Bayly Guslits

The mother, a Jordanian citizen, brought the parties' three children from Kuwait to Ontario and sought a parenting order.

The father, residing in Kuwait, challenged Ontario's jurisdiction and sought the return of the children pursuant to Kuwaiti custody orders.

The court found that while the children were not habitually resident in Ontario at the time the application commenced, Ontario had jurisdiction under s. 22(1)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act due to the children's physical presence, substantial connection, and the balance of convenience.

Alternatively, the court found jurisdiction under s. 23, as the children would suffer serious harm if returned to Kuwait due to the risk of psychological harm, family violence, and the children's strong views against returning.

The father's request to recognize the Kuwaiti orders was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $4,898.55 on a substantial indemnity basis after successfully defeating the applicant's motion for the trial judge's recusal.

The applicant, a self-represented mother, claimed an inability to pay.

The court noted significant deficiencies in the respondent's bill of costs, including a failure to break down hours spent specifically on the recusal motion.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court fixed costs at $600 payable by the applicant to the respondent.

The self-represented applicant brought a 14B motion seeking leave to appeal a prior order that restricted further motions without permission.

The court clarified that the prior order was not intended to apply to motions for leave to appeal or stay the order itself.

The court granted permission for the motion, if required, and directed the applicant to serve and file the motion in the regular course pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant and respondent each brought motions.

The applicant sought to dismiss previous court orders and trial proceedings, while the respondent sought orders for the children's return to London, deposit of their travel documents, and restrictions on their removal from London.

The court found the applicant's motion lacked urgency and merit, and her conduct demonstrated non-compliance with prior orders regarding the children's residence.

The respondent's motion was granted, ordering the children's return to London, deposit of their passports and birth certificates with the court, and strict conditions on future travel and residence changes.

The applicant's motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought an oral motion for the recusal of the trial judge, alleging bias due to the judge's prior involvement in case management and administrative functions related to the file.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding that the applicant failed to meet the high onus of establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The decision emphasized the presumption of judicial impartiality, the fact-specific nature of recusal cases, and the importance of judicial continuity in family law proceedings.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer moved for the appointment of amicus curiae in a complex international child abduction case.

Both the self-represented applicant and the respondent opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's conduct, including her inability to focus on legal issues, failure to file evidence, and mistrust of the court process, risked injustice.

The court determined that amicus assistance was essential for a fair and orderly trial, despite the applicant's right to self-representation, and that the potential for delay was manageable.

The applicant sought child support, property division (equalization or constructive trust), and divorce, while the respondent challenged the validity of their marriage.

The trial ended abruptly due to the respondent's disruptive conduct.

The court found the respondent's credibility lacking.

The court determined the marriage was valid under the Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

M.3, applying the principles from Lalonde v. Agha.

The court imputed income for child support and ordered retroactive child support.

It also found a constructive trust in favour of the applicant for 50% of the property sale proceeds due to her contributions and the respondent's unjust enrichment, and ordered adjustments for advances, a second mortgage, and costs.

The applicant sought an adjournment of a five-day trial in an international child abduction case, citing educational conflicts, inability to file evidence after counsel termination, and uncompleted procedural steps.

The respondent opposed the adjournment, while the Office of the Children's Lawyer did not, noting the children's preference to remain with the applicant.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, emphasizing the need for prompt disposition in international child abduction cases under Rule 37.2 of the Family Law Rules, and found her reasons insufficient to warrant delay.

At a case management appearance, the self-represented applicant sought to adjourn the upcoming trial and amend her application to advance a new theory.

The court scheduled a motion to adjourn the trial before the trial judge and granted the applicant leave to file an amended application.

The matter returned to update the court on the parties' readiness for trial regarding a jurisdictional dispute over child custody between Ontario and Kuwait.

The applicant requested more time to prepare, but the court directed the trial to commence in November 2023 as a hybrid proceeding.

The court also permitted the filing of a lengthy affidavit on behalf of the Children's Lawyer and scheduled a further update.

The matter was before the court for the commencement of a trial regarding an international child abduction.

On consent of the parties and the Children's Lawyer, the trial was adjourned to allow the parties to obtain expert reports on Kuwaiti family law, file an expert report from the Children's Lawyer, and arrange relationship counseling for the children.

A further appearance was scheduled to monitor progress.

The applicant father sought an order under the Hague Convention for the return of the parties' seven-year-old son to Mexico.

The respondent mother opposed, relying on two exceptions: grave risk of harm due to alleged abuse and the child's resistance to return.

The court found that the mother failed to meet the high evidentiary threshold for grave risk of harm, noting a lack of objective evidence and the father's amenability to the justice system.

The court also determined that the child, at seven and a half years old, had not reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity for his views to be determinative, as his objections were inconsistent and influenced by his new environment rather than fear for his safety.

The father's application for the child's return was granted, with specific undertakings for the child's protection and transition in Mexico.

The applicant father sought a temporary order to vary a final parenting order, requesting a change in the children's primary residence from the respondent mother to himself.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the father's motion, citing chronic dysfunction and conflict in the mother's household impacting the children's well-being.

The court applied the two-stage test for varying parenting orders, including the stringent threshold for temporary variations of final orders, and found a material change in circumstances.

Giving significant weight to the children's clear and consistent views, the court determined that changing primary residence to the father was in the children's best interests to address the intolerable situation and prevent further harm.

The Children's Aid Society sought an extended society care order for three First Nations children who had been in foster care for over three years.

The mother, who had overcome substance abuse and secured housing, sought their return.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the mother's past neglect and failure to protect them.

Applying the augmented best interests test under the CYFSA and the Federal Act, the court concluded that removing the children from their long-term foster mother, to whom they were securely attached, would cause unacceptable emotional harm.

The children were placed in extended society care with access granted to the mother, siblings, and father.

The applicant sought costs of $3,272.91 following a successful motion regarding a parenting schedule.

The respondent argued that no costs should be awarded due to her limited financial means, or alternatively, costs should be fixed at $500.

The court found that the applicant was the successful party, had made reasonable offers to settle, and that the respondent's failure to respond to settlement efforts was unreasonable.

After deducting time entries unrelated to the motion and considering the respondent's ability to pay, the court ordered the respondent to pay costs of $2,000.

The parties brought cross-motions for interim relief in a family law proceeding.

The applicant mother sought interim spousal support, imputation of income to the respondent, and financial disclosure regarding the respondent's rental properties.

The respondent father sought to impute income to the applicant, occupation rent, unrestricted access to the matrimonial home, a vocational assessment of the applicant, and shared decision-making authority.

The court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $2,413 per month, declining to impute income to the applicant who had been a stay-at-home mother since 2007.

The court ordered the respondent to provide appraisals for his 15 rental properties and bank statements.

The respondent's requests for occupation rent and unrestricted access to the home were dismissed.

The court varied the interim parenting order to grant primary residence and decision-making responsibility to the applicant, while increasing the respondent's parenting time.

The father applied under the Hague Convention for the return of the child to Peru.

Within this application, both parties brought motions: the father sought expanded in-person access, and the mother requested the appointment of the Children's Lawyer.

The court granted the father supervised in-person access, conditional on his entry into Canada and compliance with COVID-19 restrictions, replacing previous virtual access.

The court also ordered a Voice of the Child Report from the Children's Lawyer, emphasizing it should not delay the main Hague Convention hearing.

The decision considered the child's best interests and allegations of family violence.

Application by a family physician for an order committing a 17-year-old youth with a history of traumatic brain injury and complex mental health issues to a secure treatment program at Syl Apps for 180 days.

The youth initially opposed the application but subsequently consented after meeting with the Clinical Director.

The court found that all six statutory criteria under s. 164 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act were satisfied: the youth had a mental disorder (Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, likely ADHD, and borderline intellectual functioning); had caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm within 45 days preceding the application; had made substantial threats of self-harm within the preceding 12 months; the secure treatment program would be effective; appropriate treatment was available at Syl Apps; and no less restrictive method of treatment was appropriate.

The court granted the order for the maximum 180-day commitment period.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking interim sole decision-making responsibility for the parties' child's school enrollment and an order for primary residence.

The parties previously had a final order for joint custody and equally shared care.

The court found a material change in circumstances under section 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act, noting the mother's relocation, the child reaching school age, the father's work schedule and living arrangements, and the father's abusive communications.

The court concluded it was in the child's best interests to reside primarily with the mother and attend school in her district, granting the mother's motion.

This case involved a child protection application by the Children's Aid Society.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the child in need of protection, despite the mother's cousin (SD2) not consenting.

The parents (SD1 and N.C.) consented to joint custody with the father having primary care.

The court then addressed SD2's separate motions for a s. 54 assessment and for access to the child.

Both of SD2's motions were dismissed.

The court found that an assessment was not necessary as there was abundant, consistent, and independent medical evidence, along with the Society's extensive history with SD2, indicating medical child abuse.

Furthermore, the court determined that it was not in the child's best interests for SD2 to have any access, citing the clear causal connection between SD2's care and the child's declining health, and the potential negative impact on the mother's development.