Denis Edmund Burns

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's answer due to his failure to comply with an interim spousal support order and an interim costs order.

The respondent argued he was financially unable to comply, citing his retirement and depleted investments.

The court found the respondent's non-compliance to be willful, deliberate, and flagrant, noting his ability to pay for a luxury vehicle lease buyout while claiming poverty.

The court ordered the respondent's answer struck, except for the claim for divorce, but granted a time-limited stay to allow him a final opportunity to pay the full arrears.

The applicant sought costs following a successful interim spousal support motion.

The court considered the applicant's offers to settle, which included costs provisions and spousal support for periods not covered by the order.

The court found that these offers did not meet the strict conditions of Rule 18(14) for full indemnity due to the inclusion of costs and extraneous support periods.

However, the offers were considered under Rule 18(16).

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 24(12), the court awarded the applicant $11,500 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, rejecting the respondent's argument that the applicant's conduct was unreasonable.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The primary issue was the respondent's early retirement and whether income should be imputed to him.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed, as his retirement was voluntary and not due to health or incapacity, and he had not sought new employment.

Income was imputed to the respondent based on an average of his pre-retirement earnings, including commissions and capital gains.

The court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $8,000 per month and maintained the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

The accused was stopped by police after passing several vehicles at a high rate of speed and was found to be impaired by marihuana.

Police also discovered 18 grams of marihuana, for which the accused held a valid medical prescription.

The Crown argued that lawful possession became unlawful once the drug was used in the commission of impaired driving.

The court rejected this argument, distinguishing precedent on innocent possession becoming unlawful and holding that possession remained lawful because the substance had been validly prescribed and obtained.

As the admitted facts did not disclose the offence of unlawful possession under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the guilty plea on that charge was struck.

The applicant sought permission to add six witnesses to the trial list shortly before the scheduled family law trial, despite an order from the trial management conference restricting witnesses to those listed.

The proposed witnesses were intended to testify about the applicant's physical and emotional condition following separation.

The court refused permission, noting the lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay, the potential prejudice to the respondent, and the lack of detailed 'will say' statements, while leaving the ultimate evidentiary rulings to the trial judge.

The applicant sought to vary spousal support upwards, arguing the respondent deliberately reduced his income and failed to disclose financial benefits to minimize support obligations.

The respondent sought to reduce spousal support due to retirement.

The court found the respondent's retirement and reduced income were part of a scheme to reduce spousal support, imputed income to him for several years, and found the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to become self-sufficient.

Spousal support was varied upwards for the applicant, and significant arrears were ordered.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief, which resulted in a final consent order for child support and the dismissal of her claims for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent to return to work.

The respondent sought costs, arguing he was entitled to the automatic cost consequences of Rule 18(14) based on his offers to settle.

The court found the respondent did not meet the burden under Rule 18(14) because his offers were either less favourable than the order or failed to comply with the timing requirements.

The court awarded the respondent costs for his partial success but reduced the amount due to his unreasonable failure to disclose a severance payment, fixing costs at $4,746 payable at the conclusion of the case.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent husband to return to full-time employment and not retire during the course of the lawsuit.

The parties had previously signed a separation agreement resolving all issues, which was filed with the court.

The court treated the motion as an interim variation of a final spousal support order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate urgency, hardship, or that the continuation of the existing support order was incongruous and absurd.

The court also found no merit in ordering the respondent not to retire, noting that imputation of income could be addressed at trial.

The appellant appealed a finding of civil contempt and a 75-day sentence for failing to deliver jewellery and artwork to the respondent pursuant to a court order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, noting the motion judge implicitly rejected the appellant's claim that he did not possess the items.

However, the Court varied the sentence, setting aside the 30-day term for the jewellery due to lack of clarity on the extent of the breach, and reducing the 45-day term for the artwork to 15 days, adding a coercive clause allowing the appellant to avoid or shorten the sentence by delivering the specified items.

The appellant appealed an interim order for spousal and child support, arguing the motions judge erred by including $100,000 from a share redemption as income available for support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the Child Support Guidelines to attribute corporate income to a sole shareholder.

The court also admitted fresh evidence that confirmed the availability of the funds, noting any necessary adjustments could be made at the upcoming trial.

The wife appealed the trial judge's dismissal of her claim for spousal support for 2002 and 2003, and the denial of a proportionate sharing of childcare costs.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in characterizing the request for 2002 and 2003 support as retroactive, finding instead that it was a claim for prospective support from the date of notice.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in requiring childcare expenses to be 'extraordinary' under section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, as the provision only requires them to be necessary and reasonable.

The appeal was allowed, with the husband ordered to pay a lump sum for spousal support and a proportionate share of childcare expenses.

The parties separated after a ten-year traditional marriage.

The separation agreement provided for time-limited spousal support and child support.

The father's income subsequently increased substantially, and the parties' son moved in with the father while the daughter remained with the mother.

The father drafted an amending agreement reducing child support, which the mother signed without financial disclosure or independent legal advice.

The mother later applied to vary spousal and child support, seeking retroactive increases.

The trial judge increased support but declined to make it retroactive to the date the father's income increased.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, increasing the quantum of spousal support to reflect the mother's economic disadvantage and making the child support increase retroactive due to the father's financial non-disclosure and blameworthy conduct.

The appellant appealed a Family Court order regarding the calculation of his income and the resulting child support obligations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's calculation of the appellant's income was justified based on the evidence tendered.

The court declined to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion and awarded costs of $2,000 to the respondent.