Denis Edmund Burns

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's answer due to his failure to comply with an interim spousal support order and an interim costs order.

The respondent argued he was financially unable to comply, citing his retirement and depleted investments.

The court found the respondent's non-compliance to be willful, deliberate, and flagrant, noting his ability to pay for a luxury vehicle lease buyout while claiming poverty.

The court ordered the respondent's answer struck, except for the claim for divorce, but granted a time-limited stay to allow him a final opportunity to pay the full arrears.

The applicant sought costs following a successful interim spousal support motion.

The court considered the applicant's offers to settle, which included costs provisions and spousal support for periods not covered by the order.

The court found that these offers did not meet the strict conditions of Rule 18(14) for full indemnity due to the inclusion of costs and extraneous support periods.

However, the offers were considered under Rule 18(16).

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 24(12), the court awarded the applicant $11,500 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, rejecting the respondent's argument that the applicant's conduct was unreasonable.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The primary issue was the respondent's early retirement and whether income should be imputed to him.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed, as his retirement was voluntary and not due to health or incapacity, and he had not sought new employment.

Income was imputed to the respondent based on an average of his pre-retirement earnings, including commissions and capital gains.

The court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $8,000 per month and maintained the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and possession of cannabis contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after police observed him operating a motor vehicle at high speed and determined his ability was impaired by marijuana consumption.

The accused had a valid medical prescription for the marijuana.

The accused entered a guilty plea, but the court struck the plea after determining that the facts did not disclose an offence of unlawful possession.

The court held that lawful possession of a prescribed substance does not become unlawful merely because the accused subsequently used it while operating a motor vehicle, distinguishing the case from Elias v. The Queen on the basis that the accused was always lawfully entitled to possess the prescribed marijuana.

The accused was stopped by police after passing several vehicles at a high rate of speed and was found to be impaired by marihuana.

Police also discovered 18 grams of marihuana, for which the accused held a valid medical prescription.

The Crown argued that lawful possession became unlawful once the drug was used in the commission of impaired driving.

The court rejected this argument, distinguishing precedent on innocent possession becoming unlawful and holding that possession remained lawful because the substance had been validly prescribed and obtained.

As the admitted facts did not disclose the offence of unlawful possession under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the guilty plea on that charge was struck.

The applicant sought to vary spousal support upwards, arguing the respondent deliberately reduced his income and failed to disclose financial benefits to minimize support obligations.

The respondent sought to reduce spousal support due to retirement.

The court found the respondent's retirement and reduced income were part of a scheme to reduce spousal support, imputed income to him for several years, and found the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to become self-sufficient.

Spousal support was varied upwards for the applicant, and significant arrears were ordered.

The appellant appealed a finding of civil contempt and a 75-day sentence for failing to deliver jewellery and artwork to the respondent pursuant to a court order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, noting the motion judge implicitly rejected the appellant's claim that he did not possess the items.

However, the Court varied the sentence, setting aside the 30-day term for the jewellery due to lack of clarity on the extent of the breach, and reducing the 45-day term for the artwork to 15 days, adding a coercive clause allowing the appellant to avoid or shorten the sentence by delivering the specified items.

The appellant appealed an interim order for spousal and child support, arguing the motions judge erred by including $100,000 from a share redemption as income available for support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the Child Support Guidelines to attribute corporate income to a sole shareholder.

The court also admitted fresh evidence that confirmed the availability of the funds, noting any necessary adjustments could be made at the upcoming trial.