Julie Lee

This endorsement resolves a preliminary objection regarding the participation of foster parents, D.T. and S.C., in a motion to add prospective kin placement D.M. and R.A. as party respondents in a child protection application.

The court examined the definition of 'hearing' under the Family Law Rules and the Courts of Justice Act, concluding that an interlocutory motion constitutes a 'hearing,' thereby entitling the foster parents to participate.

The foster parents of a nine-month-old child brought a motion to be added as parties or granted expanded participatory rights in a child protection proceeding where the Society sought society wardship.

The child had been in their care since she was three days old.

The court applied the criteria for adding parties in child protection cases and determined that adding the foster parents would prolong the proceeding, was not necessary to determine the issues, and that they did not have a legal interest at this stage.

The motion was dismissed, though the foster parents retained their statutory right to make submissions at trial.

The respondent moved to set aside a final order granting sole custody to the applicant mother, permitting relocation, and fixing child support, which was made in his absence after he was noted in default.

The court applied the three-part test for setting aside a default judgment, finding the respondent moved promptly but failed to provide a plausible explanation for his default or an arguable case on most merits.

The motion to set aside was largely dismissed, with a temporary suspension of child support obligations conditional on the respondent filing financial documentation.

The applicants brought a motion under s. 138 of the Child and Family Services Act to dispense with the respondent mother's consent to the adoption of the child, J. The child had been in the applicants' care since 10 months of age following apprehension by the Children's Aid Society due to parental drug addiction and neglect.

The biological father consented to the adoption.

The mother opposed, raising issues of access and alleging bribery, which she later withdrew.

The court granted the motion, finding it in the child's best interests, emphasizing the child's secure placement with the applicants and the speculative nature of a future relationship with the mother.

The court also clarified that access was not a justiciable issue in the adoption motion.

The moving parties, who were foster parents to three children, brought a motion to be added as party respondents in a Crown wardship application.

They wished to adopt the children, but the children's aid society preferred a kin placement with the grandmother.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not a proper case for a best interests comparison within the unresolved child protection application, and noting the foster parents' existing participatory rights under the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the applicant grandfather’s claim for access to his grandchildren under s. 21 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court considered Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and the summary judgment principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Applying the grandparent access framework from Chapman v. Chapman, the court found there was no meaningful existing relationship between the grandfather and the children and no evidence that the parents acted arbitrarily in restricting contact.

The parents were demonstrably attentive to the children’s best interests and had previously allowed limited contact before concerns arose about the grandfather’s behaviour.

The evidentiary record disclosed no genuine issue requiring a trial, and the application for access was dismissed.