George F. McFadyen

The applicant mother brought multiple motions, and the respondent father brought cross-motions, seeking interim orders regarding parenting time, child support, spousal support, and issues related to the matrimonial home mortgage and section 7 expenses.

The court maintained the existing 60/40 parenting split for the younger child, imputed income to the applicant for child support calculations, dismissed the applicant's claim for interim spousal support, and dismissed the applicant's request to remove her name from the mortgage or sell the home.

Section 7 expenses were ordered to be divided proportionally.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion to establish parenting arrangements for the parties' youngest child, Stewart, during the COVID-19 pandemic, after the applicant father unilaterally withheld access.

The court reaffirmed the presumption that existing parenting arrangements should continue, subject to public health directives, and found no valid reason for the father to deny access.

A temporary order was issued codifying the agreed-upon alternate weekend and mid-week access schedule for the mother, with make-up access to be resolved by counsel.

The order also included non-disparagement clauses and clarified transportation responsibilities.

Other claims, including interim custody, child support arrears, and costs, were deemed non-urgent.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from several contentious family law proceedings, including a motion to reinstate counsel, a motion to change a final order, and a 10-day trial.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, considering the success of each party, their litigation conduct, and the importance and complexity of the issues.

The applicant was largely successful across the various stages, although his conduct was noted as unreasonable in some instances.

The respondent's counsel was held personally liable for costs due to a missed court appearance.

The court fixed specific cost awards for each stage, emphasizing proportionality and reasonableness.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion to establish parenting arrangements for a child, S.J.M.B., after the applicant father unilaterally withheld access due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court, acting as Triage Judge, found the matter urgent under the "Notice to the Profession" guidelines, as it involved the alleged wrongful retention of a child and a unilateral alteration of the status quo.

The court set a schedule for the parties to deliver materials for the motion, reserving the right to reconsider urgency once all materials are filed.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict family law trial addressing custody, access, child support, and spousal support.

The applicant father sought sole custody, alleging the respondent mother alienated the children and caused the teenage daughter's mental health crises.

The court found a material change in circumstances and awarded sole custody to the applicant, noting the children thrived in his care while the respondent lacked insight into how her conduct harmed them.

The respondent was granted specified access.

The court imputed income to the respondent for child support purposes due to intentional under-employment.

The respondent was awarded spousal support on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, but the court declined to include the applicant's post-separation income increases in the calculation.

The court also permitted the applicant to set off unpaid costs awards against an equalization payment owed to the respondent.

The appellant husband appealed from a motion judge's order that struck his reply factum, rectified an overpayment of trust funds, and struck his pleadings for failure to comply with court orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on three grounds: the husband was denied the opportunity to respond fully to the wife's motion to strike; the motion judge overstated the wife's efforts to move the case to trial; and the motion judge failed to consider whether lesser remedies would suffice.

The court set aside the order striking the pleadings and substituted specific disclosure orders with consequences for non-compliance.

The applicant father opposed the respondent mother's request to relocate with their 18-month-old child from Sarnia, Ontario, to Alberta.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test from *Gordon v. Goertz*, denied the mother's mobility application.

The decision emphasized the child's young age and the need for frequent, regular contact with both parents to foster a strong bond, outweighing the benefits to the mother of relocating to be closer to her family and career opportunities, especially given concerns about her mental health treatment plan in Alberta.

The case involved multiple motions in a long-standing family law dispute.

The respondent's motions for an accounting of trust funds and allegations of fraud/breach of trust against the applicant's solicitor were dismissed, with the court accepting the solicitor's accountant's explanation of an innocent overpayment which was set off against support arrears.

The applicant's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings for persistent failure to provide financial disclosure, despite multiple court orders, was granted.

The court emphasized the fundamental obligation of financial disclosure in family law and deemed the respondent's conduct exceptional, warranting the striking of pleadings.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking interim joint custody with primary residence of the children with him, citing the children's unhappiness with the respondent mother.

The respondent mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a further Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) report.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, expressing significant concerns about potential parental alienation by the father and the manipulation of the children.

The court granted the order for a further OCL report and urged both parties to seek counselling and improve communication.

The parties, married in 1998 and separated in 2016, sought interim orders regarding parenting, child support, s. 7 expenses, and the matrimonial home.

The court granted primary residence of the five daughters to the applicant mother, establishing a shared care schedule for the younger children and allowing the 16-year-old to determine her own access with the respondent father.

The respondent was ordered to pay child support of $2,422 monthly and contribute 86% to s. 7 expenses.

A 45-day window was set for the applicant to buy out the respondent's interest in the matrimonial home, failing which the property would be listed for sale.

Ancillary relief included designating the applicant and children as beneficiaries of health/fringe benefits and the applicant as the sole beneficiary of the respondent's life insurance.

Ms. Faddoul, counsel for the Respondent, was removed mid-trial due to a conflict of interest arising from her failure to properly appeal a prior final order.

After the trial was adjourned for the Respondent to obtain new counsel, Ms. Faddoul sought to be reinstated as counsel.

The court dismissed her motion, finding that the conflict of interest persisted and that allowing her to continue would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and unfairly prejudice the Applicant by virtually guaranteeing an appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court emphasized that the right to counsel of choice is not unlimited and must be balanced against the integrity of the justice system.

The moving party (respondent in the main action) brought an interlocutory motion for the partition and sale of two jointly owned family cottages.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that the Partition Act was not specifically pleaded and that he might be able to buy out the moving party's interest after the equalization of net family property at trial.

The court held that the failure to specifically plead the Partition Act was not a bar to relief, as there was no unfairness or surprise.

The court granted the motion, finding that the responding party failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial or that a forced sale would be vexatious, malicious, or oppressive.

Following an interim motion in a family law proceeding involving custody, parenting time, and child support, the court addressed the issue of costs.

Most substantive issues had been resolved by consent after the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, leaving only certain parenting schedule recommendations and interim child support to be determined.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs relying in part on an earlier offer to settle that closely resembled the eventual order.

The court held that although the applicant was the successful party and the offer to settle was relevant, the issues were not complex and both parties had acted reasonably.

Costs were therefore reduced to a partial amount considered fair in the circumstances.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to hear corollary relief proceedings for child support under the Divorce Act because a separation agreement had previously been filed in the Ontario Court of Justice under the Family Law Act.

The court considered whether the filing of a separation agreement under s. 35 of the Family Law Act deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear a corollary relief claim under s. 15.1 of the Divorce Act.

Relying on recent appellate authority, the court held that an application for corollary relief under the Divorce Act is not an application to vary an order made under provincial legislation.

Such relief can only be sought in the Superior Court of Justice and may supersede prior provincial orders.

The motion challenging jurisdiction was therefore dismissed.

In a family law proceeding following separation after a long marriage, the remaining issue concerned the appropriate imputation of income to both parties for purposes of determining spousal support.

The applicant alleged that the respondent had intentionally reduced his income after separation, while the respondent argued that the applicant was underemployed and capable of earning more than her reported income from retail work.

The court accepted evidence of broader economic factors affecting the respondent’s earnings and declined to find intentional income reduction.

However, the court found the applicant’s reported income unrealistically low and imputed a higher earning capacity to her.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines midpoint, the court ordered spousal support of $2,000 per month effective November 1, 2010 with arrears payable and a four‑year review period.