Salim J. Khot

The court considered whether it has jurisdiction to make a final order for corollary relief under the Divorce Act before a divorce is granted.

After reviewing conflicting authorities, the court concluded that, according to binding appellate authority, a Canadian court cannot make a final order for corollary relief under the Divorce Act unless a divorce has been granted.

The court also addressed the correction of a previous order that was mistakenly made under the Divorce Act before a divorce claim was included, and provided guidance for future cases to avoid orders made without jurisdiction.

This decision concerns a motion to change a final parenting and child support order following a material change in circumstances.

After the mother, Christal Hennessy, lost her housing in May 2022, the children began residing primarily with the father, Bernard Tenpas.

The court reviews the parties’ circumstances, the children’s best interests, and the parties’ communication and employment histories.

The court finds a material change in circumstances, declines to grant sole decision-making to the father, and instead provides for final decision-making authority to the parent with primary residence in the event of disagreement.

The mother’s parenting time is expanded, and her child support obligations are set based on her imputed income, with arrears calculated accordingly.

The matter was before the court for the commencement of a trial regarding an international child abduction.

On consent of the parties and the Children's Lawyer, the trial was adjourned to allow the parties to obtain expert reports on Kuwaiti family law, file an expert report from the Children's Lawyer, and arrange relationship counseling for the children.

A further appearance was scheduled to monitor progress.

The applicant brought a motion regarding an international child abduction claim.

The court noted that the Children's Lawyer had not been notified and a first meeting had not been held, as required by the Family Law Rules.

Given the issues of credibility and the need for expert evidence on foreign law, the court adjourned the motion, ordered the involvement of the Children's Lawyer, and scheduled a trial of the issues.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application regarding a First Nations child who had been placed in the joint care of the parents under a supervision order.

The court found no ongoing protection concerns requiring Society supervision and terminated the supervision order.

In determining the appropriate parenting order under s. 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the court evaluated the competing plans of the parents.

The court awarded primary care and sole decision-making responsibility to the father, noting his ability to provide stability and the mother's history of relationships with violent partners, while granting the mother specified parenting time and decision-making responsibility for education.

The applicant sought an interim restraining order against a respondent, Christopher Lee Sommerville, under the Children's Law Reform Act, alleging sexual abuse of children and criminal ties.

The court dismissed the request for a restraining order, finding insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for fear for safety.

However, the court, in the children's best interests, issued a contact order under s. 28(1)(c)(i) of the Act, prohibiting the respondent from direct or indirect contact with the children or the applicant, while an investigation by the Children's Aid Society was ongoing.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for the return of the parties' three-year-old child, whom the respondent mother had withheld, alleging the father's substance use posed a risk.

The mother also sought an interlocutory order for primary care.

The court addressed the father's motion and the mother's responding material, including issues of inadmissible hearsay evidence.

An interim, without prejudice, parenting order was issued, granting the mother unsupervised parenting time, including overnights, and the father supervised parenting time in the presence of the paternal grandmother.

The mother's motion for primary care was adjourned to a later date, and the balance of motions were dismissed with costs reserved.

The applicant mother and respondent father both brought motions for interim primary care of their three children and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The parties had been living separate and apart under the same roof for over a year, with significant domestic conflict adversely affecting the children.

The father sought to introduce surreptitious video recordings of the mother; the court admitted three where the mother was aware of the recording but gave them little weight, and excluded a fourth taken without her knowledge.

The court granted the mother interim primary care, finding she had been the primary caregiver and it was in the children's best interests to maintain the status quo.

The court also granted the mother exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to protect the children from further exposure to conflict, with the implementation date adjourned to allow the father to find alternate accommodations.

The respondent sought costs following his successful cross-motion to have the parties' children returned to their habitual residence after the applicant unilaterally relocated them to Windsor.

The applicant opposed the costs request, citing her lack of financial resources.

The court found that the applicant had acted unreasonably and in bad faith by resorting to self-help and repeatedly withholding the children.

Emphasizing that impecuniosity does not confer immunity from adverse cost awards, the court ordered the applicant to pay $3,400 in costs, to be satisfied by a deduction from her share of the net equity in the matrimonial home.

The mother brought an urgent interim motion seeking sole custody and permission to relocate the parties' two young children from London to Windsor.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking an order that the children's primary residence remain in London with him.

The mother had unilaterally removed the children from their school and home in London following an altercation that resulted in criminal charges against her.

The court applied the best interests of the child test and mobility principles, finding that the mother's unilateral relocation was not necessary and created an inappropriate 'fait accompli'.

The court dismissed the mother's motion and granted the father's cross-motion, ordering the children to reside primarily with the father in London and attend their previous school, with the mother having alternate weekend parenting time.

E.N.H., the sister of the mother (T.R.), brought a motion to be added as a party respondent in a child protection status review application.

E.N.H. sought to claim placement of the two children with her or a custody order, intending to involve the mother in their lives.

The Children's Aid Society, the father (G.R.), and counsel for the children opposed the motion, arguing that E.N.H. was a "stalking horse" for the mother and had adopted the mother's unsubstantiated delusions about the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that E.N.H.'s plan did not merit consideration and that adding her as a party was not in the children's best interests, as her beliefs and minimization of past misconduct were problematic.

The applicants (father and paternal grandparents) brought a motion for interim custody and access for two children.

The respondent (mother) opposed.

The court addressed conflicting evidence regarding parental fitness, the mother's mental health, and the role of the grandparents as de facto caregivers.

Emphasizing the children's best interests, the court awarded interim joint custody to the mother and grandparents, establishing a detailed rotating parenting schedule with conditions on the mother's residence and supervision.

The father was granted reasonable access during the grandparents' parenting time.