Paul Lepine

The Children's Aid Society sought a six-month supervision order to place the child C. with the parent Ms. P., partner of the child's father Mr. P. The court, despite significant historical concerns regarding Mr. P.'s domestic violence, criminal record, mental health, and past failures to complete programs, reluctantly approved the order.

The decision was based on the Society's strong recommendation, positive reports of parental cooperation, and the need to avoid moving C. to a new foster home.

The court imposed additional conditions requiring Mr. P. to undergo psychiatric assessment, complete programs, and ensuring Ms. P. supervises all his interactions with both C. and his half-sibling K. Furthermore, Mr. P. was explicitly prohibited from supervising Ms. W.'s (C.'s mother) access.

The Children's Aid Society sought a disposition order following a finding that two young children were in need of protection due to severe neglect, unsanitary living conditions, and parental substance abuse.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care, with the support of the maternal grandmother.

The court found that the mother and grandmother had failed to demonstrate any meaningful rehabilitation or ability to integrate parenting instruction, and that returning the children would expose them to an unacceptable risk of harm.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the younger child with no access order, and granted custody of the older child to the paternal grandmother, finding these dispositions to be in the children's best interests.

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether courts hearing such motions may exercise the expanded fact‑finding powers available under Rule 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that Rule 16 does not confer jurisdiction to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or draw inferences in the same manner as the civil rules because the legislature has not amended the family rules to provide those powers.

The Hryniak “cultural shift” applies only to the extent of interpreting existing jurisdiction broadly, but it does not create new fact‑finding powers absent legislative authorization.

Accordingly, summary judgment motions in family and child protection matters under Rule 16 are limited to determining whether a genuine issue requiring a trial exists based solely on the evidentiary record.