Sandra E. Welch

The Children's Aid Society applied under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 to commit a 12-year-old child to a secure treatment program.

The child, who resided in an unlicensed group home, had a complex neurodevelopmental disorder and frequently ran away.

The court found that while the child had a mental disorder, the Society failed to prove that he had attempted to cause serious bodily harm to himself or others within the preceding 45 days or 12 months.

The incidents relied upon—touching a worker's boot with a glass shard and setting a fire in a bathroom—did not meet the statutory threshold of attempting to cause serious bodily harm.

The application was dismissed.

This decision concerns a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, regarding a five-year-old child, M.M. The Court found that the child remained in need of protection and ordered her placement in extended society care with the Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex.

The Court considered the plans of both the father and the Society, ultimately determining that the Society’s plan best met the child’s best interests, including permanency and stability.

The decision also addresses access arrangements for the parents and paternal grandmother, balancing the preservation of family relationships with the child’s need for permanency.

The Children's Aid Society applied under s. 161 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to commit the child, A.R.P., to a secure treatment program for 180 days due to severe mental health issues, high-risk behaviours, and a history of self-harm and substance abuse.

The child, represented by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, opposed the application.

The court found that all six criteria under s. 164(1) of the CYFSA were met, including the child suffering from a mental disorder (FASD, intellectual disability, borderline personality disorder), having caused or attempted serious bodily harm within 45 days and 12 months of the application, and that the proposed secure treatment program was effective, appropriate, and the least restrictive option given the child's complex needs and lack of success with less restrictive alternatives.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application seeking an extended society care order for a three-year-old child who had been in foster care since birth.

The mother sought the child's return.

The court found the child remained in need of protection due to the mother's unresolved anger management issues, housing instability, and association with individuals involved in criminal activity.

Concluding that a supervision order would not adequately protect the child, the court ordered extended society care.

The court also granted limited supervised access to the mother and siblings, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society brought a temporary care hearing concerning the placement of two young children who were taken to a place of safety after their mother passed away.

Two competing plans for permanent care were presented: one by the children's maternal aunt residing in Georgia, and another by a police officer who responded to the initial call and his spouse.

The Society supported the maternal aunt's plan.

The court evaluated both plans, finding them both to be of high quality.

Ultimately, the court determined that it was in the children's best interests to be placed in the temporary care and custody of their maternal aunt, emphasizing the statutory preference for placement with a relative and the familial continuity she could provide.

This case involved a child protection application by the Children's Aid Society.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the child in need of protection, despite the mother's cousin (SD2) not consenting.

The parents (SD1 and N.C.) consented to joint custody with the father having primary care.

The court then addressed SD2's separate motions for a s. 54 assessment and for access to the child.

Both of SD2's motions were dismissed.

The court found that an assessment was not necessary as there was abundant, consistent, and independent medical evidence, along with the Society's extensive history with SD2, indicating medical child abuse.

Furthermore, the court determined that it was not in the child's best interests for SD2 to have any access, citing the clear causal connection between SD2's care and the child's declining health, and the potential negative impact on the mother's development.

In a status review application proceeding on consent, the Children's Aid Society sought to terminate a supervision order and grant joint custody of a nine-year-old child to the maternal grandparents residing in New Brunswick.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make the custody order given the child's residence outside Ontario.

The court found statutory authority under s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act and concluded the child remained habitually resident in Ontario.

The court granted joint custody to the grandparents with reasonable access to the mother.

A status review application concerning two children, S. and N., resulted in a final order awarding sole custody to their paternal great-aunt, C.M.P., pursuant to s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The children's mother and father did not participate in the proceedings.

While other access issues were resolved, the father's access was adjourned for further evidence due to historical allegations of sexually inappropriate behaviour and concerns regarding one child's "sexualized behaviour."

The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary care and custody order for a child with complex medical needs, following concerns of "medical child abuse" by the maternal grandmother.

Despite an initial ADR process, a final resolution was not reached.

The court considered a consent order, signed by all parties except the maternal grandmother, to place the child with the father and paternal grandmother under Society supervision.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence detailing the child's significant improvement after being removed from the maternal grandmother's primary care.

The court granted the temporary supervision order, placing the child with the father and paternal grandmother, with conditions, and ordered supervised access for the maternal grandmother due to the credible medical concerns.

The Children's Aid Society sought a disposition order following a finding that two young children were in need of protection due to severe neglect, unsanitary living conditions, and parental substance abuse.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care, with the support of the maternal grandmother.

The court found that the mother and grandmother had failed to demonstrate any meaningful rehabilitation or ability to integrate parenting instruction, and that returning the children would expose them to an unacceptable risk of harm.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the younger child with no access order, and granted custody of the older child to the paternal grandmother, finding these dispositions to be in the children's best interests.

A temporary care and custody hearing under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act considered the placement of three children following their apprehension from the mother.

The Society maintained a neutral position between the father and the maternal grandmother as potential caregivers for the two younger children, while the eldest child had been residing with the grandmother.

The court evaluated the best interests of the children, including sibling relationships, stability, caregiving capacity, and the least disruptive placement.

It found the father capable of safely caring for the two younger children and concluded that the grandmother’s responsibility for the eldest child’s significant needs made placement of all three children with her less appropriate.

Temporary care and custody of the two younger children was granted to the father, while the eldest child remained with the grandmother, all subject to Society supervision and access arrangements.

On a consent status review application in a child protection matter, the court terminated an existing six-month supervision order and directed that the child be placed in the custody of the maternal grandparents under s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court was satisfied the proposed placement was in the child’s best interests, given the mother’s significant history of instability and neglect-related concerns, the father’s prolonged absence, and the child’s stable and nurturing relationship with the grandparents.

The decision also addressed procedural difficulties arising from the deeming of a s. 57.1 order as an order under the Children's Law Reform Act, and directed that a separate order issue in the protection file with the grandparents named as applicants.

The court further required service on the society in any future variation proceeding commenced before the child’s 16th birthday and included supervised access for the mother while denying access to the father.

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether courts hearing such motions may exercise the expanded fact‑finding powers available under Rule 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that Rule 16 does not confer jurisdiction to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or draw inferences in the same manner as the civil rules because the legislature has not amended the family rules to provide those powers.

The Hryniak “cultural shift” applies only to the extent of interpreting existing jurisdiction broadly, but it does not create new fact‑finding powers absent legislative authorization.

Accordingly, summary judgment motions in family and child protection matters under Rule 16 are limited to determining whether a genuine issue requiring a trial exists based solely on the evidentiary record.

The applicant sought a four-month extension of society wardship for a nine-year-old child who had been in care for nearly 29 months.

All parties consented to the extension.

The court raised the issue of whether section 70(4) of the Child and Family Services Act permitted an extension that would exceed the 30-month statutory maximum for a child over six years old.

After reviewing conflicting case law on whether section 70(4) should be interpreted liberally to allow multiple extensions or strictly as a finite ceiling, the court held that the legislation imposes a strict maximum of 30 months for a child six or older.

The court granted only a one-month extension to reach the 30-month limit and declined the requested four-month extension.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a young child due to severe concerns of medical child abuse (Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy) by the mother.

On a motion for temporary care and access, the parents sought the return of the child to their care and expanded access, while the Society sought directions on access and the distribution of a parenting capacity assessment.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of risk of harm and ordered the child to remain in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother.

The court granted a gradual expansion of access, allowing limited unsupervised access for the father, provided the mother is never left alone with the child.

The court also ordered the distribution of the assessment to specific medical and childcare providers.