INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROHIBITED FROM PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO SUBSECTIONS 87(8) AND (9) OF THE CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, 2017
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex
Sandra Welch for the Society
Applicant
- and -
J.J.M.
Marnelle Dragila for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD: March 16, 17 and 18, 2026
T. PRICE J.
Nature of Proceeding
1The Applicant, Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex (hereinafter, the Society), has brought an application pursuant to s. 161(1).1.iii of the Child, Youth, and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c.14, Sched. 1 (hereinafter, the CYFSA) seeking an order committing, for a period of 180 days, the Respondent J.J.M. (hereinafter, J.), a child who is 12 years of age, to the secure treatment program at Syl Apps Youth Centre (hereinafter Syl Apps) located in Oakville, Ontario.
2The application was opposed by J., who was represented by Marnelle Dragila, a lawyer appointed by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (hereinafter, the OCL). Ms. Dragila filed J.’s consent for the hearing to proceed in his absence.
3Ms. Welch, counsel for the Society, filed the Consent of Syl Apps to the application signed by Jim McNamee, the administrator of the secure treatment program at Syl Apps.
Background
4J. first came into Society care in April 2022. He was in extended Society care in February 2024. His parents were said to have had issues with mental health, addictions and housing instability. He had been raised by his paternal grandparents. His paternal grandfather is now deceased.
5J. has resided in an unlicensed group home in London since September 2025. Only one other child resides there. J.’s staff to individual ratio is 2:1 although, for a while, it was 3:1. Before his current residence, J. resided in two other unlicensed group homes between March 2025 and September 2025.
6An unlicensed group home is, in essence, a property rented by the Society to house children in its care. The staff who work with those children are employees of an outside agency. In this case, the staff members who work with J. are employees of Bluewater Respite Services.
7J. leaves the group home without permission (AWOL) daily. When he does, Society supervisor Shadi Behruz, who manages a team of Child Protection Workers, one or more of whom have responsibility for J., receives notification of the AWOL. She also is provided with copies of any incident reports generated by J.’s actions or behaviours in the group home.
8Before J. turned 12, police would be notified of his AWOL absences if he was not back within an hour. Now that he is 12, staff wait until 8 p.m. before filing a missing person report with the police and preparing a serious occurrence report.
9When J. goes into downtown London, he sometimes attends the Youth Opportunities Unlimited Cornerstone, a place where the Society places some children over the age of 16. Group home staff have offered to accompany J. when he goes downtown but he declines their offers.
10Whenever J. returns to the group home, he is subject to a personalized return protocol. He is searched, to ensure that he is not in possession of weapons or items which could start a fire, such as a lighter or matches. Staff also monitor to determine if J. returns under the influence of any substance, which is said to occur regularly.
Education
11At the present time, J. is not attending school. Although there had been a school meeting in June 2025 to develop a plan for his return to school, none emerged because of staff concerns about his behaviours and instability. The Society currently provides him with a tutor but there are no current plans to enroll him in school because of his lack of engagement and desire to attend school.
J.’s Previous Hospitalizations
12J. has attended the hospital on several occasions in the past. I was not informed of the reasons for most. He has either gone by himself or asked to be taken there by group home staff. However, he typically grows impatient waiting to be assessed and will often leave before an assessment can occur.
13His most recent extended hospital admissions occurred in August and September 2025. Both admissions were involuntary. J. was 11 years old at the time of both admissions.
14During both admissions, J.’s treating psychiatrist was Dr. Mohamed Khoodoruth.
15While the reason for J.’s admission to hospital in August 2025 was not made clear, he was admitted in September 2025 for the purpose of addressing symptoms of his withdrawal from cannabis, which manifested as anxiety, tremors, irritability, and sleep deprivation.
16During the admissions, Ms. Behruz communicated regularly with the hospital, advocating for J. to receive support and treatment. She also participated in discharge planning discussions with the hospital staff.
17When the withdrawal symptoms of September 2025 had been addressed through a combination of the passage of time and medication to calm him as he withdrew, J. wanted to be discharged.
18J.’s pending discharge sparked a discussion between Society staff and Dr. Khoodoruth about whether J. could remain in the hospital.
19When Dr. Khoodoruth informed Society staff that J. was to be discharged because he had no acute medical or psychiatric care needs and did not meet the requirements of the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, for an involuntary hospital admission, he was asked if he could recommend an “alternate level of care” (ALC) bed for J. An admission to an ALC bed would have allowed J. to remain in the hospital without necessarily needing medical care. Dr. Khoodoruth declined the request. He was also concerned that J. would deteriorate if he remained in the hospital.
20Cross-examined about this meeting, Ms. Behruz acknowledged that the conversation had to be redirected from the difficulties being faced by the Society in finding a suitable placement for J. In her acknowledgement, Ms. Behruz added that the hospital staff with whom she spoke misunderstood the nature of the unlicensed group home in which J. is currently residing.
21The differences of opinion between Ms. Behruz and Dr. Khoodoruth were that Ms. Behruz was of the view that J. would be safer in the hospital than in the community, while Dr. Khoodoruth’s position was that hospitalization cannot be a remedy for Society placement problems.
22Ms. Behruz acknowledged that, during the meeting, Dr. Khoodoruth and staff were told that the Society was exploring an application to place J. in a secure treatment program as one of several placement options being considered.
The Society’s Current Conundrum about J.
23At present, according to Ms. Behruz, there are few services being provided to J. She described his behaviours as continuing to decline.
24In an effort to obtain help with services for J., Ms. Behruz ensured that a completed referral package was sent by the Society to the Community Services Coordination Network (CSCN), a local organization that coordinates services and supports for children and youth. However, because J. is in the extended care of the Society, he does not qualify for special needs funding.
25Ms. Behruz also ensured that the application for J.’s admission to Syl Apps was completed and remitted to Syl Apps in July 2025.
Law
26As Justice V.A. Starr wrote in McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R., [2019] O.J. No. 3628, an often-cited precedent for cases in which a secure treatment order is sought:
8 Subsection 161(1) of the Act grants the Court the power to order a child be committed to a secure treatment program where the Court is satisfied that all six of the criteria outlined in subsection 164(1) of the Act have been met. The six criteria set out in that section are as follows:
164 (1) The court may order that a child be committed to a secure treatment program only where the court is satisfied that,
(a) the child has a mental disorder;
(b) the child has, as a result of the mental disorder, within the 45 days immediately preceding,
(i) the application under subsection 161 (1),
(ii) the child's detention or custody under the Child Criminal Justice Act (Canada) or under the Provincial Offences Act, or
(iii) the child's admission to a psychiatric facility under the Mental Health Act as an involuntary patient,
caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm to themself or another person;
(c) the child has,
(i) within the 12 months immediately preceding the application, but on another occasion than that referred to in clause (b), caused, attempted to cause or by words or conduct made a substantial threat to cause serious bodily harm to themself or another person, or
(ii) in committing the act or attempt referred to in clause (b), caused or attempted to cause a person's death;
(d) the secure treatment program would be effective to prevent the child from causing or attempting to cause serious bodily harm to themself or another person;
(e) treatment appropriate for the child's mental disorder is available at the place of secure treatment to which the application relates; and
(f) no less restrictive method of providing treatment appropriate for the child's mental disorder is appropriate in the circumstances.
26 Taking all of the foregoing into account along with the guiding principles this court summarized at paragraph 20 of its decision in Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences v. C.S.,1 the following emerge as the key guiding principles with respect to how the court is to safeguard against the arbitrary loss of a young person's liberty in the context of secure treatment applications, be they applications of first instance or applications to extend the committal:
The loss of a young person's liberty is a very serious matter. Decisions that have the potential of resulting in such a loss are not to be made arbitrarily;
An order committing a child to secure treatment is to be considered as a remedy of last resort.
The applicant bears the onus to demonstrate why the young person should be (or continue to be) committed to a secure program against the child's wishes;
To fulfill its onus the applicant must:
a. adduce clear, logical, and convincing evidence establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that each and every one of the five criteria has been met;
b. direct evidence from the psychiatrist whose opinion evidence resulted in the child's admission;
The court cannot make a ruling on the basis of a summary procedure. It is the applicant's obligation to lead oral evidence, and the child is entitled to test that evidence.
The evidentiary standard on such applications is that the evidence must be trial worthy. It is not permissible to lead or rely on inadmissible hearsay or on hearsay opinion evidence given only in written form.
The court is required to review the evidence with respect to each criterion carefully and exhaustively; and be satisfied that the preponderance of evidence with respect to each of the criteria supports a finding that the particular criteria has been established;
The court may only make an order committing, or extending the committal, where it is satisfied that all of the criteria in subsection 164(1) (secure treatment applications) and s. 167(1) (extension applications) have been met.
The court retains the discretion to decline to make a committal order, even in cases where all of the criteria have been met.
Criterion #1
s. 164(1)(a) – the child has a mental disorder
27The CYFSA defines a “mental disorder” in s. 157 as “a substantial disorder of emotional processes, thought or cognition which grossly impairs a person’s capacity to make reasoned judgments.”
28An Applicant must establish that this criterion has been met by clear, logical, and convincing evidence.
Evidence of Dr. Mohamed Khoodoruth
29Dr. Khoodoruth is an Assistant Professor at the Schulich School of Medicine at Western University in London, Ontario and an Assistant Professor of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry London Health Sciences Centre (LHSC). He obtained his medical degree in 2014, became a resident in psychiatry at Hamad Medical Corporation in Doha, Qatar in 2017 and the chief resident in psychiatry there in 2021. He has been certified by the Royal College of Psychiatrists in the United Kingdom since 2021 and by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario since 2025. He has been a member of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry since 2023. He has authored or co-authored several peer-reviewed articles covering a number of topics in the field of psychiatry, including neurodevelopmental disorders.
30He was qualified as a participating expert in child and adolescent psychiatry, and the diagnosis and treatment of conditions commonly presented by children and adolescents requiring psychiatric care.
31During the questioning of Dr. Khoodoruth about his qualifications, he indicated that one of his duties as a treating psychiatrist is to identify when there is a need for a patient to access a facility offering secure treatment, which he described as “intensive behavioural shaping that takes place in a protected locked environment.”
32Speaking of J.’s involuntary admissions to hospital in August and September 2025, Dr. Khoodoruth testified that the unit to which J. had been admitted at LHSC on both occasions was the psychiatric intensive care unit (PICU), which is a locked ward for persons up to 18 years of age.
33He further clarified that, while J. had been discharged from LHSC on both occasions, it was because there was then no acute medical reason to keep him there. It did not mean, however, that J. no longer required treatment.
34According to Dr. Khoodoruth, when he first treated J., he and his team conducted a clinical assessment which included interviews with J., during which he discussed some of his behaviours. Dr. Khoodoruth said the main example of what J. told him that he found quite concerning was how J. obtained substances such as cannabis. J. reported that he has to steal items from stores to give to the supplier of the cannabis as payment for the substance provided. Dr. Khoodoruth also said that J. disclosed that he had put himself at risk by engaging in some sort of sexual activity which was not described by Dr. Khoodoruth.
35Other sources considered by Dr. Khoodoruth when conducting his clinical assessment of J. included:
a) J.’s presentation;
b) J.’s behaviour in the unit, both as observed by him and as reported by staff;
c) information received from J.’s family doctor;
d) reports received from J.’s care providers; and
e) information learned from a prior admission to LHSC.
36A urine toxicology screen was also performed which showed that J. had cannabis in his system at the times of admission.
37Asked to describe J.’s community behaviours that he considered in arriving at a diagnosis, he cited a history of J. reportedly engaging in escalating violent and self-injurious behaviours at the group home where he was residing. The violence was said to consist of lashing out at others and thereby creating safety issues. He also cited J.’s repeated incidents of running away from the group home.
38He further described J.’s behaviours in the hospital as including being agitated in the unit, kicking doors, punching walls, and banging his head on the walls. These, he testified, are behaviours which are all connected with elevated risk. When given the opportunity to leave the unit for fresh air or a snack from a Tim Horton’s located in the hospital, J., instead, ran away.
39Having regard to the information available to him from the various sources cited and the clinical observations of J. by himself and others, Dr. Khoodoruth diagnosed J. with having multiple psychiatric conditions, or comorbidities. He labelled J.’s overall diagnosis as a complex neurodevelopmental disorder.
40As Dr. Khoodoruth explained, J. was born with a neurodevelopmental disorder. He described the addition of the modifier “complex” to a condition as being like describing a tumor as being malignant. It is an added vulnerability. Complexity arises from such factors as depression, aggression, and conduct disorders.
41According to Dr. Khoodoruth, the comorbidities which comprise J.’s complex neurodevelopmental disorder consist of: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); intellectual disability; presumptive fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD); developmental trauma; conduct disorder; and cannabis use disorder.
42Dr. Khoodoruth described the clinical features of each of these conditions as follows:
ADHD: The primary feature is a deficit in J.’s attention span, with J. presenting with difficulty concentrating and engaging in impulsive actions.
Intellectual disability: This affects J.’s planning skills, judgment, and adaptive skills.
Presumptive FASD: This results from an in-utero exposure to substances. FASD has been linked to cognitive and behavioural challenges.
Developmental trauma: This arises from adverse childhood experiences. It can affect emotional regulation and has an impact on trust issues.
Conduct disorder: For J., this is manifested by his disregard for house rules, safety, and the rights of others. The term “conduct disorder” is used for persons under the age of 18. For adults, it would be called “antisocial personality disorder.” Adults with antisocial personality disorder are at high risk for assaults, homicides, and suicides.
Cannabis use disorder: This was diagnosed because J. frequently uses cannabis, having begun its use at age 9. The frequent use of cannabis equates to a use disorder.
43Asked if the conditions which with which J. has been diagnosed can impair his judgment, Dr. Khoodoruth responded that they do, “significantly.”
44He explained that young persons with complex ADHD or complex FASD lack capacity to foresee consequences. The frontal lobe of their brains is affected by these conditions. In humans, the frontal lobe plays a role in “executive functioning.” It is the component of the brain which helps people adhere to social norms, follow the rules, organize thoughts, and control their impulses.
45Asked how J.’s conditions affect his ability to recognize and avoid danger, Dr. Khoodoruth explained that because J. cannot plan things sequentially due to his frontal lobe deficiencies, he constantly puts himself at risk. He referred to the issue as being one of cause (a mental disorder which precludes planning and forethought) and effect (the risks that exist because of impulsive acts).
46He described J.’s mental state while in the hospital as being at the “threat” stage on the “fight or flight” response scale. He explained that this was why J. would run from the hospital. He felt cornered. However, he ran without thinking ahead about such things as his need for food or clothing, or other items that might help him survive away from the hospital.
47Dr. Khoodoruth rated as high both J.’s risk of seriously harming himself or inflicting serious bodily harm to others, given his constellation of developmental challenges.
48Asked what it was about the diagnosed conditions in J. that contribute to the risks being rated as high, Dr. Khoodoruth explained that J. was in an exaggerated state of “fight or flight” which, coupled with his inability to foresee danger, places him at risk of accidental self-harm, such as being struck by a car if he were to remain on the run from the hospital.
49Dr. Khoodoruth also pointed to a reported history of J. setting fires as being dangerous to himself and elevating the risk to persons around him.
50Asked about J.’s use of cannabis, Dr. Khoodoruth indicated that, because J.’s cognitive capacity is reduced, it is unlikely that he is able to anticipate the risks of using cannabis which, purchased illegally, typically has an unknown concentration of THC. This leads to both a risk of overdosing and, in persons under the age of 20 years who, like J., have “fragile” brains, drug induced psychosis. This result, he reported, is commonly seen in the psychiatric unit at LHSC.
51Cross-examined by Ms. Dragila, Dr. Khoodoruth acknowledged that he could not quantify the severity of J.’s intellectual disability because he does not have data addressing that issue. He added that it was not uncommon for a young person with FASD to have reduced cognitive capacities. He cited the inability of J. to do the types of math questions usually faced by 12-year-old students.
52He also indicated, in responding to Ms. Dragila’s questions, that he is not an expert in FASD, although it is categorized as a neurodevelopmental disorder. Comparatively, there is much more research into ADHD and other neurodevelopmental disorders.
Analysis
53While Ms. Dragila pointed to Dr. Khoodoruth’s acknowledgements that he is not an expert in FASD and that he is unable to quantify the severity of J.’s intellectual disability, she did not otherwise challenge the submissions made by Ms. Welch that J. has a mental disorder. She was right not to do so.
54She accepted Dr. Khoodoruth’s academic qualifications and did not challenge him being qualified to testify as a participating expert. Her limited but focused cross-examination left Dr. Khoodoruth’s opinions unscathed.
55His evidence clearly established that the constellation of disorders which afflict J. are substantial. They are “complex.”
56Collectively, they impair his emotional processes, including by:
a) leaving him with a heightened “fight or flight” response;
b) causing him not to trust others; and
c) making him unable to adhere to social norms.
57J.’s thoughts and cognition are seriously impaired because of the deficiencies in his frontal lobe, which are the result of, at least, his presumptive FASD and his intellectual impairment, both of which have been present since birth. His use of cannabis further impairs both his thoughts and cognition and can lead to drug-induced psychosis, which would undoubtedly impair his thoughts and cognition.
58Taken alone or together, they impair J.’s capacity to make reasoned judgments. This was demonstrated when he ran away from LHSC because he could, even while being treated.
59I am satisfied that the Society has established the criterion under s. 164(1)(a).
Criteria #2 and #3
s. 164(1)(b) – As a result of his mental disorder, the child has caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person within the 45 days immediately preceding the Application
s. 164(1)(c) – Within 12 months immediately preceding the Application, but on another occasion than the one described in Criterion #2, the child has caused, attempted to cause or by words or conduct made a substantial threat to cause serious bodily harm to themself or another person
60I am considering these two criteria together because both deal with actions or words tied to serious bodily harm. The two criteria, however, are not identical, and each will be analyzed according to the language in the statute that applies to that criterion.
61The application in this matter is dated February 20, 2026. The 45-day period referred to in criterion #2 lies, therefore, between January 6, 2026 and February 20, 2026.
62The evidence offered by the Society in support of the establishment of these two criteria was provided by a number of different support workers who work at the unlicensed group home in which J. and the other young person reside.
63Despite Justice Tobin leaving it open to the Society to rely upon more than one event to satisfy criterion #3, as evidenced by the terms of his endorsement dated February 27, 2026, the Society relies on a single event in respect of each of the two criteria. However, in respect of the third criterion, Ms. Welch suggests that it must be looked at “in context.”
The 45-day incident
64Society counsel Ms. Welch called four witnesses to testify about an event that occurred at or about 12:15 a.m. on January 10, 2026 at the group home where J. and one other child reside.
65The witnesses were Oludele Jiboku, James Adu, Simran Kaur, and Simon Durojaye. All four are employed by Bluewater Respite Services and all were working at the time of the event. All four were located in the living room/dining room area of the residence when the event relied upon by the Society occurred.
66While there were slight variations in what they described, the core of the evidence of each was consistent.
67At or about the time noted above, J. returned to the residence. With his return, both residents were in the building. The other resident was in his own room.
68At some point after his return, J. approached one of the workers, other than Mr. Jiboku, and tapped that worker twice on the head. He was asked to stop. He then approached Mr. Jiboku, who was seated, and began to tap Mr. Jiboku on the head. Mr. Jiboku asked him to stop. J. responded that he was entitled to do what he was doing because Mr. Jiboku was his worker, which he was.
69After continuing to tap Mr. Jiboku on the head for several minutes, and being asked, then told, to stop, J. became angry and went upstairs to his room. According to Ms. Kaur, J. called Mr. Jiboku a derogatory word as he went up the stairs.
70A short while later, J. came down the stairs carrying something in his hand. It was a shard of glass described, variously, as being “about the size of a short ruler” and “about the size of a new pencil.” It was described as being curved to some extent and came to a point or near point. All four witnesses described it as being sharp along all edges.
71J. approached Mr. Jiboku and, according to Mr. Jiboku, said words to the effect of, “Olu, I will stab you, bro.” One of the other witnesses, Mr. Durojaye, said that J. threatened to “hit” Mr. Jiboku.
72Both Ms. Kaur and Mr. Durojaye testified that J. spoke to Mr. Jiboku in an angry tone.
73Regardless, J. was holding the glass in his bare hand as if holding a knife while standing near the seated Mr. Jiboku. There was no evidence that he moved nearer to Mr. Jiboku while holding the shard of glass than he had been when he said that he “will stab” Mr. Jiboku.
74In response to J.’s statement, Mr. Jiboku, who remained calm, either crossed or raised his leg while remaining seated, thus leaving J. looking at the sole of Mr. Jiboku’s boot.
75J. thereupon touched the bottom of Mr. Jiboku’s boot with the shard of glass. According to Mr. Jiboku, J. put no pressure on his boot when the shard of glass made contact with the sole of the boot.
76It appears that at some point the other resident came downstairs and was witness to this event, although not all witnesses were consistent on this point.
77While these events were occurring, one of the witnesses, Ms. Kaur, called 911 on her cell phone from outside of the residence, having also taken the other resident, whom she was supporting, out of the building with her.
78As Ms. Kaur was outside the residence, the other staff members were speaking to J. in an effort to calm him because he appeared to be upset. According to Mr. Durojaye, J. was indifferent to their efforts.
79When the sound of sirens caused J. to conclude that the police might be approaching the residence, he quicky ran upstairs to his room in an effort to hide the shard of glass. He was coming back down the stairs when the police entered the residence. They went to his room and, after a brief search, located the shard of glass. J. was removed from the residence.
80Ms. Kaur and Mr. Adu testified that the incident had frightened them. Ms. Kaur also expressed fear for the other resident’s safety.
81During the cross-examination of the witnesses by Ms. Dragila, each agreed that none of them, nor J. nor the other resident, had been physically harmed or injured as a result of J.’s actions during this event.
The 12-month event
82David Folorunsho is a developmental services worker employed by Bluewater Respite Services. He works at the unlicensed Society group home in London where J. is one of two residents. He usually supports J.
83On December 28, 2025, J. had been away from the group home for a period. After his return, he was the only resident in the building.
84After entering the residence, he initially socialized with the on-duty staff members in the kitchen. Because he told them that he was hungry, they began to prepare something for him to eat. After taking his medication, he excused himself to use the washroom.
85While in the washroom, J. started a fire with a lighter that he had brought into the residence. After doing so, he exited the washroom, locking the door as he did.
86On returning to the kitchen, J. began to joke with the staff members present. He said nothing to them about the fire that he had started.
87While in the kitchen after his return from the washroom, he was asked to empty his pockets to ensure that he had no contraband on him. This was part of a protocol that had been developed for when J. returned from the community. J. willingly complied. A staff member other than Mr. Folorunsho took possession of the lighter.
88A short time later, Mr. Folorunsho smelled a strong order coming from elsewhere in the residence. He quickly realized that it might be from a fire. He ran upstairs to the washroom which had been used by J. He tried to open the door but could not do so because it was locked.
89He shouted for one of his co-workers to call 911 and for another to retrieve a fire extinguisher. He ran to the basement and retrieved a tool, then ran back to the washroom. He was able to unlock the door with the tool.
90He then entered the washroom carrying the fire extinguisher and discharged it to extinguish the fire in the washroom. He did not indicate to what extent the room was damaged or how large the fire was that he extinguished.
91After extinguishing the fire, Ms. Folorunsho exited the building, where J. and the other staff members were located. Police and firefighters arrived on the scene.
92Mr. Folorunsho asked J. why he had set the fire. His response was that he “just felt like setting the house on fire.” J. was smiling as he spoke with Mr. Folorunsho.
93Asked if he was concerned for his own safety, Mr. Folorunsho responded, “only in the moment” before noting that he is “trained for incidents like this” and that “things do happen.”
94He also reported, when asked, that J. was not at risk during the incident because he had been downstairs when Mr. Folorunsho confronted the fire.
95Asked by Ms. Welch, Mr. Folorunsho reported that this was not the first time that J. had set a fire at the group home. Because of an objection by Ms. Dragila that any expansion of Mr. Folorunsho’s evidence would place the Society in breach of Justice Tobin’s disclosure order, because none relating to other alleged fires had been disclosed by the Society, I did not allow any questions about the other fires mentioned by Mr. Folorunsho.
Analysis: Criterion #2
96The key components of this criterion are:
a) within the 45 days immediately preceding the Application;
b) the child has caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person; and
c) he did so as a result of his mental disorder.
97The event on which the Society relies did fall within the relevant 45-day window.
98Because J. did not cause serious bodily harm to either himself or anyone else, the Society must establish on clear, logical, and convincing evidence that J. “attempted to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person.”
99Justice Spence made clear in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M.O that criterion #2 can be satisfied by an attempt and that serious bodily harm need not be proven, writing:
49 However, criteria #2 does not require the court to find that SA actually caused serious bodily harm to herself or to another person. Rather, it is sufficient to find that she attempted to cause such harm.
100There was no evidence suggesting that, while holding the shard of glass in his hand, J. did anything that could lead one to conclude that he attempted to cause serious bodily harm to himself.
101That leaves for consideration whether J. attempted to cause serious bodily harm to Mr. Jiboku, with whom he interacted while holding the glass, or any of the other persons in the group home at the time of this incident.
102There was no evidence that J. interacted with any of the persons in the group home at the time other than Mr. Jiboku, to whom he said that he “will stab” him.
103However, the evidence shows only that, when Mr. Jiboku crossed his leg and presented the sole of his boot to J., J. used the glass to lightly touch the sole of Mr. Jiboku’s boot, without the slightest application of pressure.
104There was no evidence of what transpired between J. and Mr. Jiboku after that. What is clearly not in evidence is any suggestion that J. directed any action toward, or even more closely approached, Mr. Jiboku after that.
105The Divisional Court considered the meaning of “attempt” at paragraph 64 of its decision in A.R.P. v. Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex, [2024] O.J. No. 3216, where it wrote:
64 The error in the trial judge's analysis is that in order to find that she attempted to cause serious bodily harm the child must have taken some action in furtherance of her intent. In oral submissions, the OCL referred to the dictionary definition of "intent" in the Merriam Webster Dictionary, which defines "intent" as "intention or purpose" or "resolved or determined to do something." Attempt, on the other hand, is defined as "the act or an instance of trying to do or accomplish something." The CAS acknowledged, in oral submissions, that to constitute an "attempt" under Criterion 2, there had to be the requisite intent and there had to be evidence that the child acted in furtherance of that intent….
106While one could suggest that, by touching Mr. Jiboku’s boot after telling him that he “will” be “stab[bed],” J. was taking an action in furtherance of his intent to stab Mr. Jiboku, I hold that the nature of the alleged attempt must align with the alleged intent. That is, if the intent is to cause serious bodily harm, the attempt must be such that, had it succeeded, serious bodily harm more likely than not would have resulted.
107In this case, even if J. had such an intent, his “attempt” in furtherance of that intent, which consisted of only lightly touching the sole of Mr. Jiboku’s boot, can hardly be said to be an attempt to cause Mr. Jiboku “serious bodily harm.”
108In McMaster Children’s Hospital Justice Starr discussed the difference between bodily harm and serious bodily harm as follows:
70…By drawing a distinction between bodily harm and serious bodily harm, the legislature reinforces its intention that only severe circumstances justify secure treatment. To be serious, the harm must be "not trifling or superficial" (Niagara). For example, courts have indicated that cuts that require stitches are "serious". Cuts that do not require stitches are, on the other hand, likely not serious [See: Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region v HP, supra, at para 36].
109In Re JA (An Infant), 1989 3135 (ON PROVCT), [1989] O.J. No. 1668 (Ont. Prov. Ct., Family Div.), Justice Spence wrote the following about serious bodily harm:
39 … I think that what is required under Section 113 [now s. 164] is conduct that is not trifling; I also believe that it is conduct that is something more than minor assaults or nuisances. What is required is also more than an assault that causes bodily harm. The word "serious" has to have some significance.
110In that case, assaults consisting of: hitting a male staff member; kicking another in the shins; pulling the hair of a worker; scratching another worker's hand; kicking a worker in the stomach area; biting a worker on the knee; and punching a worker in the arm, none of whom required medical attention, did not rise to the level of causing serious bodily harm.
111J.’s assault, while done while holding a shard of glass, did not even rise to the level of violence mentioned by Justice Spence. Thus, without more violent acts on his part that, if successful, might have led to Mr. Jiboku suffering serious bodily harm, I find that J. did not, in the circumstances, attempt to cause bodily harm to Mr. Jiboku.
112As for the words spoken by J. to Mr. Jiboku – that he “will stab” him – such words constituted a threat. The Divisional Court held in A.R.P. v. Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex, again at paragraph 64, that "At most, it was a "threat", which is defined in the same dictionary as ‘an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage.’ As already noted, threats are not sufficient to satisfy Criterion 2.”
113Lest one think that this analysis lets J. off lightly, it is important to recall why a strict interpretation of the statute’s requirements is necessary. As Justice Starr wrote at paragraph 70 of McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R., “By drawing a distinction between bodily harm and serious bodily harm, the legislature reinforces its intention that only severe circumstances justify secure treatment.”
114I do not regard what J. did during the evening of January 10, 2026 as an example of a “severe circumstance.”
115Had I needed to go further, I would have found that J.’s impulsive act that evening, while not constituting an attempt to cause serious bodily harm, was a result of his mental disorder, a hallmark of which is an impulsive act without forethought about consequences.
116The Society’s application fails to satisfy criterion #2. While that is sufficient to dispose of the application, I will also address criterion #3 since the Society called evidence about an event that it claims also justifies J. being locked up for treatment.
Analysis: Criterion #3
117The key components of this criterion are:
a) within 12 months preceding the application, but on an occasion different than that relied on for the 45-day period criterion
b) the child has caused, attempted to cause or by words or conduct made a substantial threat to cause serious bodily harm to themself or another person.
118There is no doubt that the temporal component of this criterion has been met.
119The real issue is whether, in setting the bathroom on fire in the group home on December 28, 2025, J. “caused, attempted to cause or by words or conduct made a substantial threat to cause serious bodily harm to [himself] or another person.”
120The evidence shows that his act did not cause serious bodily harm to himself or anyone else.
121It also shows that J. did not, by words, make a substantial threat to cause serious bodily harm to himself or anyone else.
122The questions to be answered then become:
a) Did J.’s act of setting the fire constitute an attempt to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person?
b) In setting the fire, was J. by conduct making a substantial threat to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person?
123It is firstly noted that this criterion makes no connection to J.’s mental disorder and the setting of the fire.
124As Justice Starr wrote at paragraph 69 of McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R, this criterion’s “purpose is to show either, that the event relied on in subsection (b) is not an isolated incident; or, that the behaviour relied on in subsection (b) was so severe that the child caused, or attempted to cause another person's death.”
125Since the Society’s purpose was not to show that the event of January 10, 2026 was so severe that J. caused or attempted to cause the death of Mr. Jiboku, it must have been tendered to show that the event of January 10, 2026 was not an isolated incident.
126To that point, while the incident of January 10, 2026 cannot be said to have been isolated, given that of December 28, 2025, they were vastly different from one another.
127In my view, J.’s intent or purpose in setting the fire on December 28, 2025 is important to answering the two questions above.
128At paragraph 86 of McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R, Justice Starr wrote:
86 Turning to the question of intent to cause serious bodily harm. Evidence of specific intent is not the standard to apply in every case. There may be some cases (and this is one of them) where evidence of general intent will be sufficient. To put it more plainly, in some cases it will be necessary to demonstrate that the child intended the precise harm or result; in others, evidence that the child intended the act that caused the harm or result, will be enough. The degree or type of intent required may depend on such considerations as the nature of the causal connection, whether the child knew or ought to have known that her actions would or could cause serious bodily harm to herself or another person, and the child's mental disorder.
129In this case, the harm that was caused was property damage – a bathroom damaged by fire.
130One might infer that J. intended to cause serious bodily harm to the other persons in the group home on December 18, 2025 because he said nothing to them about the fire. That, however, would require one to conclude that he knew that they would be harmed by the fire before they could escape it.
131There is no evidence of that and, based on the evidence of Dr. Khoodoruth, I find it unlikely that he was capable of making the connection between the lighting of a fire in the bathroom and the stages and parts of the residence through which it would need to pass before it became dangerous enough to put at risk the lives or health of the other persons with him in the residence.
132Such a connection might have been easier to draw if he had locked the exit doors to the house than just the bathroom door.
133His silence also suggests that he was not, by setting the fire, intending to make a substantial threat to cause serious bodily injury to the others present. The evidence supporting that conclusion lies in J.’s response when he was asked why he set the fire. He responded that he “just felt like setting the house on fire.” That was his intent. He expressed no thought of harming the others. Setting the house on fire and watching the ensuing excitement was likely his goal. His mental disorder precluded thought beyond that.
134That someone could have suffered serious bodily injury was a potential consequence of his action, but the section addresses cause, not result.
135To that point, the answer to the first question posed above, based on the evidence, would be: J.’s act of setting the fire could have resulted in serious bodily harm to himself or another person. That, however, would have been, for him, an unintended consequence of setting the house on fire.
136In McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R, a case dealing with a young person with a long history of attempting to kill herself, advertently and inadvertently, because of her eating disorder, Justice Starrr held that a failed attempt to consume windshield washer fluid because the lid was still on it when she put it to her mouth could still support a conclusion that she had an intent to cause serious bodily injury to herself at the time.
137This is the “contextual argument” raised by Ms. Welch. She wants me to leverage the bare evidence that J. had previously set fires at the house to conclude that he knew and intended that the fire that he set on December 28, 2025 constituted an attempt to cause serious bodily injury to himself or the others in the house.
138The argument would have had more force were I to have been provided with specific evidence about the other fires, including the number, the circumstances under which they were set, what was burned, and most significantly, what, if anything, J. had been told about the dangers to others of setting fires in an occupied residence.
139In the absence of all of that information, I cannot draw the conclusion that Ms. Welch requested.
140Moreover, given J.’s stated intention in setting the fire, it seems apparent that what he really wanted to do was watch the house burn. In other words, to damage property. It is clear from the language of the statute that damaging or intending to damage property is not sufficient to warrant a committal to secure treatment. (Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. T.M., [2022] O.J. No. 5289)
141In the result, I find that the Society has also failed to establish criterion #3.
142Consequently, because the Society has not established these two criteria, I am left with no option but to dismiss its application.
143For the benefit of the parties and the witnesses, however, I will briefly review the other criteria.
Criterion #4:
s. 164(1)(d) – the secure treatment program would be effective to prevent the child from causing or attempting to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person
144The difficulty that is posed in this case by criterion #4 is that its focus is on the effectiveness of the proposed treatment program at “preventing” a subject child from “from causing or attempting to cause serious bodily harm to himself or another person.”
145Having found that J. did not do either, I cannot conclude that this criterion has been met.
146In recommending J.’s committal to Syl Apps, Dr. Khoodoruth had explained that what J. needs most, and first, is to be followed by primary care providers who will ensure that he takes his medications. He described it as a case of being proactive rather reactive in addressing the consequences of J.M.’s various behaviours.
147Dr, Khoodoruth’s evidence was that the security offered by Syl Apps is “necessary to sustainable long-term treatment for J.”
148In reaching that conclusion, Dr. Khoodoruth had dismissed J.’s group home as a place for him to remain while being treated, indicating that the lack of staff resources would impede any chance of J. progressing in treatment. He could not foresee group home staff regularly ensuring that J. would take his medications. With J. regularly running away, his medication regimen would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain, thus undermining a key component of his treatment.
149It is therefore clear that Dr. Khoodoruth was primarily concerned that J. be placed in a controlled environment to give treatment a meaningful chance of success. However, in the absence of the precursor behaviours required by criteria #2 and #3, that would be the only reason for sending J. to Syl Apps.
150As Justice Starr wrote in Ontario Shores:
35 The requirement that the court make a finding that the secure treatment program would be effective in preventing the youth from causing or attempting to cause such harm, is likewise a signal that the youth cannot be committed to just any program. If he is to be committed to a secure treatment program the program must be equipped with the type of services required to prevent him from causing or attempting to cause serious bodily harm to himself or others. If it is not, then the underlying purpose of preventing serious bodily harm is unattainable. Then the youth's committal to that particular program and consequent loss of liberty, unjustified.
151To this I add, if a child such as J. has not been shown to have caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury to himself or others, the underlying purpose of preventing serious bodily harm is unattainable. As a result, the committal of that child to a secure treatment program, with its consequent loss of liberty, is equally unjustified.
152In the result, I would have found that the Society had failed to satisfy criterion #4.
Criterion #5:
s. 164(1)(e) – treatment appropriate for the child's mental disorder is available at the place of secure treatment to which the application relates
153Dr, Khoodoruth described the available treatments for patients such as J. as consisting of talk therapy, medication, and a combination of the two.
154One of the goals of talk therapy would be to address J.’s heightened “fight or flight” response. Because J. often believes that he is being cornered, a part of talk therapy would be to work on helping him develop coping skills to manage such feelings.
155Dr. Khoodoruth listed some therapies which, in his opinion, would be helpful to J. They were:
a) trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy, which he described as “therapy focused on the relationship between thoughts, emotions, and behaviour,” with a focus on “how trauma factors into one’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviours;.” and
b) dialectical behavioural therapy, which, in J.’s case, would focus on how to avoid a fully explosive reaction to events and aim for a lesser reaction.
156Two key aspects of J.’s medication treatment, according to Dr. Khoodoruth, were:
a) ensuring that J. actually takes his medications, something that he doubted J. could do, responsibly, two or three times per day, without prompting, because the lack of executive functioning in his frontal lobe; and
b) the active follow-up by staff to ensure that J. is being prescribed the proper doses of his medications.
157Lastly, Dr. Khoodoruth testified that, by being in secure treatment, J. would lose his access to cannabis. He testified that some studies have provided evidence that the use of substances such a cannabis can interfere with the effectiveness of treating medications in youths who abuse drugs.
158The evidence of Mr. McNamee was that, if committed to Syl Apps’ secure treatment program, the physical layout, resources and staffing of which he fully described, J. would, first be stabilized in the environment, and undergo a psychiatric and medication assessment.
159Based on his understanding that J. has limited insight into how his interactions with others affect them, Mr. McNamee said that a cognitive behavioural approach would be taken with J. to work on this issue.
160He also said that, working with the Halton Board of education, efforts would be made to reintegrate J. back into the school program which the school Board operates on site at Syl Apps.
161Being in a locked environment, J. would be denied access to a lighter and matches and would be initially placed on a 1:1 basis with a worker.
162The nurse practitioner and a psychiatrist would manage J.’s substance abuse and withdrawal after they performed an assessment about how to best address those issues.
163J.’s tendency to go AWOL would be curbed by the fact that the facility is locked.
164While I am satisfied that treatment appropriate for J.’s mental disorder is available at Syl Apps, it is apparent that its goal would be to address, lessen or eliminate the “challenges which cause J. to be aggressive in his interactions with staff and peers,” as it was phrased by Mr. McNamee.
165As with criterion #4, it seems that criterion #5 hinges on the child about whom committal to Syl Apps’ secure treatment program is sought hinges on him or her having engaged in the type of behaviour identified in criteria #2 and #3.
166Apart from that important factor, there seems little doubt that J. would benefit from the services and treatment offered at Syl Apps. However, those other criteria have not been satisfied.
167However, had they been, I would have found that the Society had established “treatment appropriate for [J.’s] mental disorder is available” at Syl Apps.
Criterion #6:
no less restrictive method of providing treatment appropriate for the child's mental disorder is appropriate in the circumstances
168The criterion addresses the absence, in the circumstances, of an appropriate, less restrictive method of providing treatment appropriate for the child's mental disorder.
169At paragraph 134 of her decision in McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R., Justice Starr addressed this factor as follows2:
134 There are at least three key guiding principles that emerge from the jurisprudence with respect to Criteria F. These are:
(a) All other treatment options outside of secure treatment have been considered and none of them have been or would be appropriate in the circumstances;
(b) The evidence must address the specific efforts that were made to exhaust all options available to support the child outside of a secure setting; and,
(c) Evidence that the child could benefit from secure treatment or that it is in the child's best interest to attend secure treatment is not sufficient.
170Justice Starr rejected the argument that the criterion will not have been met if a subject child can demonstrate that an alternate method of treatment appropriate to treat the child's mental disorder exists but is not available.
171According to Dr. Khoodoruth, some, but not all, of the treatments necessary to address J.’s mental disorder are available at LHSC. He testified that LHSC has neither the personnel numbers nor the resources that J. requires for treatment.
172He also testified that, if J. were to be kept at LHSC on an involuntary basis under the Mental Health Act, he would have regular rights to challenge his continued involuntary admissions. A successful challenge could bring the treatment to a sudden halt which, presumably would be contraindicated, which would be inappropriate for J.’s mental disorder.
173Justice Starr addressed similar issues in McMaster Children’s Hospital v. L.R, writing:
144 I reject the argument that all of the foregoing demonstrate the option of S remaining as an involuntary patient of McMaster is a less restrictive method of providing treatment appropriate for the child's mental disorder and is appropriate in the circumstances. I do so for these key reasons: First, S needs intensive long-term treatment, including intensive DBT. McMaster does not offer intensive DBT and thus, far, according to the evidence, S has not engaged in any meaningful way in what they do offer. I see no basis for concluding that she will suddenly start doing so. Further, even if McMaster offered this kind of treatment at the level S requires, there is no guarantee that S will remain an in-patient for the length of time her treatment requires.
145 To be kept there for six months or more her certificates would have to be renewed at various intervals and at each interval she would have the option of challenging them. Each time the requisite test would have to be met. Although it is true that that test is lower than on these secure treatment applications, the difference is that once the test is met in these cases and should the court fix the period at 180 days (6 months), there is no need or requirement for the applicant to prove S remains at risk to cause or attempt to cause serious bodily harm to herself. The only time the applicant will have to meet another test of that ilk is if, at the end of the committal term under this order, the applicant applies to extend it. Thus, once the order is made in these proceedings, there is no real risk that the long-term intensive treatment available at Syl Apps and which S needs will be disrupted.
146 Second and perhaps most importantly, McMaster does not offer the treatment S needs for her mental disorder at the level or intensity S requires. Dr. Couturier was very clear that when she was asked in cross-examination whether it would be possible for S to stay at McMaster long term so that she could receive the intensive treatment she needs, she said: "that is not our practice standard", meaning the standard the hospital applies to decisions about whether to continue an admission. Their standard is to medically stabilize her and once this is done and it is felt that the risk of her causing serious bodily harm to herself is no longer imminent, to discharge her.
174After reviewing other reasons favouring Syl Apps, including it offering more variety, greater programming options, and more extensive opportunities to practice skills to avoid [harmful behaviours], than are available in hospital, and Syl Apps being designed for longer terms stays which the hospital is not suited to provide, Justice Starr concluded, at paragraph 155,
155 Even if I am wrong and the hospital setting is less restrictive; it does not and cannot provide the level of treatment appropriate for S's mental disorder and self-harming behaviours.
175I again note that the issue of harmful behaviours by the subject child factored into Justice Starr’s reasoning.
176Society witness Shannon Brothers, who is the Supervisor of Placement and Permanency at the Society, responsible for securing placements for children in care, testified in great detail about the efforts that have been made to find a less restrictive placement for J. which can offer him the treatment he requires for his mental disorder. None have been located. Whenever his name comes up for consideration by 55 of the 57 possible options available to the Society, J. is turned down as a resident.
177Ms. Brothers also noted that, whereas there used to be a number of programs in London from which the Society could purchase bed spaces for children with mental health issues, those resources now must be accessed through the children’s mental health care system, leaving the Society with far fewer placement options for children in its care who have mental health issues.
178On a balance of probabilities, had all other criteria for J. to be committed to Syl Apps been satisfied in this case, I would have found that the Society had equally satisfied this criterion, based on the evidence presented at the hearing.
A Final Comment
179I must note, in closing, that J. is being failed by a society at large which claims to care about the weakest amongst us.
180I can understand why the Society brought this application and I do not criticize it for doing so.
181Had the evidence on some of the criteria been stronger, I might have ruled otherwise than I do.
182In a province as large and wealthy as Ontario, it is tragic that the Society cannot find any placement for J. where he can receive the treatment he needs for his mental disorder, regardless of whether or not he engages in the types of behaviours that must be demonstrated to be committed to Syl Apps.
183Given the evidence of Dr. Khoodoruth about J.’s impulsiveness and desire to take to the streets over remaining to be cared for, I fear that he may one day be back before the court, if not the subject of another of these applications based on more robust evidence, then as an offender or, worse, a victim.
184In the interim, in my view, it is incumbent on the provincial government to provide the Society with the resources that will allow it, as J.’s statutory parent, to secure for him the most effective treatments available, with adequate supports, to help him achieve the best outcomes that his challenging disorders will allow.
Order
The Society’s application to commit the child J.J.M. to the secure treatment program at Syl Apps is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
“Justice T. Price”
Justice T. Price
Released: March 23, 2026