28 total
Interim spousal support ordered and financial disclosure mandated; primary decision-making responsibility granted to mother.
The parties brought cross-motions for interim relief in a family law proceeding.
The applicant mother sought interim spousal support, imputation of income to the respondent, and financial disclosure regarding the respondent's rental properties.
The respondent father sought to impute income to the applicant, occupation rent, unrestricted access to the matrimonial home, a vocational assessment of the applicant, and shared decision-making authority.
The court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $2,413 per month, declining to impute income to the applicant who had been a stay-at-home mother since 2007.
The court ordered the respondent to provide appraisals for his 15 rental properties and bank statements.
The respondent's requests for occupation rent and unrestricted access to the home were dismissed.
The court varied the interim parenting order to grant primary residence and decision-making responsibility to the applicant, while increasing the respondent's parenting time.
The court granted the father conditional supervised in-person access and requested a Voice of the Child Report pending a Hague Convention hearing.
The father applied under the Hague Convention for the return of the child to Peru.
Within this application, both parties brought motions: the father sought expanded in-person access, and the mother requested the appointment of the Children's Lawyer.
The court granted the father supervised in-person access, conditional on his entry into Canada and compliance with COVID-19 restrictions, replacing previous virtual access.
The court also ordered a Voice of the Child Report from the Children's Lawyer, emphasizing it should not delay the main Hague Convention hearing.
The decision considered the child's best interests and allegations of family violence.
The court granted an application to commit a youth with complex mental health needs to a secure treatment program for 180 days.
Application by a family physician for an order committing a 17-year-old youth with a history of traumatic brain injury and complex mental health issues to a secure treatment program at Syl Apps for 180 days.
The youth initially opposed the application but subsequently consented after meeting with the Clinical Director.
The court found that all six statutory criteria under s. 164 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act were satisfied: the youth had a mental disorder (Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, likely ADHD, and borderline intellectual functioning); had caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm within 45 days preceding the application; had made substantial threats of self-harm within the preceding 12 months; the secure treatment program would be effective; appropriate treatment was available at Syl Apps; and no less restrictive method of treatment was appropriate.
The court granted the order for the maximum 180-day commitment period.
Interim primary residence and school decision-making granted to mother following material change in circumstances.
The applicant mother brought a motion seeking interim sole decision-making responsibility for the parties' child's school enrollment and an order for primary residence.
The parties previously had a final order for joint custody and equally shared care.
The court found a material change in circumstances under section 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act, noting the mother's relocation, the child reaching school age, the father's work schedule and living arrangements, and the father's abusive communications.
The court concluded it was in the child's best interests to reside primarily with the mother and attend school in her district, granting the mother's motion.
Summary judgment denied a non-parent caregiver's request for access and an assessment.
This case involved a child protection application by the Children's Aid Society.
The court granted summary judgment, finding the child in need of protection, despite the mother's cousin (SD2) not consenting.
The parents (SD1 and N.C.) consented to joint custody with the father having primary care.
The court then addressed SD2's separate motions for a s. 54 assessment and for access to the child.
Both of SD2's motions were dismissed.
The court found that an assessment was not necessary as there was abundant, consistent, and independent medical evidence, along with the Society's extensive history with SD2, indicating medical child abuse.
Furthermore, the court determined that it was not in the child's best interests for SD2 to have any access, citing the clear causal connection between SD2's care and the child's declining health, and the potential negative impact on the mother's development.
Aunt and uncle added as parties to child protection proceeding to advance kinship plan.
The moving parties, the aunt and uncle of a child apprehended at birth, sought to be added as parties to a child protection proceeding where the Society sought Crown wardship.
The Society opposed the motion, arguing that the mother could advance the kinship plan.
The court granted the motion, finding that adding the aunt and uncle was in the child's best interests, would not delay the proceedings, and was necessary to allow them to independently advance their kinship plan.
The court granted temporary care and custody to the father with supervised access for the maternal grandmother.
The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary care and custody order for a child with complex medical needs, following concerns of "medical child abuse" by the maternal grandmother.
Despite an initial ADR process, a final resolution was not reached.
The court considered a consent order, signed by all parties except the maternal grandmother, to place the child with the father and paternal grandmother under Society supervision.
The court reviewed extensive medical evidence detailing the child's significant improvement after being removed from the maternal grandmother's primary care.
The court granted the temporary supervision order, placing the child with the father and paternal grandmother, with conditions, and ordered supervised access for the maternal grandmother due to the credible medical concerns.
Interim mobility denied and children ordered returned to London due to failure to provide required notice.
The applicant mother moved with the two children from London to Brampton without providing the 60 days' written notice required by the final order.
The respondent father brought an emergency motion for the return of the children, and the mother brought a cross-motion to remain in Brampton.
The court applied the Plumley factors for interim mobility, finding a genuine issue for trial and no compelling circumstances to justify an interim move.
The court ordered the children returned to London pending trial, noting the mother could not benefit from creating a new status quo without proper notice.