Russell M. Raikes

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination application as abandoned.

The Tribunal had directed the applicant to resubmit documents it deemed faint and illegible, and dismissed the application when he allegedly failed to comply.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding the Tribunal's decision unreasonable because the documents, while faint, were clearly legible.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicants, members of First Nations operating unlicensed cannabis dispensaries on reserves, brought a constitutional challenge against the federal Cannabis Act.

They argued that the licensing requirements infringed their aboriginal, treaty, and inherent rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and UNDRIPA.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no evidentiary basis for an aboriginal right to trade cannabis, as the plant is not indigenous to Canada and was not historically traded by the Anishinaabe.

The court also found no treaty right to sell cannabis, noting that historic treaties did not contemplate such trade and any hypothetical right was extinguished by criminal prohibitions enacted in 1923.

Finally, the court held that the legislation did not violate the applicants' inherent rights under UNDRIPA, as the retail sale of cannabis is not an aspect of indigenous identity.

The appellant, Tek Holdings Limited, appealed an Order to Comply issued by the Chief Building Official requiring construction of a covered manure storage facility for a broiler chicken barn.

The appellant had initially obtained a building permit for an uncovered manure storage but was required to obtain a minor variance after a planning department error regarding Minimum Distance Separation (MDS) setbacks was discovered.

The Committee of Adjustment granted the variance on condition that the manure storage be covered.

The appellant subsequently constructed the facility with an uncovered manure storage, contrary to the revised permit.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Order to Comply was reasonable and within the Chief Building Official's authority under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The appellant society appealed temporary child protection orders that required access arrangements for a child in temporary society care and limited placement to a residence within a two-hour travel time to facilitate in-person family access.

The appeal argued that the motion judge exceeded jurisdiction by effectively controlling placement under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act while the child remained in temporary society care.

The court held that the judge lacked authority to direct placement itself but retained broad jurisdiction under s. 94(8) to make access orders and ancillary terms consistent with the child's best interests and family reunification.

The impugned distance restriction was found to be ancillary to access, reasonable on the facts, and not an impermissible placement direction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application alleging the defendant breached his conditional sentence order after police executed a search warrant at his residence and found illicit drugs.

The defendant sought to challenge the validity of the search warrant under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown argued that a judge presiding over a breach hearing under s. 742.6 of the Criminal Code is not a court of competent jurisdiction to hear Charter applications.

The court disagreed, following R. v. Palmer, and held that it has jurisdiction to hear the Charter application.

The matter was adjourned to allow the Crown to provide the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) to the defence.

The plaintiff, Contrans Tank Group GP Inc., brought a defamation action against its former employee, Zhuo Chen.

Chen brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action, claiming his expressions related to public interest matters (alleged systemic underpayment and discrimination against immigrant drivers).

Contrans attempted to discontinue the action without costs shortly before the motion hearing.

The court found that the notice of discontinuance was ineffective due to the statutory stay imposed by s. 137.1(5) of the Act, which prohibits "any further step in the proceeding" once an anti-SLAPP motion is made.

The court then proceeded to hear the anti-SLAPP motion on its merits, finding that Chen's communications were on a matter of public interest.

Contrans failed to show grounds to believe its defamation claim had substantial merit or that Chen had no valid defence (specifically, truth/justification).

The court also found that Contrans brought the action in bad faith or for an improper purpose, aiming to silence and intimidate the defendant.

The action was dismissed, and Chen was awarded $5,000 in damages and full indemnity costs.

This decision concerns the sentencing of two co-accused, Jason Nahmabin and James Armstrong, who pleaded guilty to being accessories after the fact to murder.

Andrew Chute was murdered in April 2022.

Nahmabin, a drug dealer, was instrumental in bringing the victim to the scene and actively assisted the killers post-murder by retrieving evidence and instructing the co-accused to remain silent and destroy evidence.

Armstrong, a first-time offender with addiction issues, drove the killers from the scene and initially lied to police before cooperating.

The court applied sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and extensively considered Gladue factors for Nahmabin.

Armstrong received a 22-month conditional sentence with house arrest and probation, while Nahmabin received four years of incarceration.

The defendant, Arielle Wall, was charged with impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and having a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The court dismissed the dangerous driving charge due to a lack of evidence regarding the manner of driving.

For the remaining charges, the court relied on expert testimony regarding blood alcohol concentration and its effects on driving faculties.

The defendant's blood alcohol concentration was found to be between 103 and 107 mg/100mL at the time of the blood sample, and calculated to be between 120-127 mg/100mL at the time of the collision.

The court concluded that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, which contributed to the fatal collision.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired driving causing death and having a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mg, and not guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

This motion concerned the approval of class counsel fees, disbursements, and a representative plaintiff honorarium following the settlement of two national class proceedings (2012 and 2016 Actions) against various defendants, including Apple Inc., for an alleged eBook price-fixing conspiracy.

The aggregate settlement amount was $15,175,000.

Class Counsel sought $2.7 million in fees (25% of the Apple settlement, adjusted for Quebec) and $43,669.39 in disbursements, plus a $5,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff.

The court addressed whether the Class Proceedings Act is a complete code for fee approval, the applicability of the Solicitors Act and its regulations regarding costs and disbursements in "all-in" settlements, and the treatment of notional cost contributions and administration costs.

The court found that the Solicitors Act provisions regarding costs and disbursements should apply harmoniously to class proceedings.

It ruled that disbursements should be deducted from the gross settlement amount, and a notional contribution to costs ($500,000) should be applied before calculating counsel fees.

Settlement administration costs were deemed not a disbursement incurred by counsel.

The court approved class counsel fees of $2,450,000 plus taxes, disbursements of $43,669.39 plus taxes, and an honorarium of $2,500 for the representative plaintiff.

The parties, who were unmarried cohabitants, jointly purchased a home.

The applicant paid the down payment and all mortgage and property expenses during cohabitation and for 3.75 years post-separation.

After the property was sold, the applicant moved for summary judgment seeking an unequal division of the net sale proceeds based on unjust enrichment.

The respondent opposed, seeking equal division and occupation rent for the post-separation period.

The court granted the applicant's motion, finding he was unjustly enriched by paying down the mortgage principal and replacing the furnace without contribution from the respondent.

The respondent's claim for occupation rent was dismissed as inequitable given her lack of financial contribution to the property.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of a $14,000,000 settlement in a medical negligence action involving a minor who suffered catastrophic brain damage.

The court approved the settlement, the allocation of damages, and the proposed contingency fees for plaintiffs' counsel, finding them fair and reasonable given the significant risks and complexity of the litigation.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for a sealing order, holding that it was contrary to the open court principle and that no compelling interest justified sealing the materials.

The applicant developer sought to enforce a cost sharing provision in a 1975 subdivision agreement against the respondent municipality, arguing the municipality was required to collect a proportionate share of servicing costs from a new adjacent development.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the cost sharing obligation was only triggered if the new development connected to or benefited from the installed services, which it did not.

The court also dismissed the applicant's alternative claim for unjust enrichment, holding that the subdivision agreement provided a juristic reason for the municipality's benefit.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for dangerous driving.

The trial judge had found that the appellant's vehicle was the same one observed speeding on Highway 8 and that he drove dangerously in the Goderich Courthouse Square.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider other reasonable possibilities regarding the circumstantial identification of the vehicle on Highway 8.

Furthermore, the trial judge made an impermissible inference that the appellant had tailored his evidence to the Crown's case, which fatally flawed the credibility assessment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, brought a defamation action against the defendant, a former law partner and opposing counsel, over an article published in an insurance adjusters' magazine.

The article accused the plaintiff of making false representations during a pretrial conference, based on a lower court decision that was later overturned on appeal.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the action, finding that while the claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant had no valid defence, as the defence of qualified privilege was legally tenable and required a trial to determine if it was defeated by malice.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including sexual assault and assault against an intimate partner, applied for release from custody after his trial had commenced but was adjourned due to a conflict of interest issue involving his defence counsel.

The accused argued that his continued detention was unjustified and sought a review under sections 520, 523, and 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that section 525 did not apply because the trial had commenced, and section 520 did not apply for the same reason.

However, the court assumed jurisdiction under section 523(2)(a) to consider vacating the previous detention order.

Applying the framework from St-Cloud, the court found no error of law in the initial detention order and concluded that there was no material change in circumstances.

The court held that the proposed release plan did not sufficiently mitigate the substantial likelihood that the accused would re-offend or interfere with the administration of justice, and dismissed the application for release.

Class counsel sought approval of fees representing 25 percent of a $770,000 partial settlement, as well as disbursements.

The court approved the disbursements but declined to approve the requested 25 percent fee at this stage.

The court found the hourly rates used by counsel to be grossly excessive, distorting the value of docketed time.

Noting that the litigation remained in its procedural infancy after six years, the court fixed the fee award at $100,000 plus HST, without prejudice to counsel's right to seek additional amounts upon further settlement or completion of the certification motion.

The plaintiff in a class action sought court approval for a partial settlement agreement with the Kamaya defendants, who were accused of participating in a price-fixing conspiracy for linear resistors.

The settlement included a monetary payment and cooperation benefits for the plaintiff class.

The court, applying principles from the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and relevant case law, found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, despite the monetary amount being at the lower end of the reasonable zone.

The decision emphasized the value of arm's-length negotiation, counsel's recommendation, and the strategic benefits of early cooperation from settling defendants in complex conspiracy litigation.

The applicant brought a motion to increase interim spousal support, seeking to impute over $1.8 million in corporate income to the respondent following a corporate reorganization.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to compel the applicant to approve the valuation reports of a jointly retained expert.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no material change in circumstances and preferring the joint expert's preliminary view that a promissory note from the reorganization was not available income.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion to compel approval but provided directions for finalizing the expert reports.

A paralegal who represented individual consumers in Small Claims Court actions against the defendants brought a motion seeking compensation from class counsel's fees following the settlement of a related class proceeding.

The paralegal argued that his independent efforts, including media interviews, pressured the defendants to settle and benefited the class, justifying payment on the basis of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no contractual agreement between the paralegal and class counsel.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that class counsel requested, encouraged, or acquiesced to his efforts, nor any proof that his actions influenced the settlement.

The moving defendants sought a temporary stay of the plaintiff's certification motion pending the determination of a certification motion in a related price-fixing class action involving different electronic components.

The defendants argued that a stay would promote efficiency as the expert evidence and methodology were substantially similar in both actions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the actions involved different products, time periods, and parties, and that an indefinite delay would be unfair to the plaintiff class and contrary to the goals of judicial economy and access to justice.