Emrys Charles Davis

The court considered whether the plaintiff, Gaurav Tewari, should be permitted to bring a motion for an interlocutory injunction under Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure against multiple defendants, given his outstanding costs orders from previous litigation.

The court found that it would be unfair to allow further motions until the costs orders were satisfied, despite the plaintiff's claims of significant assets.

The motion was not permitted to proceed at this time.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing the plaintiffs' motion to amend their pleadings in a class action alleging a multi-bank conspiracy to fix gold and silver prices and engage in 'spoofing'.

The motion judge had found the proposed amendments time-barred or improper for joinder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by treating amendments as new causes of action when they were alternative theories based on existing facts, and by misapplying the 'actual knowledge' standard for limitation periods.

The Court also found a palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's assessment of JP Morgan's joinder, concluding that the CFTC order did not preclude conspiratorial spoofing allegations.

The amendments were allowed, with the possibility for some respondents to plead a limitations defence at trial.

The appellant, Gaurav Tewari, appealed the dismissal of his action for lack of jurisdiction and associated costs orders.

He claimed intellectual property rights violations and breach of agreements.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario, no attornment, and that the appellant, acting in a personal capacity, could not rely on a corporate non-disclosure agreement for jurisdiction.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence (earlier agreements) on appeal, which was denied due to lack of due diligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings on jurisdiction and denied leave to appeal the costs orders, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle.

This motion concerned the approval of class counsel fees, disbursements, and a representative plaintiff honorarium following the settlement of two national class proceedings (2012 and 2016 Actions) against various defendants, including Apple Inc., for an alleged eBook price-fixing conspiracy.

The aggregate settlement amount was $15,175,000.

Class Counsel sought $2.7 million in fees (25% of the Apple settlement, adjusted for Quebec) and $43,669.39 in disbursements, plus a $5,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff.

The court addressed whether the Class Proceedings Act is a complete code for fee approval, the applicability of the Solicitors Act and its regulations regarding costs and disbursements in "all-in" settlements, and the treatment of notional cost contributions and administration costs.

The court found that the Solicitors Act provisions regarding costs and disbursements should apply harmoniously to class proceedings.

It ruled that disbursements should be deducted from the gross settlement amount, and a notional contribution to costs ($500,000) should be applied before calculating counsel fees.

Settlement administration costs were deemed not a disbursement incurred by counsel.

The court approved class counsel fees of $2,450,000 plus taxes, disbursements of $43,669.39 plus taxes, and an honorarium of $2,500 for the representative plaintiff.

This motion concerned the approval of several settlement agreements in ongoing automotive parts class actions, specifically with Mitsubishi Heavy, SKF, Brose, and Yamada.

The plaintiffs also sought approval for a distribution protocol for Automotive Bearings, Electric Powered Steering Assemblies, High Intensity Discharge Ballasts, and Manual Steering Columns actions, authorization for using previously produced customer information, honoraria for representative plaintiffs, use of residual wire harness funds, and class counsel's legal fees and disbursements.

The court granted all requests, finding the settlements and distribution protocol fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and the requested fees and honoraria justified.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend its claim to include causes of action under the Trademarks Act and for intentional interference with economic relations, abandoning its initial defamation claim.

The court struck the original statement of claim due to the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue on behalf of its members.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, finding that the proposed amended claim failed to plead essential elements for both the Trademark Act claim (lack of pleaded intellectual property ownership) and the intentional interference claim (failure to clearly plead its own economic interests and how they were harmed).

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a new draft amended statement of claim by a specified date, emphasizing that further attempts without proper pleading might be deemed abusive.

Costs of $25,000 were awarded to the defendant, payable before any new draft statement of claim is delivered.

This motion concerned the approval of class counsel's retainer agreement, fees, and disbursements following a partial settlement in a price-fixing class action.

The plaintiff class counsel sought approval for 25% of the settlement amount ($2.35 million) as fees, plus disbursements and interest.

The court reviewed the retainer agreements for compliance with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and assessed the reasonableness of the fees and disbursements based on established factors.

The court approved the retainer agreements and the requested fees and most disbursements, but declined to approve interest on disbursements at this stage, pending further developments in the ongoing litigation.

The plaintiff sought court approval for a class action settlement agreement with the Panasonic defendants in a price-fixing conspiracy action concerning linear resistors.

The settlement included a monetary payment of $2,350,000 and significant cooperation from the Panasonic defendants to assist in prosecuting the action against non-settling defendants.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, considering the arm's length negotiations, the benefits of cooperation, and the risks of continued litigation.

However, the court rejected a proposed term in the draft order that would allow class counsel to use settlement funds for future disbursements, citing concerns about retainer agreements and counsel's financial risks.

The appellants brought a class action against defendant manufacturers and suppliers alleging they conspired to fix the price of lithium-ion batteries sold in Canada between January 2000 and December 2011.

The conspiracy allegedly impacted all purchasers, including "umbrella purchasers" whose batteries originated from non-defendants, as the cartel's price increases caused non-conspirators to also raise prices.

The certification judge certified only a statutory claim under the Competition Act for non-umbrella purchasers.

The Divisional Court certified an unlawful means conspiracy claim but excluded umbrella purchasers, citing indeterminate liability concerns.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the principle of indeterminate liability does not apply to either the statutory claim or the unlawful means conspiracy claim, and that umbrella purchasers should be included in the class with a subclass created for non-umbrella purchasers regarding aggregate damages quantification.

This appeal concerns whether a proposed securities class action asserting a statutory cause of action for misrepresentation under Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act was time-barred by the three-year limitation period in section 138.14.

The appellant commenced a class action in May 2009 but did not bring a motion for leave to proceed with the statutory claim within the limitation period.

The motion judge refused to grant leave nunc pro tunc (retroactively), finding that the appellant failed to meet the test established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Green.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle in the exercise of discretion to deny nunc pro tunc relief.

In a proposed class action alleging a price‑fixing conspiracy in the optical disc drive (ODD) market contrary to common law and s. 45 of the Competition Act, the plaintiff sought leave to amend the claim to add eighteen additional corporate defendants.

The defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that limitation periods under the Limitations Act and s. 36(4) of the Competition Act had expired.

The court held that at the pleadings amendment stage it was inappropriate to make definitive findings on discoverability or the expiry of limitation periods where the evidentiary record was incomplete.

Although the plaintiff’s evidence regarding due diligence was thin, the court concluded it would be unfair to refuse the amendment solely on the deficient record.

The motion was adjourned to permit the plaintiff to file additional evidence addressing discoverability and diligence.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify two actions as class proceedings for settlement purposes under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 in relation to alleged price-fixing of DRAM (dynamic random access memory) devices.

The actions alleged breach of Part IV of the Competition Act, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with economic interests against numerous international semiconductor manufacturers.

Following earlier settlement with one defendant, additional settlements were reached with several defendants totaling substantial monetary payments and cooperation commitments.

The court held that the criteria for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were satisfied and approved certification for settlement purposes.

The court further determined that no additional opt‑out period was required because class members had already been provided a valid opportunity to opt out during the earlier settlement process.

In Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings, the debtor sought approval of a debtor-in-possession financing facility, an extension of the stay of proceedings, approval of a management incentive plan, and approval of the monitor’s actions.

Certain noteholders opposed the proposed financing and incentive plan and proposed an alternative short-term DIP facility intended to maintain the status quo pending negotiation of a restructuring plan.

The court held that the debtor’s board had exercised reasonable business judgment after a competitive process and that the proposed financing satisfied the statutory considerations under s. 11.2 of the CCAA.

The court rejected the argument that the DIP facility constituted a de facto plan of arrangement requiring creditor approval and found the alternative financing proposal tactical and inconsistent with market conditions.

The management incentive plan was also approved as reasonable and necessary to retain key personnel responsible for pursuing a significant international arbitration claim forming the debtor’s primary asset.

In Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings, the debtor sought approval of short‑term bridge financing pending a larger DIP financing facility.

Competing bridge financing proposals were advanced by an existing lender and by noteholders.

The court approved the debtor’s preferred proposal despite it being more expensive, holding that the board’s decision was protected by the business judgment rule and was supported by the debtor’s financial advisor and the monitor.

A cross‑motion by noteholders seeking revisions to the DIP auction procedures and exemption from signing a non‑disclosure agreement was largely dismissed, though the deadline for qualification as a bidder was briefly extended.