Kimberly L. Doucett

The parties sought to vary a 2016 final order regarding parenting time and child support for their child.

The respondent initiated a motion to change parenting time, and the applicant sought to vary child support and exchange methods.

The court assessed the child's best interests, including views and preferences from a Voice of the Child Report, and the parents' credibility and willingness to cooperate.

The court varied the parenting schedule to a two-week rotating schedule, adjusting exchange methods, and imputed income to the respondent for child support purposes, ordering retroactive and ongoing support.

The court issued supplementary reasons to clarify the precise start date and length of cohabitation for spousal support calculations.

The applicant contended cohabitation began in January 1992, while the respondent asserted May 1995.

The court determined that cohabitation commenced in October or November 1994, resulting in a cohabitation period of 21.5 years.

This clarification was deemed necessary because the length of cohabitation impacts the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) "without children" formula, which became relevant after child support obligations ended.

This family law trial addressed property division and spousal support for unmarried spouses after a 20+ year cohabitation.

The court found a "joint family venture" existed from late 1994, recognizing the applicant's significant non-financial contributions and career sacrifices.

The family home and joint investments were ordered to be equally divided, with the respondent paying the applicant an equalization payment.

The court imputed income to the applicant for spousal support purposes due to inconsistent job search efforts post-separation, but also acknowledged her past caregiving responsibilities.

Indefinite spousal support was awarded to the applicant at the midpoint of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range, and child support termination dates were confirmed.

The applicant father sought an order compelling the respondent mother and their 17-year-old son, Ryan, to participate in reunification counselling to re-establish his relationship with Ryan.

The respondent and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL), representing Ryan, opposed the motion.

The court considered the child's best interests, giving significant weight to Ryan's clear and independent views against participating in the therapy, especially given his approaching age of majority.

The court found that forcing therapy would likely be counter-productive and dismissed the motion.

The applicant father sought the immediate return of the child to Ohio, USA, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The respondent mother opposed, relying on Article 13(b) (grave risk of harm) and Article 13(2) (child's objection).

The court found that the child was habitually resident in Ohio and wrongfully removed.

However, the court determined that both Article 13(b) and Article 13(2) exceptions applied, citing the father's controlling and abusive behavior, the child's forced performance of demeaning chores, the presence of loaded weapons, and the child's strong, independent objection to returning.

The application for the child's return was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society sought an extended society care order for three First Nations children who had been in foster care for over three years.

The mother, who had overcome substance abuse and secured housing, sought their return.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the mother's past neglect and failure to protect them.

Applying the augmented best interests test under the CYFSA and the Federal Act, the court concluded that removing the children from their long-term foster mother, to whom they were securely attached, would cause unacceptable emotional harm.

The children were placed in extended society care with access granted to the mother, siblings, and father.

This is a costs decision following the applicant's successful motion for compliance with undertakings and financial disclosure.

The applicant sought $32,000 in costs, while the respondent argued for no costs or partial indemnity.

The court found the applicant largely successful and presumptively entitled to costs.

While acknowledging the respondent's substantial voluntary disclosure, the court determined that his position on certain disclosure was incorrect, leading to the motion.

The court applied the Family Law Rules, which allow for flexibility in costs, and considered the absence of offers to settle from either party.

Ultimately, the court fixed the applicant's costs at $22,425, representing approximately 70% of her fees plus allowed disbursements, and ordered the respondent to pay this amount within 30 days, enforceable as a support order.

The applicant brought a motion to compel the respondent to answer undertakings and refusals from oral questioning in a family law proceeding.

The requested disclosure primarily related to the respondent's severance package from a former employer, significant loans received from a friend, consulting invoices, bank and credit card statements, and documents regarding the purchase of a farm property.

The court granted almost all of the applicant's requests, finding the financial information relevant to the applicant's claims for spousal support and potential imputation of income.

The applicant father brought a motion in a high-conflict parenting dispute seeking to terminate the children's current counselling and commence reconciliation counselling to re-establish his parenting time.

The respondent mother agreed to terminate the current counselling but proposed trauma therapy before reconciliation counselling.

The court found no basis to delay reconciliation counselling and ordered the parties to immediately engage in reconciliation counselling with a newly appointed therapist pursuant to section 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act.