Ben Leschied

The foster parents of a nine-month-old child brought a motion to be added as parties or granted expanded participatory rights in a child protection proceeding where the Society sought society wardship.

The child had been in their care since she was three days old.

The court applied the criteria for adding parties in child protection cases and determined that adding the foster parents would prolong the proceeding, was not necessary to determine the issues, and that they did not have a legal interest at this stage.

The motion was dismissed, though the foster parents retained their statutory right to make submissions at trial.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for directions after discovering it had failed to serve the First Nation before obtaining a Crown wardship order for an Indigenous child.

The court found the original order was a nullity as against the First Nation due to the lack of notice.

Applying Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules, the court varied the Crown wardship order in accordance with minutes of settlement to add the First Nation as a party, formally recognize the child's Indigenous status, and mandate specific cultural access and community connection provisions.

This status review application concerned the return of a child to parents with significant developmental delays under a six-month final supervision order.

The court initially declined to make the order due to concerns about parental capacity and suggested a s. 54 assessment.

After further evidence, including developmental reports and the parents' decision for Crown wardship of a subsequent child, the court granted the supervision order.

A fundamental condition was that the parents and child must reside with the paternal grandparents, whose home was noted as overcrowded and had past protection concerns.

The court emphasized the necessity of a s. 54 assessment for any future plan involving the parents living independently.

The moving parties, the aunt and uncle of a child apprehended at birth, sought to be added as parties to a child protection proceeding where the Society sought Crown wardship.

The Society opposed the motion, arguing that the mother could advance the kinship plan.

The court granted the motion, finding that adding the aunt and uncle was in the child's best interests, would not delay the proceedings, and was necessary to allow them to independently advance their kinship plan.

The Children's Aid Society moved to strike a parent's answer in status review applications for her two children under Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules.

The parent had ceased participation in the children's lives and the court process, having moved to another province and expressed a degree of agreement with the Society's plans for permanency.

The court granted the motion, finding that the parent's answers would further delay the proceedings and that striking them was a proportionate and fair way to achieve permanency for the children, balancing the parent's prejudice against the children's need for timely resolution.

The Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order of Crown wardship for the child M.J.D-N. without access.

The child's father concurred, but the mother opposed, seeking a six-month wardship with access.

The court found no genuine triable issue, noting the mother's extensive history of mental health issues, drug use, criminal charges, and failure to follow through with programs or maintain consistent access.

The court granted Crown wardship, finding it to be the least intrusive order consistent with the child's best interests, and determined that the mother failed to satisfy the statutory conditions for continued access to a Crown ward.

In a child protection proceeding, the society brought a motion under s. 74(3) of the Child and Family Services Act seeking production of a psychological assessment report prepared regarding a parent.

The parent had initially consented to the assessment but later withdrew consent for the society to obtain the report.

The court held that the statutory threshold for production—whether the record may be relevant to the proceeding—was not onerous and was met because the report was prepared specifically to assess the parent’s mental health and its impact on parenting.

The parent filed no evidence opposing production or supporting redactions.

The court ordered the assessor to produce the report and permitted disclosure to counsel, subject to statutory confidentiality restrictions.