Randolph Douglas Mills

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for damages arising from the defendants' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a home in Ilderton, Ontario.

The defendants refused to close, alleging the home was heavily saturated with cigarette smoke that was not disclosed.

The court found no reliable evidence of smoke, no representations made by the plaintiff regarding smoking, and no objectively reasonable danger posed by any smoke present.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, awarding damages of $280,612.08 plus prejudgment interest, finding no genuine issue requiring trial.

The respondent father brought a motion to strike portions of the applicant mother's affidavit and for an interim order for joint decision-making and expanded parenting time, including overnights, for their 17-month-old child.

The court struck portions of the affidavit containing improper expert opinion but excused formatting errors.

The court declined to order joint decision-making, leaving day-to-day decisions with the mother as the primary caregiver.

However, finding it in the child's best interests to foster a strong bond with the father, the court ordered a gradual expansion of the father's parenting time, culminating in alternating weekend overnights, subject to a mold inspection of his residence.

The plaintiff, a manufacturer of formic acid pest control products for honey bees, brought an action against the federal Crown alleging misfeasance in public office, negligent misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The claims arose from the Pest Management Regulatory Agency's (PMRA) decisions to permit the continued use of unregistered 65% formic acid, grant emergency use registrations for competitor products, and require the plaintiff to register its products.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action.

The court found no evidence of deliberate or unlawful conduct by PMRA officials, no intent to harm the plaintiff, and no private law duty of care owed by the regulatory agency to the plaintiff.

This status review application concerned the return of a child to parents with significant developmental delays under a six-month final supervision order.

The court initially declined to make the order due to concerns about parental capacity and suggested a s. 54 assessment.

After further evidence, including developmental reports and the parents' decision for Crown wardship of a subsequent child, the court granted the supervision order.

A fundamental condition was that the parents and child must reside with the paternal grandparents, whose home was noted as overcrowded and had past protection concerns.

The court emphasized the necessity of a s. 54 assessment for any future plan involving the parents living independently.

The plaintiff, a national human resources association, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, a provincial association that withdrew its membership, for unpaid membership levies and exam fees.

The defendant admitted the exam fees but disputed the membership levies, arguing the budget was improperly passed, and claimed a set-off for its share of the plaintiff's accumulated Members' Equity.

The court found the levies were lawfully passed but reduced the amount by 30% based on actual corporate needs.

The court dismissed the defendant's claim for set-off, finding that neither legal nor equitable set-off applied because the plaintiff's Board of Directors had not taken action to allocate or distribute the Members' Equity.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision declaring that the respondent landowners could enforce a 1953 agreement in which the municipality agreed to perpetually maintain a storm sewer drainage system.

The municipality argued the claim was statute-barred because previous landowners had accepted its anticipatory repudiation of the agreement by their inaction, and that the respondents lacked privity of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that mere inaction does not constitute acceptance of a repudiatory breach.

Furthermore, the respondents had standing to enforce the agreement as successors in title under the agreement's enurement clause and the principled exception to the privity of contract doctrine.

Two shareholders of a hotel holding company each sought oppression relief following a complete breakdown in their business relationship.

The court had previously found that neither party validly invoked the buy‑sell clause in the shareholders’ agreement and that the parties could no longer operate the business together.

The issue was the appropriate court‑ordered mechanism to separate the shareholders.

The court ordered an independent valuation of the holding company and directed the majority shareholder to purchase the minority shareholder’s interest without a minority discount, together with repayment of the minority shareholder’s loan plus interest calculated under the shareholders’ agreement.

Costs were awarded to the majority shareholder as the substantially successful party.

Two shareholders of a hotel holding company each sought oppression relief following a complete breakdown in their business relationship.

The court had previously found that neither party validly invoked the buy‑sell clause in the shareholders’ agreement and that the parties could no longer operate the business together.

The issue was the appropriate court‑ordered mechanism to separate the shareholders.

The court ordered an independent valuation of the holding company and directed the majority shareholder to purchase the minority shareholder’s interest without a minority discount, together with repayment of the minority shareholder’s loan plus interest calculated under the shareholders’ agreement.

Costs were awarded to the majority shareholder as the substantially successful party.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's interpretation of section 22(i) read in conjunction with section 23.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 on consent.

The appellant was bitten by the respondent's dog while canvassing door-to-door.

At trial, a jury found the appellant 100% at fault for the incident, noting he ignored warnings from the respondent and the dogs.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury charge regarding apportionment of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding it was open to the jury under section 2(3) of the Dog Owner's Liability Act to find the appellant entirely at fault.