Brian Doody

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of intimidation by blocking or obstructing a highway under s. 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, arising from his leadership role in the 'Freedom Convoy' protests in Ottawa.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the offence required proof of threats or violence and an intent to intimidate individuals when occurring in the context of a political protest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by reading in elements not found in the text of the provision and by treating the political protest context as a defence to otherwise criminal conduct.

The Court substituted a conviction, finding that the respondent's conduct in blocking highways to compel the government to change its COVID-19 policies satisfied all elements of the offence.

The mother appealed a trial decision placing her two children in extended society care and ordering that access for the mother, older sister, and grandmother be at the discretion of the Children's Aid Society.

The Divisional Court upheld the extended society care order, dismissing the mother's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and other errors.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding access, finding that the trial judge erred in law by delegating the determination of the type, frequency, and duration of access entirely to the Society.

The matter of access was remitted to the trial judge.

The Children's Aid Society sought a protection finding for child XR against parents ARM (mother) and DW (father) under the Child and Family Services Act, alleging risk of harm and sexual molestation due to the father's pedohebephilia and the mother's failure to protect.

The Society's application for protection of two other children was dismissed.

The court dismissed the Society's *Khan* application to admit hearsay statements from K (father's child from a prior relationship) due to lack of necessity and reliability.

However, based on an unchallenged psychological assessment of the father confirming pedohebephilia and the mother's denial of the risk, the court found XR in need of protection.

A 12-month supervision order was issued, placing XR with the mother under strict terms regarding the father's access and residence, requiring constant supervision and participation in recommended programs.

This status review application concerned the return of a child to parents with significant developmental delays under a six-month final supervision order.

The court initially declined to make the order due to concerns about parental capacity and suggested a s. 54 assessment.

After further evidence, including developmental reports and the parents' decision for Crown wardship of a subsequent child, the court granted the supervision order.

A fundamental condition was that the parents and child must reside with the paternal grandparents, whose home was noted as overcrowded and had past protection concerns.

The court emphasized the necessity of a s. 54 assessment for any future plan involving the parents living independently.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the applicant grandfather’s claim for access to his grandchildren under s. 21 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court considered Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and the summary judgment principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Applying the grandparent access framework from Chapman v. Chapman, the court found there was no meaningful existing relationship between the grandfather and the children and no evidence that the parents acted arbitrarily in restricting contact.

The parents were demonstrably attentive to the children’s best interests and had previously allowed limited contact before concerns arose about the grandfather’s behaviour.

The evidentiary record disclosed no genuine issue requiring a trial, and the application for access was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay impaired driving charges against the respondent due to a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found seven weeks of Crown delay related to disclosure and six and a half months of institutional delay, along with actual prejudice.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in characterizing the delay periods, which should have been classified as neutral inherent time requirements or defence delay.

The court also found palpable and overriding factual errors in the trial judge's assessment of prejudice, noting the respondent's own conduct caused substantial delays.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and the matter remitted for trial.