Marnelle Dragila

The Children's Aid Society applied under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 to commit a 12-year-old child to a secure treatment program.

The child, who resided in an unlicensed group home, had a complex neurodevelopmental disorder and frequently ran away.

The court found that while the child had a mental disorder, the Society failed to prove that he had attempted to cause serious bodily harm to himself or others within the preceding 45 days or 12 months.

The incidents relied upon—touching a worker's boot with a glass shard and setting a fire in a bathroom—did not meet the statutory threshold of attempting to cause serious bodily harm.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order committing a youth to a secure treatment program for 180 days under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The trial judge found that the youth had attempted to cause serious bodily harm within the preceding 45 days based on a threat to jump off a bridge, ingestion of an unidentified quantity of methamphetamine, and an involuntary hospital admission for suicidal ideation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law because the incidents amounted to mere threats or lacked evidence of actual harm or risk of serious bodily harm.

The secure treatment order was set aside.

The Children's Aid Society applied under s. 161 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to commit the child, A.R.P., to a secure treatment program for 180 days due to severe mental health issues, high-risk behaviours, and a history of self-harm and substance abuse.

The child, represented by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, opposed the application.

The court found that all six criteria under s. 164(1) of the CYFSA were met, including the child suffering from a mental disorder (FASD, intellectual disability, borderline personality disorder), having caused or attempted serious bodily harm within 45 days and 12 months of the application, and that the proposed secure treatment program was effective, appropriate, and the least restrictive option given the child's complex needs and lack of success with less restrictive alternatives.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for specified access between a child and his maternal grandparents.

The child's foster parent brought a cross-motion to be added as a party to the child protection proceeding.

The child had been in the foster parent's care for over two years and expressed a strong desire not to have contact with the maternal grandparents.

The court granted the foster parent's motion to be added as a party, finding that the foster parent had a legal interest, was capable of putting forward a plan of care, and was necessary to determine the issues.

The court dismissed the Society's motion for specified access, ordering instead that any access between the child and the maternal grandparents be subject to the child's wishes, as confirmed by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The Children's Aid Society sought a supervision order for a child with kin, while the kin (maternal great aunt and her spouse) sought custody.

The mother, father, and foster parents proposed extended society care for adoption by the foster parents.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's drug abuse and unstable living situation.

The court dismissed expert evidence on attachment theory as not specific to the child.

Ultimately, the court granted custody of the child to the kin, finding it to be in the child's best interests, and ordered reasonable access for the mother, siblings, and foster parents.

This endorsement resolves a preliminary objection regarding the participation of foster parents, D.T. and S.C., in a motion to add prospective kin placement D.M. and R.A. as party respondents in a child protection application.

The court examined the definition of 'hearing' under the Family Law Rules and the Courts of Justice Act, concluding that an interlocutory motion constitutes a 'hearing,' thereby entitling the foster parents to participate.

The foster parents of a nine-month-old child brought a motion to be added as parties or granted expanded participatory rights in a child protection proceeding where the Society sought society wardship.

The child had been in their care since she was three days old.

The court applied the criteria for adding parties in child protection cases and determined that adding the foster parents would prolong the proceeding, was not necessary to determine the issues, and that they did not have a legal interest at this stage.

The motion was dismissed, though the foster parents retained their statutory right to make submissions at trial.

In a status review application proceeding on consent, the Children's Aid Society sought to terminate a supervision order and grant joint custody of a nine-year-old child to the maternal grandparents residing in New Brunswick.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make the custody order given the child's residence outside Ontario.

The court found statutory authority under s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act and concluded the child remained habitually resident in Ontario.

The court granted joint custody to the grandparents with reasonable access to the mother.