Denise M. Korpan

This focused hearing determined the valuation date for the equalization of the parties’ net family property.

The applicant wife sought a valuation date of September 19, 2022, while the respondent husband argued for July 1, 2014, which would have statute-barred the wife's equalization claim.

The court, after a holistic review of the evidence regarding the parties' intentions and conduct, found that neither party intended to end the marital relationship or regarded the marriage as being at an end until September 19, 2022.

Consequently, the court set the valuation date for equalization purposes as September 19, 2022.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking sole control over the sale of the matrimonial home, which had been previously ordered sold.

The court found that the respondent mother was delaying the sale in an attempt to acquire the home herself.

The motion was granted, giving the father sole authority to negotiate and close the sale, dispensing with the mother's consent, though requiring him to keep her apprised of offers.

A separate request by the father for the mother to remove online reviews about his counsel was dismissed as being outside the scope of the case.

The father was provisionally awarded costs.

The Children's Aid Society moved to strike a parent's answer in status review applications for her two children under Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules.

The parent had ceased participation in the children's lives and the court process, having moved to another province and expressed a degree of agreement with the Society's plans for permanency.

The court granted the motion, finding that the parent's answers would further delay the proceedings and that striking them was a proportionate and fair way to achieve permanency for the children, balancing the parent's prejudice against the children's need for timely resolution.

An adult child sought retroactive and ongoing child support from her father for the period she attended post‑secondary education full time.

The court considered the obligations of parents under the Family Law Act and the Child Support Guidelines where a child over the age of majority remains a dependant due to full‑time studies.

Finding the table approach under s. 3(2)(a) inappropriate because the adult child lived at home and sought payment directly, the court calculated support under s. 3(2)(b) based on the child’s actual expenses, income, and contributions from the parents.

After assessing the child’s financial shortfall during her studies and accounting for credits and prior payments, the court ordered the father to pay a lump‑sum support amount.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2001 child support order, seeking retroactive reduction of child support and rescission of accumulated arrears on the basis that the original order imputed income of $40,000 which he never earned.

The court examined his historical income, finding that although he had periods of financial hardship following separation, he was intentionally under‑employed between 2002 and 2004 and income should be imputed for those years.

The court concluded there had nevertheless been a material change in circumstances because the $40,000 imputed income exceeded his realistic earning capacity.

Exercising its discretion under s. 37 of the Family Law Act and the Child Support Guidelines, the court recalculated historical support obligations and determined when each child ceased to be entitled to support.

The arrears were reduced from the amount recorded by enforcement authorities and fixed at $19,573.50, payable in monthly instalments.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to hear corollary relief proceedings for child support under the Divorce Act because a separation agreement had previously been filed in the Ontario Court of Justice under the Family Law Act.

The court considered whether the filing of a separation agreement under s. 35 of the Family Law Act deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear a corollary relief claim under s. 15.1 of the Divorce Act.

Relying on recent appellate authority, the court held that an application for corollary relief under the Divorce Act is not an application to vary an order made under provincial legislation.

Such relief can only be sought in the Superior Court of Justice and may supersede prior provincial orders.

The motion challenging jurisdiction was therefore dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the court considered competing motions regarding temporary care and custody of a young child pending determination of the protection application.

The evidence consisted largely of conflicting affidavit evidence concerning allegations of domestic violence between the parents and related criminal proceedings.

Applying s. 51 of the Act, the court found reasonable grounds to believe the child faced a probable risk of harm if protective conditions were not imposed.

The court determined the child could be adequately protected by remaining in the mother’s care under the supervision of the Children’s Aid Society.

A structured access schedule for the father, including exchanges through the Society’s access exchange program, was ordered.

The defendant brought a motion seeking consolidation of a tort action for damages arising from alleged spousal assaults with an ongoing family law application between the same parties.

The plaintiff opposed consolidation, arguing the tort claim was separate and commenced later due to psychological readiness.

The court considered Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle in s. 138 of the Courts of Justice Act that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided.

Finding that both proceedings involved identical parties, overlapping factual allegations of assault during the marriage, and common issues of fact, the court held that all claims arising from the marital relationship should be determined together.

The tort action was ordered consolidated with the family law application to avoid duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings.