Superior Court of Justice – Ontario Family Court
RE: Hadeel Dawoud, Applicant
-and-
Osama Baddar, Respondent
Before: Justice Spencer Nicholson
Counsel: B. Guslits for the Applicant R. Chaiton-Murray for the Respondent
Heard: October 16, 2025
Decision on Motion
1From a review of the court file, this has been a contentious family proceeding.
2I note that the parties were married for 7 ½ years and have four very young children. They separated on November 11, 2023. One month following the separation, the Respondent Father was charged criminally with assaulting the Applicant Mother. Those charges were eventually withdrawn by the Crown six months later when the Respondent Father entered into a common law peace bond. However, the Applicant Mother brought an ex parte motion in December of 2023 which resulted in an Order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and which limited the Respondent Father's parenting time.
3The Respondent Father states that the Applicant Mother's criminal allegations were false. I pause to note that a peace bond is not a finding of guilt, nor a declaration of innocence. It is simply a resolution of the charges. In any event, the Respondent Father deposes that he was fired from his employment as a result of those charges.
4There was an interim parenting motion, heard by Raikes J. in March 2024. In his Reasons ( Dawoud v. Baddar , 2024 ONSC 2075 ), Justice Raikes was troubled by some of the late disclosure of the allegations of violence by the Applicant Mother (at para. 68 of his Reasons). At para. 64, he notes that her affidavit on the ex parte motion appeared deliberately vague and if he were required to do so, he would find that she failed to make full and frank disclosure. Raikes J. restored significant unsupervised parenting time to the Respondent Father and reinstated joint decision-making.
5On December 19, 2024, Horvat J. granted a Consent Order based on executed minutes of settlement. This was a very comprehensive Order, made on a Final Basis, consisting of 61 paragraphs. The Order included, inter alia , the following provisions:
(a) That the Applicant Mother be permitted to relocate with the children from Sarnia to London;
(b) That the Applicant Mother shall vacate the matrimonial home in Sarnia by February 15, 2025 (recall that she had been given exclusive possession of the home by prior order);
(c) That the Respondent Father's payments towards the matrimonial home be a credit towards child and spousal support;
(d) That the Respondent Father pay an equalization payment to the Applicant Mother in the amount of $50,000 in full and final satisfaction of all claims under Part I of the Family Law Act ;
(e) That the Respondent Father could, after February 15, 2025, encumber or sell the matrimonial home without the consent of the Applicant Mother. The Respondent Father was to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and its contents commencing February 16, 2025; and
(f) That each party would retain the personal items which are in his or her possession free from any rights and claims by the other party. The Applicant Mother was to take her personal possessions and the children's personal possessions from the matrimonial home. The Respondent Father was to keep all other household contents including but not limited to all fixtures, furniture, kitchen appliances, televisions and computers and similar .
(Emphasis added by me)
6Although not germane to the issues before me, the Order also included an extremely detailed parenting schedule and decision-making plan in respect of their four children. The Order did not deal with child support, although a separate Interim Order dated December 29, 2024 dealt with interim child support. The Final Order did include a $10,000 lump sum amount for spousal support payable by the Respondent Father to the Applicant Mother.
7In accordance with the Consent Order, the Respondent Father paid the Applicant Mother $60,000, which he indicates he had to borrow.
8This is the Respondent Father's motion. He asserts that the Applicant Mother violated the Final Order. Specifically, he deposes that on February 16, 2025, he discovered that she had removed nearly all household contents, including furniture and fixtures such as built-in closets, the dining table, beds, carpets and a lighting fixture. She left a couch in poor condition and removed a television. She took with her all smaller household items, including utensils and cookware. He further claims that she damaged walls, floors and other areas of the home while removing the contents.
Preliminary Issues:
9Counsel for the Respondent Father raised two preliminary issues.
10First, it is described that the material filed by the Applicant Mother exceeds the allowable page limits. The Respondent Father had brought a 14B motion specifically seeking leave to file material in excess of the page limit, and received the Court's prior authorization to do so. The Applicant Mother did not seek leave and has filed affidavit material that exceeds the allowable limits by some 6 pages and has included exhibits of 28 pages, which exceeds the allowable limit. The Respondent Father claims that this is unfair.
11I am referred to the decision of Sharma J. in Dupont-Goode v. Ashmeade , 2024 ONSC 7092 . He noted the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings at the Superior Court of Justice and the importance of adhering strictly to that Practice Direction absent leave of the court. Citing all of the deficiencies with the material submitted before him, Sharma J. simply indicated that he would only consider the acceptable portions of it rather than address each offending paragraph in his decision.
12In another decision of Justice Sharma, Ramdoo v. Houlden , 2024 ONSC 5994 , a Costs Endorsement, he reiterated his concern with the frequency with which parties fail to comply with the Practice Direction . He highlighted, among his concerns, that violating the Practice Direction can result in unfairness to the opposite party that does comply. It also takes away from the ability of the presiding judge to conduct their function, both with respect to the case before them, but all of the other cases on the docket. Sharma J. considered awarding costs against counsel personally, but ultimately decided not to do so.
13Like Sharma J., I accept that by exceeding the allowable page limits without first seeking leave of the court, the Applicant Mother has presented more evidence than she should otherwise have been able to do. The practical reality is that the court is left with few options to fairly address this transgression. Do I simply stop reading when I get to the allowable page limit? Do I disregard some extraneous evidence in favour of evidence more relevant to the task at hand? Do I strike the affidavit in its entirety?
14I have decided that I will address this issue when considering costs of the motion and I invite the Respondent Father to bring this concern up during costs submissions.
15The second preliminary concern raised by the Respondent Father is that the Applicant Mother attempted to argue a Cross-motion for child support at the same hearing as the Respondent Father's motion. The Respondent Father's motion had been timetabled and there were filing deadlines imposed in respect of his motion. The Applicant Mother's motion was not timetabled and was only raised last minute. The Respondent Father did not have an opportunity to serve and file responding materials that include financial statements.
16This concern was readily addressed during the motion. I was only prepared to hear the Respondent Father's motion and adjourned the Applicant Mother's motion to a later date.
The Motion Before the Court:
17The Respondent Father deposes that the Applicant Mother's actions when she moved out have been financially "devastating" to him, as he cannot afford to repair the damage or replace items that she removed. He had intended to re-rent the premises to generate income. He claims that the Applicant Mother's breach of the Final Order has cost him an estimated $111,000, including $68,965 to replace the removed contents; at least $5,842 to repair the damage and re-assemble removed built-in furniture and at least $36,400 in lost rental income.
18I note that as of the date of the motion, the Respondent Father remained unemployed. He had worked as an Analyzer Engineer at Imperial Oil. In 2023, he earned $176,933 as reflected on Line 15000 of his income tax return. He did receive a severance package, although he does not disclose the amount.
19The Respondent Father argues that to remove all of these items, there would have been advanced planning before the move out date, and therefore, the Applicant Mother's conduct was planned and deliberate.
20The Respondent Father also describes that his agreement to make the $50,000 equalization payment was a significant compromise, as the net family property statements actually showed that she would have owed him an equalization payment.
21The Respondent Father has included a list of the items "stolen" or damaged and the costs to replace and install them.
22With respect to rental income, the Respondent Father deposes that he intended to rent the home starting March 1, 2025, in the amount of $4,000 to $5,000 per month. I note that the home is a two-storey, 5-year-old home, approximately 3,000 square feet, with 3 + 1 bedrooms and four bathrooms. He described it as having "high end finishes, a theatre room and a 1,400 square foot finished basement". The Respondent Father includes a summary of comparable homes with his affidavit.
23He describes the carrying costs of the home at $4,118 per month. He has included an AirDNA summary outlining the projected revenue of $72,700 that he could have earned had the home been listed for rent on AirBNB.
24The Applicant Mother deposes that she is a stay-at-home mother who worked in retail prior to the marriage and has not worked since that time.
25Her affidavit repeats the allegations of family violence against the Respondent Father. She alleges that he was financially controlling and would monitor her activities with cameras located throughout the home.
26The Applicant Mother states that many of the items that the Respondent Father is claiming were purchased by her at various stores. She has included some evidence of her online purchases.
27She asserts that the home always had a "cracking" issue in the window, and, in fact, the Respondent Father made a Tarion claim in 2023 about those cracks and received a lump sum payment in 2024. Therefore, the cracking damage the Respondent Father complains of could not have been caused by her move.
28The Applicant Mother otherwise denies damaging the walls, floors and other areas of the home. She states that there is reasonable wear and tear.
29In fact, the Applicant Mother states that the home was in a good enough state of repair that the Respondent Father hosted a party there on February 22, 2025. She has included a video posted on the Respondent Father's sister-in-law's public Instagram account.
30The Applicant Mother claims that her family paid for a lot of the furniture, including after the date of separation. She also states that many of the items, such as the camera system and the doorbell cameras remain at the house, and were simply never installed.
31The Applicant Mother states that the Respondent Father never intended to rent the home out as an Airbnb but only as a long-term rental unit.
32The Applicant Mother states that it is not true that the NFPs showed a payment owing to the Respondent Father and disputes many of his entries, particularly loans that are disputed and artificially lower his NFP. Since the case settled, that issue was not fully explored prior to reaching their settlement.
33A large portion of the Applicant Mother's affidavit is devoted to parenting issues. They are not relevant to the issue before me on this motion. It was, accordingly, easy to disregard those portions.
34However, there are several paragraphs in which the Applicant Mother addresses specific items of furniture. Again, her main position is that these items were purchased by her family and were lent to the parties. The Applicant Mother accordingly indicates that it was contemplated that these would be returned to her family, and she did so. She admits to taking many items, such as the toaster, the bed in the Master bedroom, the tv in the bedroom, a Dyson vacuum and a knife set. She takes the position that the amounts that the Respondent has claimed for each item is inflated.
Analysis:
35The Respondent Father relies upon Rule 1 (8) of the Family Law Rules , which reads as follows:
(8) If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,
(a) An order for costs;
(a.1) an order to pay an amount to a party or into court as a penalty or fine;
(b) an order dismissing a claim;
(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit or any other document filed by a party;
(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;
(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;
(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and
(g) a contempt order, if sought under rule 31.
36In Ferguson v. Charlton , 2008 ONCJ 1 , the court outlined the approach to rule 1(8) as involving a three-part test, as follows (at para. 64):
(1) has there been a triggering event that would allow the court to consider the wording of subrule 1 (8). That triggering event is non-compliance with a court order for r. 1 (8);
(2) if the triggering event exists, the court should consider whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party by not sanctioning that party under r. 1 (8). Spence J. in Ferguson described that this discretion should only be granted in exceptional circumstances and ought to take into account all relevant history in the course of the litigation, and specifically, the conduct of the non-complying party;
(3) if the court will not exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying party, what is the appropriate remedy among the very broad discretion provided in r. 1 (8).
37This approach has been oft cited (see, for example: Myers v. Myers , 2014 ONSC 1804 ); Troiano v. Theriault , 2022 ONSC 331 ).
38The remedial subrule 1 (8) has been broadly applied. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Bouchard v. Sgovio , 2021 ONCA 709 at paras. 49-52 , the list of remedies is inclusive not exhaustive. "The reach of the remedial orders that can be made is governed not by the itemized list in that rule, but by the general and broad language of the chapeau that precedes it, which provides that 'the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter'".
39Further, in Bouchard , the Court noted at para. 50 , that the rule is not confined to purely procedural remedies. And at para. 51, the court said "[s]tated simply, if the remedy ordered is found to be necessary to achieve the enforcement of the order being breached, that remedy is prima facie authorized by r. 1 (8).
40The Court in Bouchard , at para. 52 , did note some remedies that were beyond r. 1(8), including the remedies found in r. 31(5) for contempt of court, which include imprisonment.
41In the present case, these parties were both represented by counsel. They negotiated the terms of the minutes of settlement that both parties agreed to, with the benefit of legal advice and disclosure. My role on this motion is not to re-write the parties' settlement, but to enforce the Order that the settlement became.
42In my view, the Order could not be any clearer with respect to the items that the Applicant Mother was free to remove from the home. This included only the personal possessions belonging to her and the children. The Respondent Father was to keep all other household contents including but not limited to all fixtures, furniture, kitchen appliances, televisions and computers and similar.
43Had the Applicant Mother wished to carve out an exception for items that were purchased by various family members and did not belong to the parties, the time to do so was during the negotiations, not unilaterally when she was packing up to leave. I agree entirely with the Respondent Father that it is irrelevant who purchased the items that belonged to the parties during their relationship, unless those items were personal to the Applicant Mother. Furniture and fixtures left in the house were agreed to belong to the Respondent Father.
44The Applicant Mother was not free to help herself without first consulting the Respondent Father. This cannot be a situation where it is better to beg for forgiveness than to ask for permission.
45I have no hesitation in saying that the Applicant Mother failed to comply with the Final Order, that she negotiated .
46Furthermore, I am not prepared to exercise my discretion and not sanction this breach. The entirety of the settlement was a compromise, such that the ability to relocate, the amount of the equalization payment, the amount of spousal support and the division of property, including the contents of the home, were part of the package. To forgive the Applicant Mother's breach is to re-write the settlement.
47I find that it is unnecessary, and impossible, to determine whether the Applicant Mother's criminal allegations regarding the Respondent Father should play a role and I am not considering those allegations.
48I have also considered that the Applicant Mother's unilateral actions in removing nearly all of the contents from the home has likely prevented this case from being concluded.
49Furthermore, to forgive the failure to comply with the Final Order would ignore the harm suffered by the Respondent Father, who has either had to live without furniture, etcetera, for a significant period of time, or re-acquire furniture, etcetera, at his own personal expense. The Applicant Mother, on the other hand, benefitted from possessing the household items that she agreed to leave.
50The Applicant Mother argues that the Respondent Father does not come to court with clean hands because he has not complied with his child support obligations. In that regard, I reiterate that the Applicant Mother attempted to proceed with a cross-motion with respect to child support, but I refused to hear it because only the Respondent Father's motion had been timetabled and the Applicant Mother initiated her cross-motion at the 11th hour.
51With respect to the clean hands argument, I cannot determine the issue of child support. However, I am satisfied that the Applicant Mother acted improperly when she removed practically all the contents from the home upon her departure. Obviously the court does not condone non-payment of child support, but that does not forgive the Applicant Mother's actions either.
52It has been said that judicial response to a party's failure to respect the court process and court orders should be strong and decisive (see, for example, Levely v. Levely , 2013 ONSC 1026 , at para. 13 ).
53In my view, the Respondent Father is entitled to be placed, as best possible, in the same position that he would have been in had the Applicant Mother complied with the Final Order.
54I have considered whether it would be appropriate to simply order that the Applicant Mother return, at her own expense, the furniture, etcetera, that she took, rather than award damages. I might have been inclined to do that but for the passage of time. I cannot know whether the Applicant Mother has the ability to return the furniture, since she deposes that she gave some of it to her family. I also do not know if some of the items were replaced by the father in the intervening time, including since the motion was argued. It is of no benefit to him to have two sets of furniture.
55I have not been provided with any legal decision in which the court awarded damages as a remedy under subrule 1 (8). Other than the enumerated remedies in r. 1 (8), courts have often altered parenting arrangements as a remedy. Similarly, the Applicant Mother did not provide any cases in which such awards were determined to be inappropriate.
56An award of damages is not the same as a "fine" or a "penalty" in my view, but rather is compensation for the wrong caused by the other party. Again, damages seek to place the innocent party, as much as possible, in the same position that they would have been in had the wrong not occurred. However, I do believe that since a "fine" is specifically contemplated, a "fine" that bears some semblance of the quantum of damages is perfectly permissible. I also note that rule 1(8) specifically envisions that a "fine" or "penalty" can be paid directly to a party, rather than to court.
57I have located the decision of Rhinelander J., B.A. v. I.K ., 2024 ONSC 2225 , a case in which the Applicant sought costs in the amount of $10,000. Rhinelander J. stated, at para. 41 "…The Applicant acknowledged jurisprudence is unsettled whether monetary remedies can be ordered under Rule 1 (8) of the Family Law Rules ". However, there is no elaboration. Ultimately, Rhinelander J. found that the Agreement that the parties in that case which had been breached had not been made into an Order and therefore, rule 1 (8) did not apply.
58I have considered Evans v. Chambers , 2025 ONSC 235 , a later decision of Rhinelander J. in which she found that a party had breached previous court orders. She was asked to impose a monetary penalty of $5,000 in addition to a daily fine of $100 for each day that the party failed to file a financial statement and affidavit. She imposed a financial penalty of $3,000, payable to the other party. That penalty was to bring to the breaching party the significance of ongoing breach.
59I have considered Altman v. Altman , 2024 ONSC 3976 , a decision of Kraft J. In that case, the payor spouse was failing to comply with disclosure orders in regard to his income. He was also dissipating assets in contravention of an order not to do so. I note that this was a case in which very significant wealth was involved. Kraft J. noted that rule 1(8) was amended on April 26, 2024, which added the option for the court to impose a fine or a penalty to a party. Parenthetically, this recent amendment likely explains Rhinelander J.'s comments in B.A v. I.K., supra . That motion was heard on January 11, 2024. Kraft J., in Altman , imposed a daily fine.
60In Dalla Bona v. Lucas , 2024 ONSC 4397 , Mathen J. dealt with rule 1 (8) and imposed a penalty for breach of orders. Mathen J. described that the rule had just been amended to allow for the imposition of fines for the serial breaches of orders.
61A $10,000 fine was imposed in Allvey-Greiss v. Greiss , 2025 ONSC 4438 , by Smith J. for failing to comply with disclosure orders.
62All of the above cited cases where fines were imposed involve breaches of disclosure orders. Accordingly, none of those cases are directly on point. Clearly, disclosure obligations are taken very seriously by the court in family law proceedings.
63I have not managed to locate any cases where the breach of an Order has caused financial harm to the other party in the same manner as the breach by the Applicant Mother in the case before me. As noted, the parties did not provide cases directly on point.
64In my view, this breach was wilful and significant and caused the Respondent Father significant monetary damages. The only appropriate remedy is to hold the Applicant Mother to account for those damages. I find that Rule 1(8) can be interpreted in such a fashion as to permit the court to award damages for breach of a court order where such a remedy is appropriate. Alternatively, I would be prepared to characterize my award as a "fine" or "penalty" should that be necessary.
65However any compensation/penalty is characterized, in this particular case it must be significant enough to be proportionate to the financial harm that the Applicant Mother's actions have caused to the Respondent Father.
66I am not prepared to engage in an item-by-item analysis, including ownership and value of items. For one reason, that would require some impossible determinations based on a paper-record in respect of some of the items that might properly be considered to be the Applicant Mother's personal property. Furthermore, it would involve the issue of betterment. I agree that wear and tear is a consideration. Finally, respectfully, doing so would unnecessarily impact judicial economy contrary to rule 2 (3), which includes giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.
67I do not accept the full amount claimed by the Respondent Father, which includes estimates for labour costs and to remedy some of the damage. Those estimates appear to have simply been guesses by the Respondent Father rather than an appraisal. I also have considerable difficulty with the claim for lost rent, given that he has a positive obligation to mitigate. He should have considered the premises as a long term, unfurnished rental, if renting it was a priority. Further, holding the Applicant Mother responsible for loss of rent on an ongoing basis would be disproportionate to her breach in my view. The Respondent Father had to do more to get this property on the market if he really intended to rent it.
68The Respondent Father is entitled to have items such as the walk-in closet shelves replaced (clearly a fixture). The Applicant Mother should not have taken the built in backboard for the bed or the built in tv in the bedroom. She should not have removed any of the furniture or kitchen appliances. I could go on. All of these now have to be replaced. However, I am not satisfied that the sectional damage is beyond reasonable wear and tear from an active household. The Respondent Father is not entitled to perfect furniture, but the furniture in the state he bargained for. I also am not awarding anything in respect of the doorbell ring camera system or security system.
69I am asked to accept the amounts set out by the Respondent Father in his affidavit as being replacement costs. The Applicant Mother indicates that many of the items were purchased for far less than what is now being claimed. Again, this is not something that can be sorted out on a paper record. It is also not something that any subsequent hearing should be devoted to.
70I find myself in the position of having to do the best I can with the evidence and assess the damages, as is often the case in litigation. I award the Respondent Father the sum of $60,000, as compensatory damages, or in the alternative, as a penalty or fine. I have reached this figure by reducing the replacement costs claimed by one third, allowing one third of the cost to repair damage and allowing three months' lost rent, at $4,000 per month.
71I was asked to set a timeline for payment of this award. The material indicates that the Applicant Mother does not work at present. This award should not be offset against the Respondent Father's child support obligations, as child support is the right of the children.
72In my view, the appropriate way to address payment is for the $60,000 to constitute a judgment in favour of the Respondent Father, payable by the Applicant Mother, which can be enforced in the usual fashion.
73This is a hefty penalty for violating the Consent Order. In my view, it is entirely merited. The parties had negotiated and reached their own settlement. It is clear that the Applicant Mother ran roughshod over that settlement, and resulting Court Order, by gutting the home as she departed. The Court cannot countenance such behaviour.
Disposition:
74I declare that the Applicant Mother has breached the Order of Horvat J. dated December 19, 2024, by removing "other household contents including but not limited to all fixtures, furniture, kitchen appliances, televisions and computers and similar" that were to remain with the home.
75As a result of that breach, I order that the Applicant Mother pay to the Respondent Father the sum of $60,000 as compensation for that breach, or, in the alternative, as a fine or penalty under rule 1(8) (a.1).
76This shall be enforceable as a judgment, and is not to be a set-off against child support that may be payable by the Respondent Father.
77If the parties cannot agree on the issue of costs of this motion, the Respondent Father shall serve and file written costs submissions through the Sarnia Trial Coordinator by March 6, 2026. The Applicant Mother shall serve and file her costs submissions through the trial coordinator by March 16, 2026. The written submissions are not to exceed three pages, double spaced. Bills of Costs or Offers to Settle may be appended in addition to those page limits.
"Justice Spencer Nicholson"
Justice Spencer Nicholson
Date: February 17, 2026