Brian Doody

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the applicant grandfather’s claim for access to his grandchildren under s. 21 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court considered Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and the summary judgment principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Applying the grandparent access framework from Chapman v. Chapman, the court found there was no meaningful existing relationship between the grandfather and the children and no evidence that the parents acted arbitrarily in restricting contact.

The parents were demonstrably attentive to the children’s best interests and had previously allowed limited contact before concerns arose about the grandfather’s behaviour.

The evidentiary record disclosed no genuine issue requiring a trial, and the application for access was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay impaired driving charges against the respondent due to a violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found seven weeks of Crown delay related to disclosure and six and a half months of institutional delay, along with actual prejudice.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in characterizing the delay periods, which should have been classified as neutral inherent time requirements or defence delay.

The court also found palpable and overriding factual errors in the trial judge's assessment of prejudice, noting the respondent's own conduct caused substantial delays.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and the matter remitted for trial.