar argues that the limitation period expired on either May 20, 2012, two years past the first required payment of 15 billion Rials, or alternatively, on July 7, 2012, two years past the final payment to Parviz on July 7, 2010. The action was commenced on January 24, 2013.
5For the following reasons, I find that there was no condition requiring the removal of the Bastanfar POA and that the limitation period was extended by s. 11 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched B (“the Act”). Sattar owes Parviz the Canadian dollar equivalent of 30 billion Rials, with 15 billion due and owing on May 20, 2010 and with 15 billion due and owing on December 3, 2010. The payments actually made, of $280,000, are to be credited against the amount owing.
Factual Background
Factual Background
6Parviz’s parents owned a house in Tehran, Iran. They are now deceased. As acknowledged by Sattar, the house was in the newer part of Tehran and while in his view not the most desirable area of Tehran, it was in a good area.
7In 1989 Parviz’s parents transferred the house to his brother, Mehrdad. Mehrdad was the only child then still living in Iran. Parviz had left Iran for Canada in 1972 and in 1978 became a Canadian citizen. The other siblings, with the exception of Mehrdad, had all left Iran prior to the revolution and lived in a number of countries around the world.
8Although the house was in Mehrdad’s name, the siblings, including Mehrdad, understood that if the property was sold the proceeds would be divided between them.
9In August, 2008, Mehrdad, who was then 66 years old, was kidnapped by an undisclosed group and held for nine days. When he returned to his home it had been ransacked. When his siblings became aware of the kidnapping and what happened to his home, they prevailed upon him to leave Iran. Mehrdad agreed. But he had to do something about his house.
10The reason for the kidnapping and the ransacking of the house was never established. The Victory family are of the Baha’i faith. It was Parviz and Mehrdad’s evidence that in Iran those of the Baha’i faith are prosecuted because of their religious beliefs. Sattar disagreed. He stated that, while that might have once been the case, it was no longer so and that he identified himself as Baha’i without incident when he travelled to Iran two to three times per year for his business interests.
11Whether there is in fact prosecution of those of the Baha’i faith in Iran is irrelevant. What matters is that Parviz and Mehrdad believe this to be the case. I accept this as their evidence and as their actual belief.
12Sattar is related to Parviz through marriage. Parviz understood that Sattar was involved in real estate development both in Iran and Canada. While Sattar denies being involved in real estate development in Canada, other than having built, lived in, and then selling a number of houses, he did acknowledge that he was involved in real estate in Iran. Sattar was approached by Parviz and another brother of Mehrdad, Hooshang, who asked Sattar to assist in the sale of Mehrdad’s home in Tehran. Sattar agreed to help facilitate the sale. Sattar and Parviz agreed that even though the home was in Mehrdad’s name, Parviz would be the one to provide instructions to Sattar.
13In October, 2008 Mehrdad gave a power of attorney to Sattar in relation to his home (“the Sattar POA”) in order to facilitate its sale. To further the sale Sattar had to pay 7.5 billion Rials, or approximately $700,000 to $800,000 depending upon the exchange rate, to bribe a judicial officer or judge to remove an improper lien or charge against the property, which had been placed by a government agency or official.
14Sattar states that he discovered a further problem with the property when in June, 2009, he discovered another power of attorney, in addition to the Sattar POA, registered against the property in the name of a Mr. Bastanfar (“the Bastanfar POA”), allegedly given by Mehrdad to Bastanfar in May, 2009.
15The parties agree that the Bastanfar POA exists but Mehrdad states that it has to be a forgery as he does not know any Bastanfar and certainly has not given another POA to anyone.
16With Sattar’s assistance and agreement, Mehrdad wrote a letter on June 28, 2009 to the Tehran Registry Office advising that the Bastanfar POA was a forgery and requesting the office to issue an order preventing the issuance of a duplicate deed to Bastanfar or by Bastanfar. Mehrdad, again with Sattar’s assistance and agreement, then wrote a letter on June 30, 2009 to the Tehran Prosecutor’s Office lodging a complaint against Bastanfar of forgery and abuse of trust.
17In response to Mehrdad’s letter of June 28, 2009, the Registry Office wrote a letter to the Imam’s Executive Headquarters stating that any duplicate deed from Bastanfar was to be considered null and void.
18In October, 2009 Mehrdad was planning to leave Iran. Prior to leaving, he and Sattar executed a number of documents. On October 1, 2009 the property was transferred from Mehrdad to Sattar. Sattar held the property in trust for Mehrdad. Also, on October 1, 2009, Mehrdad and Sattar signed an agreement acknowledging that Mehrdad had not been paid anything for the transfer, and that, if and when Sattar sold the property, Sattar would pay Mehrdad the sale proceeds less his expenses. Mehrdad and Sattar signed a separate agreement on October 2, 2009 which provided that, despite Sattar being the registered owner, Mehrdad would be responsible if any issues arose with any government agencies and would indemnify Sattar for any damages that he might incur resulting from any government confiscation of the property. Mehrdad further acknowledged that if Sattar was prevented from selling the property, nothing would be owed to him, and if Sattar incurred any expenses he would be reimbursed for them.
19While Sattar was aware of the Bastanfar POA, there was nothing in the documents signed by him and Mehrdad that mentioned the Bastanfar POA, and certainly nothing which made payment to Mehrdad conditional upon the removal of the Bastanfar POA from the property. Being an experienced businessman with knowledge of Iranian real estate, if this was in fact important to Sattar and a required condition, it would have been easy to include this in the documents signed. It was not.
20I view Sattar's argument and defence, that it was a condition that the Bastanfar POA be removed prior to any payment from him, as being something concocted after the fact to avoid paying for the property which he in fact ultimately sold to a third party. He was unable to point to any document which contained such a condition. Moreover, the Bastanfar POA did not prevent Sattar from selling the property or receiving payment for the sale.
21Ms. Faezeh Nejad was called as an expert in Iranian law by Sattar. The parties agreed as to her expertise and I found her to be an expert in this area. She opined that unless there was an agreement between Sattar and Mehrdad that required Mehrdad to deal with and clear the Bastanfar POA, then Sattar was required to pay for the property when ultimately sold. There was no such agreement.
22On October 9, 2009 Mehrdad left Iran with the help of a group that assisted refugees and he travelled to Austria. As previously mentioned he was accepted as a refugee into the United States on February 17, 2010. Because of his refugee status he is unable to return to Iran even if he wished to do so.
23On November 5, 2009 Mehrdad provided his brother, Parviz, with a power of attorney to act on his behalf in relation to the property in Iran. The other siblings provided Parviz with similar powers of attorney.
24Parviz met with Sattar at a coffee shop in Toronto on November 15, 2009 to discuss Sattar actually purchasing the property rather than acting as a facilitator of its sale, as per the previous arrangement with Mehrdad.
25Sattar arrived at the meeting at the coffee shop with a draft agreement for the purchase of the property by him. It provided that: the price was 41 billion Rials, Sattar had already paid 11 billion Rials to Parviz, and the balance of 30 billion Rials would be transferred to Parviz at a date apparently to be negotiated, as it had been left blank.
26Parviz did not like the proposed agreement and over the next few hours they negotiated and drafted a new agreement. The new agreement provided that: the sale price was 41 billion Rials, Sattar had incurred expenses of 11 billion Rials, and the balance of 30 billion Rials was to be paid in two installments, 15 billion Rials on May 20, 2010 through the payment of a foreign exchange draft at that day’s rate of exchange, and 15 billion Rials to be "coordinated later". Again, there is nothing in this agreement that anything was conditional upon dealing with or clearing the Bastanfar POA.
27Sattar takes the position that Parviz was the one who suggested this new arrangement. Parviz takes the position that it was Sattar. Who suggested it is irrelevant as an agreement was reached and Sattar became the buyer. Sattar also takes the position that the agreement reached on November 15, 2009 was part of the earlier agreement between himself and Mehrdad, and that the Toronto agreement, as it was called throughout the trial, only dealt with price and terms of payment. Again this makes no difference as the Toronto agreement is clear. At one point during the litigation Sattar may have taken this position as he wanted the agreement to be interpreted in accordance with Iranian law as opposed to Canadian law, however, as the Iranian expert, Ms. Nejad, opined, even under Iranian law the Toronto agreement was enforceable due to the lack of any condition linked to the Bastanfar POA.
28Sattar alleges that the clearing of the Bastanfar POA as a condition had been discussed with Parviz at the coffee shop and agreed to by Parviz, although not in the written agreement signed by him. This is denied by Parviz. Leaving aside the whole issue of whether such a parol agreement could be collateral to the written agreement when the written agreement states that it is final and contains no such condition, I simply do not believe Sattar when he says this was discussed and agreed.
29I found Sattar to be an unreliable witness and, where in conflict with Mehrdad or Parviz, I accept their evidence over Sattar’s. Throughout, Sattar continued to insist upon the existence of documents which he stated supported his position but that he was unable to produce. He took this stance in relation to an alleged document from the Supreme Court of Iran that he said stated that the Bastanfar POA was valid and that Mehrdad’s signature giving Bastanfar the POA was correct. He was unable to produce it. He took the same position when asked for the documents confirming that one of the sales he had made of the property failed to close because of the Bastanfar POA. He was unable to produce anything. When pushed on this in cross-examination he resisted the suggestion that the documents did not exist by ignoring the question or providing a non-responsive answer.
30When the property was sold by Sattar and developed, he denied any involvement in the development despite the signs put up on the property that the owner of the property was Sattar and Partners. When he sold the property for approximately 47 billion Rials, six months after his agreement to buy it for 41 billion Rials from Parviz, he refused to acknowledge that he had made a good profit. When it was suggested to him that he had taken advantage of the Victory family, having sold the property without paying for it, he disagreed, stating that they had created problems for him. He refused to acknowledge that Mehrdad was a refugee from Iran despite his refugee status in the United States.
31Most telling however was Sattar’s evidence regarding the name of the individual who allegedly assisted him in drafting a lengthy letter in August, 2011. He stated that the person who helped him was a male friend. He refused to advise Parviz's counsel in cross-examination who this friend was because he claimed he promised his friend that his name would not be disclosed. I directed Sattar to disclose the name. Sattar then requested an adjournment to call his friend to get his friend’s authority to give out his name. I refused any adjournment and again directed him to disclose the name. Sattar then stated that he did not recall the name at the moment. This despite the claim that the individual was a friend and that, only moments before, Sattar wanted an adjournment to call him which would suggest he knew exactly who he was. Eventually Sattar disclosed the name of his friend who, as it turned out, was female, not male, as initially alleged.
32While there were occasional inconsistencies in the evidence of Mehrdad and Parviz, I believe this to be a result more of their advanced ages of 74 and 84 respectively than any intention to mislead. Moreover, their inconsistencies were in relation to inconsequential matters.
33In December, 2009 following his purchase of the property, Sattar sold the property to a Mr. Vafaie, also shown in some documents as Vafaeei. On January 6, 2010 Sattar transferred $100,000 to Parviz. If the Bastanfar POA was a true impediment to dealing with the property in Iran, then it is inconsistent for Sattar to sell the property and pay some funds to Parviz. At no time did Sattar seek to set aside his agreement with Parviz, return the property to him or Mehrdad, and let the Victory family deal with the property on their own. This is because there was no condition in relation to the Bastanfar POA and because Sattar knew it was no impediment to him dealing with the property. This is confirmed by all of what transpired with the property.
34On January 18, 2010 Vafaie applied for a building permit from Tehran. On March 2, 2010 Tehran granted a permit to demolish the existing building.
35On March 9, 2010 Sattar released Vafaie from his purchase agreement. Sattar claims that this was because Vafaie wanted out of the sale when he became aware of the Bastanfar POA. Sattar agreed to pay him 750 million Tomans, comprised of 600 million Tomans for Vafaie’s deposit and 150 million Tomans for expenses incurred by Vafaie. One Toman equals 10 Rials. There is no mention of the Bastanfar POA in any of the release documentation signed by Sattar and Vafaie.
36On June 17, 2010 Sattar sold the property to Mr. Safaeian for 47,512,500,000 Rials, with approximately 12 billion Rials being paid in cash and the balance consisting of three properties in Iran. Again, no mention is made of the Bastanfar POA being removed as a condition to this sale. Sattar admits he received the money and property in payment.
37On June 20, 2010 Sattar paid Vafaie 7.5 billion Rials as agreed in the release with him.
38On June 29, 2010 the transfer from Sattar to Safaeian was registered in the Tehran Registry Office. On July 2 and July 7, 2010 Sattar paid $100,000 and $80,000 to Parviz. Sattar made no further payments.
39On July 20, 2011 Tehran issued the building permit, initially applied for by Vafaie. Construction of a high rise building started with an expected finish date of July 26, 2012. The sign on the property indicated the owner as Sattar and Partners.
Limitation Defence
Limitation Defence
40Parviz issued his claim on January 24, 2013. This is two years beyond the breach which occurred on May 20, 2010, when Sattar failed to pay the 15 billion Rials then due, and two years beyond the partial payment received by Parviz on July 7, 2010, which arguably extended the limitation period as an acknowledgment under s. 13 of the Act.
41Parviz, following the last payment in July, 2010, continued to discuss the payment of the balance with Sattar. Sattar continued to tell him to be patient.
42Parviz contacted two mutual friends to get them to try to intervene with Sattar. When that failed, Parviz contacted the Baha’i National Spiritual Assembly (“the Assembly”) by letter dated March 23, 2011, the Baha’i Universal House of Justice by letter dated April 4, 2011, and the Assembly again by letter dated May 6, 2011. These letters were all well within any two-year limitation period, and requested intervention to either get Sattar to return the property or pay for it as agreed.
43In the letter dated April 4, 2011, Parviz acknowledged that there was a limitation period. He wrongly calculated it as expiring sometime in October, 2011, perhaps being two years from Mehrdad’s transfer in trust to Sattar.
44On July 7, 2011 the Assembly wrote Sattar and asked for his response to the Victory claim and his proposal for resolution of the dispute.
45On August 14, 2011 Sattar responded with a nine-page letter enclosing 15 documents. Rather than challenging the Assembly’s right to ask for his response or its right to assist in resolving Parviz’s claim, he instead provided a defence to the claim and presented his own claim against Parviz and the Victory family for making false accusations against him.
46On October 12, 2011 the Assembly concluded that Sattar owed Parvis $2.72 million, being $3 million as set out in the November 15, 2009 Toronto agreement less the $280,000 paid. While the letter of October 12, 2011 referred to $2.27 million being owed, this clearly is a typographical error which was corrected in subsequent correspondence from the Assembly.
47Sattar appealed this decision to the Universal House of Justice. In or around June, 2012 the Universal House of Justice advised the Assembly, Parviz and Sattar that it was upholding the decision of the Assembly. On July 19, 2012 Sattar wrote to the Assembly. While the letter is not in evidence the response from the Assembly is. The Assembly’s response letter makes clear that, by his letter of the 19th and other conduct, Sattar was not prepared to follow the decision of the Assembly.
48In light of Sattar’s response and conduct the Assembly advised him in a letter of August 10, 2012 that it would deprive him of his Baha’i administrative rights if he continued not to comply with its decision. He failed to do so and his rights were removed effective August 10, 2012.
49It is unclear when Parviz became aware of the removal of Sattar’s rights, which was perhaps the last bit of leverage that he had in the hopes of receiving payment from Sattar. On January 23, 2013 Parviz’s wife, Jaleh, received an email from her Local Spiritual Assembly advising that Sattar’s administrative rights were removed effective August 10, 2012. On January 24, 2013 the claim was issued.
50At issue is whether the time spent with the Assembly and the Universal House of Justice extends the running of the two-year limitation period pursuant to s. 11 of the Act. I hold that it does.
51Section 11 provides that if a claimant and the one against who the claim is made have agreed to have an independent third party assist them in resolving the claim, then the limitation period does not begin to run until the date when the claim is resolved, the attempted resolution process is terminated, or one party withdraws or terminates the agreement. Here, there is no resolution. While the letter itself is not in evidence, it is clear that on July 19, 2012 Sattar indicated he was no longer prepared to take part in the process. Accordingly, the limitation period begins to run again from that date. It is just over six months from July 19, 2012 to January 24, 2013 when the claim was issued.
52Parviz argues that the limitation period initially started on July 7, 2010 when Sattar made his last payment to him pursuant to the Toronto agreement. Sattar does not strenuously disagree. Even if the limitation period was to initially start on May 20, 2010 it would not change the result. Parviz argues that the limitation period stopped running on August 14, 2011 when Sattar sent his defence and claim letter to the Assembly. Sattar argues that for s. 11 of the Act to apply there must be a specific agreement of a more formal nature made between the parties. He further argues that he was coerced into participating in the process and was an unwilling participant who never agreed to having the Assembly resolve the claim or assist in resolving it.
53The purpose of s. 11 is to encourage efforts to settle by providing that there is no limitation period penalty for plaintiffs who agree to enter into third party resolution processes. Accordingly the section is to be interpreted broadly: (see Sandro Steel Fabrication Ltd. v. Chiesa, 2013 ONSC 658, at para. 69). There is no requirement that there be a specific express agreement incorporating s. 11 of the Act. Nor is there a requirement for a specific express agreement to have a third party assist in resolving the claim. There can be an agreement inferred from the parties’ conduct. That is the case here. Not only did Sattar respond to Parviz’s claim to the Assembly, he asked the Assembly to address his own claim in his letter of August 14, 2011. When the decision of the Assembly was made, Sattar then appealed it. I find that Sattar agreed to have the Baha’i Assembly assist him and Parviz in resolving the claim between them.
54It would be completely unfair for Sattar to now argue that, having been unsuccessful before the Assembly and the Universal House of Justice, his involvement in the process was as an unwilling participant. If he was in fact a coerced unwilling participant, he should have made this clear right from the beginning when he received the letter of July 7, 2011 from the Assembly rather than going through the process, and, when unsuccessful, arguing that he did not agree to do so. If he had in fact been an unwilling coerced participant, he should have made this clear so that Parviz could have considered his options.
55However, I find that Sattar was not coerced. He was not unwilling. Rather he agreed to the process thus extending the limitation period during the period of August 14, 2011, when he agreed to have the Assembly assist them in resolving their claim, to July 19, 2012, when he withdrew from the process. May 20, 2010 to August 14, 2011 is approximately 15 months and July 19, 2012 to January 24, 2013 is approximately six months. Together the two time periods are less than two years. The Parviz claim is not statute-barred.
Fiduciary Duty
Fiduciary Duty
56The plaintiff also seeks damages for breach of fiduciary duty. There was minimal evidence as to whether Sattar was or was not a fiduciary. Similarly, very little time was spent in argument by either side on this issue. The parties acknowledge that the damages are the same for breach of contract and for breach of fiduciary duty. In light of my finding in relation to the breach of contract claim I make no finding in relation to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Expenses and Punitive Damages
Expenses and Punitive Damages
57While the amended claim challenges Sattar’s expenses of 11 billion Rials, as set out in the Toronto agreement, including the 7.5 billion Rial bribe, Parviz in argument acknowledged that no claim was being made against Sattar in relation to them and the damages claim was limited to the net sale price of 30 billion Rials.
58Also, while there was a pleading for punitive damages in the amended claim no such claim was advanced at trial.
Conversion
Conversion
59The Toronto agreement provides that payment by Sattar is to be made in “Tomans, half of which being one billion five hundred million Tomans is to be paid…(around May 20, 2010) through foreign exchange draft at that day’s rate of exchange, payment of the remaining half will be coordinated later.” As mentioned, one Toman equals 10 Rials.
60The Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 addresses foreign money obligations. Section 121(1) provides a mechanism for determining the day for conversion. Under this subsection, the conversion rate is to be determined on the day prior to payment of the judgment debt. In other words, Tomans or Rials are to be converted to Canadian dollars the day before payment. However, as I read s. 121(1), this is limited to situations, where the foreign currency can be exchanged at a bank in Ontario listed in Schedule I to the Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46. Furthermore, s. 121(4) provides that where an enforceable obligation which would include an agreement between the parties, sets out the manner of conversion it is to apply. Finally, subject to where the parties have made an agreement, the court has discretion as to the conversion rate if the conversion mechanism would be inequitable to any party.
61Under the Toronto agreement Parviz and Sattar agreed to one date of conversion, namely May 20, 2010. I have however no evidence as to the conversion rate on that day. I find this to be a manner of conversion within the meaning of s. 121(4) which thus overrides s. 121(1). I also question whether s. 121(1) would even apply in any event as counsel for Parviz advised, in submissions, that there is no exchange rate for Iranian Tomans or Rials at any Schedule I bank in Ontario. Counsel for Sattar did not suggest otherwise but submitted that this fact should have been put in as evidence and not as a submission. In my view, this is no different than a submission as to appropriate interest rates and the use of a “bank rate” as defined in s. 127(1) of the Courts of Justice Act. Parties are not required to put interest rates in as evidence but are free to use schedules as published by the Bank of Canada. In any event, having found that May 20, 2010 is the conversion date with respect to the 1.5 billion Tomans or 15 billion Rials, this is irrelevant.
62As to the second payment this was to “be coordinated later”. There is no doubt that Sattar owes a further 15 billion Rials after the May 20, 2010 payment. Because no date is specified for the second payment s. 121(4) of the Courts of Justice Act does not apply. Nor does s. 121(1), for the reasons already given.
63Sattar sold the property on June 17, 2010 for 47,512,500,000 Rials with almost 12 billion Rials in cash and the balance in real property. This transaction closed on June 29, 2010 and Sattar paid Parviz $100,000 on July 2, 2010 and $80,000 on July 7, 2010.
64Recognizing that Sattar would need a reasonable period of time to convert what he received in Rials into Canadian funds or to sell or refinance the real property received by him in the sale, and that under the Toronto agreement Sattar was given approximately six months from November 15, 2009 to May 20, 2010 to make the first payment, I order that the second payment date should be six months from the closing of the sale on June 29, 2010 or December 31, 2010. If the parties are unable to establish the exchange rate from Tomans or Rials into Canadian dollars on May 20, 2010 and December 31, 2010, I may be spoken to.
Costs
Costs
65Presumptively, Parviz is entitled to costs being the successful party. However, I am unaware of whether there were any offers made by either party.
66I would hope that the parties would be able to agree on costs. If they are unable to do so, Parviz is to provide his costs submissions within three weeks of today’s date, consisting of no more than three pages, excluding any necessary attachments such as a Bill of Costs and offers to settle. Sattar will provide his submissions within three weeks thereafter, also of no more than three pages, excluding necessary attachments.
HOOD J.
Released: January 25, 2017
CITATION: Victory v. Sattar, 2017 ONSC 549
COURT FILE NO.: CV-13-472644
DATE: 20170125
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
PARVIZ VICTORY, on his own behalf and as Trustee for AMIR HOOSHANG VICTORY, MAHEEN-DOKHT VICTORY, IRADJ VICTORY, MEHRDAD VICTORY, FOROUGH VICTORY and KAMBIZ VICTORY
Plaintiff & Defendant to Counterclaim
– and –
FARHANG SATTAR
Defendant & Plaintiff by Counterclaim
REASONS FOR DECISION
HOOD J.
Released: January 25, 2017